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I Chapter 1: Introduction
Understanding the responses of firms and local labor markets to various pro-employment
policies is of critical economic and public policy interest. These policies can be important
levers for achieving a range of social goals, from ameliorating economic downturns to aid-
ing disadvantaged populations. Better characterizing these policies’ efficacy not only can
improve our ability to achieve major social goals but also can shed light on more funda-
mental aspects of how local economies work and on how firms respond to incentives. My
dissertation focuses on two pro-employment policies, payroll subsidies and fiscal stimu-
lus, and pays particular attention to how best to design and target each. Chapter 2 of this
dissertation focuses on the effect of payroll subsidies offered by state Medicaid programs
on nursing home employment and wages, and aims to draw both general conclusions
about payroll subsidies and conclusions specific to the nursing home policy context where
increasing nursing home employment is important for improving care quality. Chapter
3 builds on the work in Chapter 2 and explores how nursing home market competitive-
ness interacts with nursing home payroll subsidies. Finally, Chapter 4 explores the effect
of fiscal stimulus on employment during the Great Recession, with a particular focus on
how local fiscal multipliers vary by local economic conditions and what implications this
variation has for economic theory.
The focus on nursing home payroll subsidies in Chapters 2 and 3 is driven by a
dual interest in their healthcare policy and labor economics implications. Judged purely
as a labor policy, the nursing home payroll subsidies studied exhibit a number of features
that make them uniquely valuable for informing the broader payroll subsidy literature.
Within each state where subsidies were offered, they were designed so that different nurs-
1
ing homes were offered different effective subsidy rates. This within-state, establishment-
level heterogeneity in subsidy rates provides a uniquely valuable opportunity for identi-
fying the per dollar effect of payroll subsidies on employment and wages since it relies
on an unusually detailed and well-measured source of variation that is orthogonal to any
state-wide labor market shocks. The availability of this variation is particularly important
since payroll subsidy adoption is often motivated by market-wide economic downturns
that can confound estimates of the effect of payroll subsidies that rely on only state-level
variation in subsidy adoption. Moreover, the variation I use comes from a set of payroll
subsidies that were offered independently from other policy changes. This is a reasonably
unique feature of my nursing home payroll subsidies. Most evidence currently available
on payroll subsidies comes from the context of subsidies that were part of a broader policy
bundle of active labor market programs. While the available evidence does point toward
positive employment effects of payroll subsidies in these contexts (see Katz (1998), Neu-
mark (2009), and Card et al. (2018)), it is difficult to fully differentiate between the effect of
payroll subsidies and other features of the programs. This problem is not just theoretical
and has led in the past to some rather paradoxical findings, such as is the case in Burt-
less (1985) where payroll subsidies reduced employment within the target population of
welfare recipients, apparently by contributing to their stigmatization among employers.
Additionally, problems relating to selective policy adoption and different policy changes
being bundled with one-another are also prevalent in previous studies of nursing home
policies, suggesting that this dissertation offers some broader lessons to that literature as
well.
In addition to the above identification-based motives for studying nursing home
payroll subsidies, these subsidies also are structured in an economically interesting way
2
that potentially holds lessons for subsidy design in a wider array of contexts. In partic-
ular, the subsidies are designed to subsidize only marginal increases in payroll, as only
a nursing home’s increase in payroll relative to its payroll in some base year was eligi-
ble for subsidization. A common concern regarding payroll subsidies without this feature
is that they may require the government to spend excessive amounts subsidizing infra-
marginal payroll, despite that such spending has dubious expected returns in any setting
where scale effects are not large. By contrast, the marginal payroll subsidy structure fo-
cuses expenditure on maximizing the reduction in firms’ marginal cost of raising wages
and hiring workers. Although not very common in practice, this substitution effect max-
imizing approach seems more promising from the perspective of eliciting the largest em-
ployer response per dollar of expenditure. Although the nursing home payroll subsidies
studied in Chapters 2 and 3 all exhibit some heterogeneity in design across states, they all
exhibit this marginal payroll subsidy structure and so better understanding their efficacy
is informative about how much promise this subsidy design holds.
Beyond being informative about payroll subsidies generally, nursing home payroll
subsidies are also an independently important healthcare policy with substantial health
and welfare implications. One in three Americans who reach the age of 65 are expected
eventually to require some nursing home care, while at any given time over 1.3 million
Americans receive nursing home care (KFF, 2017). Despite the high human stakes, nurs-
ing home care quality is often sub par and nursing homes’ nurse and nursing assistant
staffing levels, the critical input into care quality (Castle and Ferguson, 2010), are generally
thought to be inefficiently low (Hackmann, 2018; Harrington et al., 2016). If the marginal
payroll subsidy design that typifies nursing home payroll subsidies is indeed very effective
at increasing nursing home employment, nursing home payroll subsidies may be highly
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effective tools for improving nursing home care quality and thereby both the health and
quality of life of nursing home residents. Note that in addition to the implications for fu-
ture policy makers seeking to improve our long-term care system in the face of an aging
population, nursing home payroll subsidies have already impacted a large number of peo-
ple: 25 states offered nursing home payroll subsidies for at least one year between 1996
and 2015, but typically for many more. If anything, this understates the impact of these
policies, since while they were offered by half of states, they were offered in a set of states
including California, Texas, and Florida that collectively represent a disproportionately
large share of the United States population.
As is true of the subsidies’ potential human impact, their public finance relevance
is also substantial. These nursing home payroll subsidies are offered by state Medicaid
programs, the primary financiers of nursing home care in the United States (KFF, 2017).
At any given time, just under two-thirds of nursing home residents are on Medicaid (KFF,
2017), with the share of persons receiving long-term nursing care that eventually spend
down their assets and take up Medicaid being still larger. Nursing home care constitutes
approximately 10% of Medicaid’s budget nation-wide (KFF, 2017), or about one-third of
Medicaid’s nation-wide expenditure on long-term care more generally. To the extent that
marginal payroll subsidies represent a subsidy structure that more efficiently induces nurs-
ing homes to increase staffing and care quality than can be achieved by less targeted mea-
sures, such as general increases in Medicaid payment rates, they may be an important tool
for helping Medicaid programs ensure nursing home residents receive high quality care
even in the face of tightening budgets or rising care costs.
As a final point, it should be remembered that by the nature of the conditions that
necessitate nursing home care, nursing home residents tend to be a vulnerable and over-
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looked population. Nursing home residents tend to be limited in their ability to advocate
for themselves, be that by agitating for policy changes, complaining about care quality to
state authorities, or by shopping around for higher quality facilities. This is a natural con-
sequence of the conditions that necessitate nursing home care causing most nursing home
residents to have mobility impairments and causing more than three in five nursing home
residents to have some kind of cognitive impairment, such as dementia or the aftermath of
a stroke (KFF, 2017). Moreover, most nursing home residents rely on Medicaid and have
little in terms of assets, complicating their ability to change nursing homes or advocate for
themselves even when physically able to do so. Given these limitations, it would seem
that maintaining a high quality nursing home care system will depend in large part on
broader social interest in doing so, especially given Medicaid’s dominant role in the in-
dustry. However, although media exposés of appalling nursing home conditions do tend
to be published periodically1, nursing home care and long-term care more generally tends
to receive less media attention and public interest than other aspects of the health care
system (Miller et al., 2012b). This lack of interest may partly be because long-term care
generally tends to viewed as a lower status part of the healthcare system (Miller et al.,
2012b), though perhaps also results from a lack of broader public awareness of the large
role Medicaid and public policy plays in the nursing home industry. Given these circum-
stances, it is my hope that research advancing the evidence pool on nursing home policy
can help rectify some of the inattention this policy area has received and thereby serve a
socially important role.
1For some recent examples, see: “They Want Docile:” How Nursing Homes in the United States Overmedicate
People with Dementia (Human Rights Watch, 2018) or Sick, Dying and Raped in America’s Nursing Homes (CNN,
2017).
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Given these motives, Chapter 2 presents novel evidence about the effects of nursing
home payroll subsidies on nursing home staffing and wages by studying a set of subsidies
offered by 12 state Medicaid programs between 1996 and 2015, excluding from analysis the
13 states where subsidies were adopted or repealed contemporaneously with other major
policy changes. Chapter 2 employs within-state, across-nursing home variation in subsidy
rates to identify the effect of the subsidies on employment and wages. My approach con-
trasts with that taken in a small prior literature relying solely on across-state variation in
subsidy adoption. This chapter’s results imply that a nursing home receiving the aver-
age subsidy of $2.32 per nursing home resident-day increased its direct care worker em-
ployment per resident-day by 6.4 percent (11.4 minutes) and increased the average hourly
wage paid to its direct care workers by 1.5 percent ($0.31). These figures correspond with
an elasticity of employment to subsidies on top of average Medicaid payments of 4.5 and
an average wage elasticity of 1.1. Furthermore, these estimates are consistent with 100%
pass-through of subsidies to labor. I also find suggestive evidence that for-profit nursing
homes are less responsive to the subsidies and that subsidies are less effective per dollar
when marginal payroll subsidy rates are set at 100%. These results are robust to extend-
ing the empirical approach to compare nursing homes in payroll subsidy states to nursing
homes in either synthetic control states or geographically neighboring control states that
would have received similar subsidies were they located in treatment states. Taken as a
whole, these findings indicate that nursing home payroll subsidies are substantially more
effective than previously thought and suggest that revisiting the efficacy of other payroll
subsidies using establishment-level subsidy variation would be valuable.
Chapter 3 builds on the evidence in Chapter 2 to help clarify the local market cir-
cumstances under which nursing home payroll subsidies are more or less effective. In
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particular, nursing homes in more concentrated markets may have weaker incentives to
provide high quality care owing to softer competition over residents and over high-paying
residents in particular. This may then translate to these nursing homes having a weaker
motive to take up subsidies and to spend subsidies on improving staffing and care qual-
ity when they do take them up. Nursing homes in concentrated markets also may have
market power in the labor market for nurses, raising their marginal cost of hiring nurses
in response to subsidies and so further reducing their incentives to take up subsidies. Un-
derstanding the interplay between market power and subsidy efficacy not only is econom-
ically interesting, but also is of substantial policy importance. While only about 30% of
nursing homes are located in concentrated markets overall, a much larger share of nurs-
ing home geographic markets are concentrated: most nursing homes in most states are in
concentrated markets. As such, although concentration might not be a relevant feature of
the markets facing most nursing homes, it is an important concern for most state Medicaid
policy makers. Ultimately, my analysis in this chapter uncovers suggestive, though not sta-
tistically conclusive, evidence that nursing homes in more concentrated markets increase
both their employment per resident-day of nurses and their payroll per resident-day by
less per subsidy dollar than do nursing homes in competitive markets. These results are
suggestive of either lower subsidy take up rates by nursing homes in concentrated mar-
kets or of weaker staffing responses when those subsidies are taken up, though neither
the precise mechanism nor separate effects of product and labor market power could be
identified.
In addition to the nursing home market focused work in Chapters 2 and 3, Chap-
ter 4 of this dissertation studies the employment effects of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009’s stimulus expenditure during the Great Recession. Note that
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this Chapter is joint work with Arindrajit Dube, Ethan Kaplan, and Ben Zipperer. Chap-
ter 4 is focused on identifying how the efficacy of stimulus spending varies by local labor
market conditions or, more specifically, on how local fiscal multipliers vary by the sever-
ity of the impact of the Great Recession on county labor markets. Understanding these
employment effects is critical once again from both an economic and a policy perspective.
Economically, heterogeneity in local fiscal multipliers driven by variation in the extent of
increases in local unemployment would have substantial implications for macroeconomic
theory and would recommend models that feature state dependent fiscal multipliers that
depend on more than just monetary policy conditions. From a policy perspective, such
heterogeneity would stress the importance of efficient targeting of stimulus expenditure
toward whichever places are most negatively impacted by a given recession. In turn, that
would further suggest that projects to maximize the employment impact of fiscal stimulus
would benefit either from preparing some sort of institutional capacity to allow for rapid
disbursement of stimulus to needy regions or from greater usage of automatic stabilizers.
Chapter 4 identifies the effect of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s
stimulus spending on employment using within-state, across-county variation in stimulus
expenditure conditional on demographic trend controls and controls for predicted employ-
ment and wage bill derived using an industry shift-share measure. These results translate
into estimates of an average annualized employment multiplier of just 0.42 job-years per
$100,000 spent per county resident, with strong evidence for the employment response be-
ing much greater in counties more severely affected by the Great Recession and thus in
counties that likely have greater excess capacity. In particular, the employment multiplier
is 0.15 in below-median excess capacity counties, while it rises by nearly a factor of seven
to 0.98 in above median-counties. These findings demonstrate that the multiplier varies
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spatially with the depth of the recession across different local labor markets. They also
imply that an employment-maximizing stimulus package targeted to high excess capacity
counties would have yielded an output multiplier of 1.09, 130% greater than we calculate
actually was achieved by the ARRA. Additionally, this chapter uncovers evidence con-
sistent with hysteresis, as positive employment effects of stimulus last many years after
initial receipt and into the current expansion, further magnifying the importance of cor-
rectly targeting stimulus expenditure. Finally, this chapter also sheds some light on the
mechanisms responsible for the spatial heterogeneity in the multiplier, demonstrating that
increases in public sector employment caused by stimulus crowd out private sector em-
ployment in low excess capacity counties where labor markets are tighter and not in high
excess capacity counties where they contain more slack.
9
II Chapter 2: The Effect of Establishment-Varying Payroll Subsidies on Nursing
Home Employment and Wages
II.I Introduction
On any given day, approximately 1.3 million people live and receive care in United
States nursing homes. About 62 percent of those people finance their nursing home care
using Medicaid and still more are likely to spend down their assets and eventually take up
Medicaid.2 Ensuring that these people receive high-quality care is an ongoing challenge
for state Medicaid programs, especially as measuring care quality in nursing homes, and
therefore contracting on care quality, is difficult (Castle and Ferguson, 2010). One potential
solution to this problem is to subsidize important inputs in the delivery of care quality. In
particular, subsidizing nursing home employment of licensed nurses and nursing assis-
tants (collectively, direct care workers3) may be a promising approach as nursing homes
are highly labor intensive: the industry labor share of income is 88 percent4 and experts
often use nursing home direct care worker to resident staffing ratios as a proxy for care
quality (Castle and Ferguson, 2010). Furthermore, experts often regard nursing homes as
understaffed, attributing a range of nursing home quality issues to low staffing levels (e.g.,
Harrington et al. (2016)), and investigative reports suggest that low staffing levels may be
partially responsible for overprescription of antipsychotic drugs and elder abuse in nurs-
2Resident count and Medicaid usage rate figures per author’s calculations using 2015 Medicaid certifica-
tion inspection survey data.
3I use the term direct care worker to refer to licensed nurses and certified nursing assistants engaged in
direct care work only, excluding nurses performing administrative duties. I will also use the term nurses and
licensed nurses interchangeably to refer to the set of both registered nurses and licensed practical nurses.
4This figure is for the Nursing and Residential Care Facilities industry (NAICS 623) in 2016 according to
the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s GDP by Industry Value Added data.
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ing homes.5 More formally, Hackmann (2018), relying on nursing home cost data and
estimates from a structural demand estimation, found that nursing homes’ nurse staffing
levels on average fall 43 percent below the social optimum. As such, understanding the
efficacy of nursing home payroll subsidies for increasing nursing home employment is
important for the welfare of nursing home residents, a population that will grow in impor-
tance as the population ages, as well as for the 1.6 million people employed in the nursing
home industry annually.6
In order to shed light on this issue, in this chapter, I study the employment and
wage effects of a set of payroll subsidies offered by 12 state Medicaid programs7 to nursing
homes between 1996 and 2015. These subsidies were structured to subsidize only incre-
mental increases in direct care worker payroll per day of nursing home resident care rela-
tive to the same figure in a base year. Since these subsidies only apply to payroll increases,
they may be capable of eliciting large responses from firms while minimizing subsidy ex-
penditures on inframarginal employment. I use previously unexploited establishment-
level heterogeneity in subsidy rates coupled with data on the universe of Medicaid and
Medicare-certified nursing homes to study the effect of these payroll subsidies on nurs-
ing home direct care worker employment per resident-day and average direct care worker
hourly wages. A benefit of using this within-state variation to identify the subsidy effects
is that it is orthogonal to state-wide nursing home industry and labor market trends that
otherwise might confound estimates of the effect of subsidy adoption.
5For examples of recent coverage, see: “They Want Docile:” How Nursing Homes in the United States Over-
medicate People with Dementia (Human Rights Watch, 2018) and Sick, Dying and Raped in America’s Nursing
Homes (CNN, 2017).
6The employment figure is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Employment Statistics and is for the
Nursing Care Facilities industry in September, 2017.
7The 12 states being Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. Note that Massachusetts and Montana have two subsidy
events each.
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As an extension to the above within-state approach, I also employ a within-and-
across-state empirical design that compares nursing homes in states with payroll subsi-
dies to nursing homes in control states whose characteristics would have caused them to
receive similarly sized payroll subsidies had their state adopted a payroll subsidy. For this
across-state approach, I consider a range of possible control states, including geographi-
cally neighboring control state pairs and statistically constructed synthetic control states.
These extensions to my primary research design relax the assumption that nursing homes
in treated states with characteristics causing them to be offered different subsidy amounts
are on similar wage and employment per resident-day trends, replacing it with the alter-
native assumption that nursing homes with those characteristics face similar trends across
the treatment and control states.
In contrast to the pre-existing literature on these subsidies that finds rather limited
effects on nursing home employment (Foster and Lee, 2015; Feng et al., 2010), evidence
from my within-state, across-nursing home research design suggests the employment and
wage effects of these subsidies are quite large. Specifically, I estimate that increasing the
maximum effective subsidy amount offered to nursing homes by an additional $1 per
resident-day causes nursing homes to increase their employment of direct care workers
per resident-day by a statistically significant 4.9 minutes, implying an increase in staffing
of approximately 6.3 percent at the mean nursing home. At the same time, the effect on
the average hourly wage paid to direct care workers is to increase it by 13 cents for each
subsidy dollar offered per resident-day, implying an increase in average wage by 1.5 per-
cent at the mean nursing home. Results from the various across-state models are similar to
these estimates. Finally, interpreting these payroll subsidies as payment increases relative
to state average daily Medicaid nursing home payment rates, I estimate that the elasticity
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of direct care worker employment per resident-day to subsidies is 4.5 and that the elasticity
of average direct care worker hourly wages to subsidies per resident-day is 1.1.
Cumulatively, the evidence I find in this chapter suggests that nursing home pay-
roll subsidies are very effective at increasing nursing home employment and so may be
an effective way of addressing concerns related to poor care quality in nursing homes.
These results also are informative for the broader payroll subsidy literature, suggesting
that attention to detail regarding the structure of payroll subsidy formulas is important
and adding to a growing pool of research examining payroll subsidies using firm-level
variation in subsidy receipt (Saez et al., 2017).
II.II Literature Review
This research is related to a number of studies in the nursing home policy literature
as well as in the broader payroll subsidy literature. The study most closely related to mine
is a paper by Foster and Lee (2015) that studies the effect of a set of nursing home pay-
roll subsidies8 offered by state Medicaid programs between 1999 and 2004. They identify
the average effect of subsidy adoption on direct care worker employment per resident-day
(direct care worker staffing) at nursing homes in states adopting subsidies using a state-
level difference-in-differences research design and nursing home level data. In addition to
regressing staffing on the standard state difference-in-differences treatment indicator vari-
ables and fixed effects, they also control for a number of time-varying nursing home char-
acteristics and a number of state-level policy environment variables. Using this approach,
Foster and Lee find that the average effect of subsidy adoption was to increase nursing
8A note on terminology: Foster and Lee, as well as other papers in the nursing home literature, often refer
to nursing home payroll subsidies as “wage pass-throughs.” Medicaid agencies sometimes use this term for
their policies, but also sometimes refer to them as “supplemental payments for direct care workers” or “wage
enhancement payments.” I will simply refer to all of these as payroll subsidies.
13
assistant employment per resident-day by nearly 1 percent, with no impact on nurse em-
ployment per resident-day. While these effects are small, they do find a larger 2.8 percent
effect on the subset of nursing homes with relatively few residents on Medicaid. One con-
cern with Foster and Lee’s approach is that their state difference-in-differences research
design is vulnerable to underestimating the effect of subsidy adoption if nursing home
payroll subsidies were adopted in response to state-wide declining nursing home staffing
trends. Policy endogeneity of this sort is likely, as Miller et al. (2012a) document that states
are more likely to adopt payroll subsidies during business cycle expansions, when low
unemployment makes hiring more difficult for nursing homes and when more favorable
fiscal conditions reduce state legislatures’ reluctance to increase Medicaid spending.
Foster and Lee’s research is limited in a number of additional respects that create
further opportunities for improvement. First, Foster and Lee determine when a state Med-
icaid program offers a payroll subsidy using a survey of state Medicaid offices. When
compared to my documentation, developed through extensive archival research,9 this sur-
vey 1) missed a number of payroll subsidies adopted within the survey window; 2) indi-
cated that a number of subsidies were repealed immediately after adoption that I found re-
mained in place; and 3) listed a number of subsidies as being in place for which I found no
corresponding payroll subsidies.10 As a result, Foster and Lee measure their main policy
9For details on the policy regime documentation process, please see Appendix II.X.I on the subject.
10Examples of these phenomena include the survey missing subsidies offered in Florida and Massachusetts
from 2000-2001, finding spurious subsidy repeals in 2003 Wyoming, 2001 Montana, and 2001 Virginia, and list-
ing subsidies as being offered for which I can find no documentary evidence in 2001 Rhode Island and 2002
New York. The difference between my records and the survey results may be due to Medicaid officials re-
membering to list dates when policies were adopted but forgetting to explicitly list that the policies continued
in other years. It may also be due to Medicaid officials responding affirmatively to questions about additional
payments for direct care workers when inflation adjustments and small demonstration programs were all that
occurred. Additionally, the survey was conducted in 2003 and surveyed Medicaid state offices about their
1996-2002 policies retrospectively. Retrospective surveying of this sort is often viewed as unreliable within
the survey methodology literature (Groves et al., 2011) and may be particularly unreliable in the context of
Medicaid state offices where institutional memory may be limited by staff turnover.
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regime variable with considerable error and likely present attenuated estimates of payroll
subsidy employment effects. Foster and Lee’s measures of other policy regime changes oc-
curring within their sample also miss some policy changes, suggesting their policy regime
controls may permit some residual contamination of their treatment and control groups
by confounding policy events. Finally, Foster and Lee’s difference-in-differences regres-
sions include controls for a number of time-varying nursing home level characteristics
that represent margins on which nursing homes may respond to subsidy adoption and
which sometimes enter directly into states’ payroll subsidy formulas.11 Controlling for
these nursing home level margins of response and characteristics associated with subsidy
rates may attenuate their state-wide estimates of the impact of subsidy adoption.
Many of the limitations affecting Foster and Lee’s research also apply to antecedent
work in the nursing home literature, such as a similar study of the effect of payroll sub-
sidies on nursing home staffing by Feng et al. (2010). They apply as well to research by
Baughman and Smith (2010) that studies the effect of nursing home and home health care
industry payroll subsidies on nursing assistant wages from 1996 to 2003. Baughman and
Smith estimate using data on nursing assistant wages from the Surveys of Income and
Program Participation to estimate that their sample of payroll subsidies caused a 12.2 per-
cent increase in nursing assistant average hourly wages. While large proportional nursing
assistant wage responses are not necessarily surprising given the low base wage rate for
these workers, the tendency of states to offer subsidies when upward pressure on em-
ployment and wages are high would suggest that this estimate may be upwardly biased.
Cumulatively, the limitations affecting the nursing home policy literature suggest that ex-
11Examples of these characteristics include nursing home resident counts, shares of nursing home residents
on Medicaid, and nursing homes’ average severity of resident care needs.
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isting estimates of the employment effects of nursing home payroll subsidy adoption may
be understated while the estimated wage effects may be overstated.
From the broader literature on payroll subsidies, Saez et al. (2017)’s study of the
employment and wage effects of a Swedish payroll tax cut is, in some respects, closely
related to this research. Similar to this study, Saez et al. estimate the effect of their policy
using firm-level variation in subsidy amounts generated by pre-subsidy variation in firm
characteristics. In particular, the payroll tax cut they study was targeted at workers under
the age of 26 and so Saez et al. compare firms receiving different subsidy windfalls due to
variation in their employment of younger workers. Using their approach, Saez et al. find
that more heavily subsidized firms, those facing a 2.4 percent greater reduction in average
labor costs, exhibited 4.6 percent more employment growth. While these firms did not
raise pre-tax wages, neither did they lower them, resulting in 2.4 percent growth in wages
net of taxes. Interestingly, Saez et al. find that firms did not restrict this employment
and wage growth to just young workers, but rather shared it across all types of workers
employed by the firm. Saez et al. further show that when estimating the effect of the policy
by comparing labor market wide outcomes for workers just above and below the age 26
threshold, one finds no effect on wages net of taxes and only a 2-3 percentage point increase
in employment driven not by hiring but rather by a reduction in the separation rate. Use
of firm-level variation in their setting, though for a different reason than the identification
one in this study, was necessary to identify the positive effect of the tax cut on wages and
to uncover the extent of firm-level employment responses.
Beyond Saez et al.’s recent work, there are many studies examining payroll subsidies
in the United States. In many respects, this literature faces challenges similar to those in
the nursing home payroll subsidy literature. Payroll tax cut and subsidy effects can be dif-
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ficult to disentangle from the broader economic conditions that motivate them as well as
from the effect of other policy changes that frequently accompany them. One key source of
evidence on payroll subsidy efficacy is the active labor market program literature. A meta-
analysis by Card et al. (2018) suggests that active labor market programs including payroll
subsidies targeted at hiring specific types of workers were more likely to have positive
employment effects than other programs. Literature reviews by Katz (1998) and Neumark
(2009) on the efficacy of payroll subsidies drawing heavily on variation from active labor
market programs also point toward positive effects of payroll subsidies on employment,
though small or insignificant employment effects are not uncommon. The estimated sub-
sidy effects also can be quite context dependent. For example, Heaton (2012) finds that
payroll subsidies targeted toward hiring disabled veterans have substantial positive em-
ployment effects, while Burtless (1985) finds that similar subsidies targeted toward welfare
recipients can reduce employment by contributing to the stigmatization of the target pop-
ulation. A related source of evidence may be drawn from the literature on place-based
policies where, in a prominent example,12 Busso et al. (2013) study the effect of the Federal
Empowerment Zone Program, which includes geographically targeted payroll subsidies,
and find substantial positive effects on employment and wages. However, these payroll
subsidy effects cannot be disentangled from the impact of other components of the pro-
gram, such as from the effect of spending on local development initiatives. Overall, the ac-
tive labor market program literature points toward payroll subsidies having the expected
positive effects but leaves substantial room for improving upon the identification of the
subsidy effects and for better separating those effects from other aspects of the programs
being studied.
12For a broader literature review of place-based policies, please see Neumark and Simpson (2014).
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Another useful source of evidence on payroll subsidies may be drawn from the lit-
erature on hiring tax credits, a policy which provides a tax subsidy for hiring individual
workers but not for wage increases, hours increases, or continued employment of exist-
ing workers. Neumark and Grijalva (2017) study a broad sample of recent state hiring
credits, many adopted during the Great Recession, using a difference-in-differences style
research design. They found hiring credits tend to have positive effects on employment
and have stronger positive effects during recessions. However, they also found many ex-
amples of state hiring tax credits which had little or no effect beyond increasing employee
churn at firms, with null results being more likely when states lacked auditing and enforce-
ment mechanisms for ensuring credits only went to firms that genuinely increased hiring.
Meanwhile, Cahuc et al. (2018) provide related evidence, finding substantial positive em-
ployment effects for a French hiring credit implemented during the Great Recession that
was targeted toward low wage workers at firms with fewer than ten employees. This part
of the payroll subsidy literature suggests one should expect to observe positive employ-
ment effects for payroll subsidies, but that attention to detail in the design and targeting of
the subsidies is necessary.
II.III Subsidy Background and Expected Effects
The nursing home payroll subsidies included in this study vary in design but in-
clude a number of common features. Notably, all of the policies I study were structured to
subsidize incremental increases in nursing home direct care worker payroll relative to each
nursing home’s direct care worker payroll in a base year. This structure minimizes subsidy
payments for inframarginal employment and creates a potential for strong employment
responses by firms. To ensure that nursing homes actually increased payroll relative to
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the chosen base year, states administered these subsidies through their broader nursing
home Medicaid reimbursement systems which had substantial pre-existing auditing ca-
pabilities.13 Many states set very high subsidy rates for incremental payroll increases, so
in order to contain costs, states also capped the size of the increase in payroll that they
would subsidize. I use the state subsidy formulas, including the subsidy caps, to simulate
the maximum subsidy amount per resident-day that nursing homes would have been of-
fered given their observed characteristics. I take these simulated maximum subsidy offers
per resident-day, which I term the nursing home’s “effective subsidy rate,” to summarize
the degree to which individual nursing homes within each state are subsidized by their
state’s policies. This approach is similar to Saez et al.’s (2017) method of calculating sub-
sidy windfalls for individual firms in their setting and carries the same limitation in that
it does not allow for separate identification of the effect of variation in maximum subsidy
amounts offered and in the marginal subsidy rate offered up to those maximums.
The variation in effective payroll subsidy rates offered to nursing homes within each
state is generated by the details of state subsidy formulas. These formulas follow one
of three general patterns: allocated payment style subsidy formulas; daily rate style sub-
sidy formulas; and hourly rate style subsidy formulas. Allocated payment subsidy for-
mulas compute for each nursing home a maximum annual payment and subsidize, at a
100 percent rate, increases in total payroll relative to a base year by up to that nursing
home-specific annual maximum. Typically, these maximum subsidy amounts are calcu-
lated by taking a fixed total amount of state-wide subsidy funding and allocating it to
nursing homes in proportion to their share of the state-wide total Medicaid nursing home
13These systems were already collecting detailed information on nursing home expenditure by cost cat-
egory and could adapt their prior auditing procedures to enforcement of payroll subsidy provisions. The
existence of these auditing and enforcement mechanisms is, given Neumark and Grijalva’s (2017) findings,
likely to contribute to the efficacy of the subsidies.
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resident population in the base year.14 For example, under an allocated payment subsidy,
a nursing home with 32,000 resident-days per year might be offered a $64,000 annual sub-
sidy, which would lead me to calculate an effective subsidy rate of $2 per resident-day.15
Such a nursing home would face a 100 percent marginal subsidy rate for increases in direct
care worker payroll per resident-day of up to $2 relative to their base year payroll.
Daily rate payroll subsidy formulas take a different approach. These formulas spec-
ify a maximum subsidy amount per nursing home Medicaid resident-day for all nursing
homes and offer to subsidize incremental increases in nursing homes’ direct care worker
payroll per Medicaid resident-day at a 100 percent rate up until that amount. These sub-
sidy designs further require that nursing homes match payroll expenditure on Medicaid
residents one-for-one with expenditure on non-Medicaid residents.16 For example, under
a daily rate subsidy, a nursing home with two-thirds of its residents on Medicaid might
be offered a maximum subsidy of $3 per Medicaid resident-day, resulting in a marginal
subsidy rate of 66 percent and an effective subsidy rate of $2 per resident-day due to the
matching requirement.
Hourly rate payroll subsidy formulas use an approach similar to daily rate states.
These designs subsidize increases in direct care worker wages at a 100 percent marginal
14More precisely, this allocation is often a function of each nursing home’s “allowed” Medicaid direct care
worker payroll expenditure. This amount is usually calculated as the number of the nursing home’s residents
on Medicaid multiplied by the lesser of the nursing home’s actual direct care worker payroll per resident-day
and a Medicaid-set maximum billable amount of payroll expenditure per resident-day specific to each nursing
home. During this study’s time period, maximum billable amounts were often set very low. This reduced
the amount of variation in allowed payroll expenditure per resident-day across nursing homes, pushing the
measure closer toward just being proportional to Medicaid resident count. When simulating subsidy rates, I
do not observe the maximum billable amounts and so just use numbers of nursing home residents on Medicaid
rather than allowed Medicaid payroll.
15All example subsidy figures, though rounded to convenient whole numbers, are approximately accurate
for an average nursing home. For precise figures, please see the summary statistics in Table II.1. Note that the
resident-days per year figure is obtained by multiplying the observed resident counts by 365.
16This is due to Medicaid requirements that Medicaid and non-Medicaid nursing home residents receive
equal care. Grabowski et al. (2008) show that these requirements are, in fact, effective.
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rate up to some maximum wage increase but only for the share of a nursing home’s work-
ers serving Medicaid residents. Nursing homes are then required to match these wage
increases for their other direct care workers. As in the daily rate subsidy states, the hourly
rate subsidy states suppose that the share of a nursing home’s direct care workers serving
Medicaid residents is equal to the share of the nursing home’s residents on Medicaid. For
example, under an hourly rate subsidy, a nursing home might be offered a $1 subsidy to in-
creases in hourly wages for workers serving Medicaid residents. For a nursing home with
two-thirds of its residents on Medicaid and three hours of direct care worker employment
per resident-day, this would translate into a 66 percent marginal subsidy to increases in
direct care worker wages up to a $1 increase and so an effective subsidy per resident-day
of $2.17
Since all subsidy formulas reduce the marginal cost of increasing payroll per resident-
day, the substitution effect would suggest nursing homes should respond by increasing
payroll per resident-day in some fashion, be that by increasing employment or by rais-
ing wages. While in principle these subsidies might have some kind of scale effect on
nursing home employment, since the subsidies are structured to minimize payments for
inframarginal payroll expenditure, it seems likely that the substitution effect will be more
important in this setting. Relative to nursing homes in allocated payment subsidy states,
nursing homes in daily rate and hourly rate subsidy states may be less likely to take up
their full subsidy amounts because they face lower average marginal subsidy rates, but
also may respond by more per subsidy dollar spent because of their states’ matching re-
quirements. It is worth noting that across all subsidy types, any nursing home whose direct
care worker payroll has fallen below its base year payroll faces marginal subsidy rates of
17This is calculated by taking the $1 per Medicaid worker hour subsidy, multiplying it by the share of
residents on Medicaid (0.66), and then by the number of worker hours per resident-day in the facility (3).
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0 until it spends back up to its initial payroll level. This subsidy feature may be expected
to generate some polarizing behavior across nursing homes, where nursing homes whose
payroll has fallen significantly might ignore their offered subsidy amounts while nursing
homes whose payroll has fallen less might exhibit very strong subsidy responses due to
the additional spending required of them to begin qualifying for subsidies.
One concern with this characterization of the effective subsidy rates offered to nurs-
ing homes is that if nursing homes may freely and quickly adjust their share of residents
on Medicaid, then these effective subsidy rate calculations overstate the degree of vari-
ation in maximum subsidy amounts offered to different nursing homes in the daily rate
and hourly rate subsidy states. This, in turn, would attenuate my estimated subsidy ef-
fects. In practice, however, shares of nursing home residents on Medicaid tend to be very
sticky. In the short run, legal limitations on ejecting nursing home residents prevents ad-
justments to nursing home resident pools from happening much faster than the natural
rate of nursing home resident churn.18 In the medium run, state Medicaid bed certifica-
tion laws prevent nursing homes from increasing their maximum Medicaid resident count
without going through a lengthy and potentially unsuccessful regulatory approval pro-
cess. Nursing homes also may be slowed in adjusting their Medicaid resident shares by
the need to make capital investments when retooling to serve different resident popula-
tions.19 Finally, even in the long run, nursing homes may be constrained from adjusting
18Note that nursing homes can influence this churn rate to some extent. Hackmann and Pohl (2018) show
that high occupancy nursing homes seem to manipulate their Medicaid residents’ average length of stay,
finding specifically that Medicaid resident average stay lengths are 36 percent lower at nursing homes with
occupancy rates close to 100 percent relative to at nursing homes with occupancy rates close to 75 percent.
However, nursing homes have little incentive to adjust their share of residents on Medicaid through a length
of stay mechanism when nursing homes have spare capacity and Hackmann and Pohl do not find substantial
variation in Medicaid resident stay lengths across nursing homes with occupancy rates under 90 percent.
19While similar in some respects, Medicaid and Medicare patients typically have some different care needs
because Medicare covers only short-term rehabilitation care, while Medicaid covers long-term care. Private
pay patients, meanwhile, may have different care needs as well as different expectations for facility quality.
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their share of residents on Medicaid by local market conditions. Hackmann (2018) shows
that most nursing home residents come from within 15 miles of their nursing home, with
just 2 percent traveling more than 30 miles, suggesting that nursing homes in lower wealth
areas may struggle to attract non-Medicaid residents. Given this substantial set of frictions
slowing adjustments in nursing home resident pool characteristics, it seems reasonable to
expect that my calculated effective subsidy rates do not substantially overstate, at least in
the short run, the degree of variation in subsidization across nursing homes in daily rate
and hourly rate subsidy states.
II.IV Research Design
My primary research design is a within-state empirical approach that uses across-
nursing home variation in effective subsidy rates to identify the effect of subsidies on direct
care worker wages and employment per resident-day through comparison of differentially
subsidized nursing homes within subsidy states. The details of this approach will be de-
scribed in subsection IV.I below. However, it is worth noting immediately that the critical
identifying assumption for this design is that nursing homes offered different effective
subsidy rates are on parallel trends in terms of direct care worker wages and employment
per resident-day. Given the nature of the state subsidy formulas, this assumption is similar
to requiring nursing homes with different shares of residents on Medicaid to be on similar
direct care worker wage and employment trends. Though my within-state approach relies
on this assumption, it has the benefit of using a source of variation orthogonal to any nurs-
ing home industry level shocks that may be generated by the state-wide changes in labor
market conditions that Miller et al. (2012a) suggest coincide with nursing home payroll
subsidy adoption.
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In addition to this within-state approach, I also detail two secondary across-state
research designs in sections IV.II-IV.IV. The first is an across-state extension of my within-
state empirical approach that compares nursing homes in subsidy states to nursing homes
in control states with characteristics that would have caused them to receive similar sub-
sidy amounts had their state adopted a similar payroll subsidy. This across-state exten-
sion replaces the parallel trends assumption of my within-state research design with one
that allows for differentially subsidized nursing homes to be on different wage and em-
ployment trends, provided those trends are common across states to nursing homes with
similar characteristics. This alternate research design is useful for establishing robustness
to national, regional, and other trends that may differentially affect nursing homes with
greater exposure to the Medicaid program. The second design is a traditional state-level
difference-in-differences analysis, included for comparability with prior literature despite
concerns about the validity of this approach’s parallel trends assumption and despite that
the bulk of variation in subsidy amounts occurs within-state rather than across-state. Note
that results from this approach are similar in size to those found by Foster and Lee (2015)
and may be found in Appendix II.XIII.
II.IV.I The Within-State Empirical Approach
My baseline within-state model regresses nursing home level outcomes on the max-
imum subsidy amount offered to each nursing home conditional on state-by-year fixed
effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. This regression is specified below:
(1) Yi,t = β1 ∗ subsidyi,t + µi,w + γt,s + εi,t,w
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In this equation, i indexes nursing homes, t indexes years, s indexes states, and w
indexes policy event specific windows. This regression is estimated on a sample including
only observations that fall within these event specific windows, which extend for a two-
year symmetric period around subsidy adoption, repeal, or modification.20 Note that in-
dexing these treatment windows in addition to indexing states is important because Mas-
sachusetts and Montana include two subsidy events each.21 In equation (1), the term Yi,t is
a time-varying nursing home level outcome variable, subsidyi,t is the simulated maximum
effective subsidy amount offered to nursing home i in year t measured in 2017 dollars per
nursing home resident, β1 is the effect on Yi,t of increasing the maximum effective subsidy
amount per resident-day offered to a nursing home by $1, µi,w is a nursing home fixed
effect that is allowed to vary across event windows in any state with more than one treat-
ment event, γt,s is a state-by-year fixed effect, and εi,t,w is an idiosyncratic nursing home
level error term which exhibits policy event window level clustering.
I calculate two sets of standard errors and test statistics for these regressions. The
first set is based on standard errors that I calculate analytically and cluster at the policy
event level, meaning one cluster for each state subsidy formula change. Since subsidy
rates are assigned to nursing homes at the policy event level, there is a clear design-based
justification for clustering at this level (Abadie et al., 2017). However, because effective
subsidy amounts are not constant within states for any policy events and since the pol-
icy events I observe are a large share of all events which occur, clustering at this level
20Treatment windows were limited to this two-year length in order to allow nursing homes time to re-
spond to the subsidies without compromising identification by extending the windows so far as to include
confounding policy changes. Note that in many cases, subsidies are adopted in the middle of a calendar year
or adopted and then expanded the next year. In every case, the two-year windows are constructed to take the
first calendar year when any subsidies are paid as the first treatment year.
21Both states’ subsidy event study windows are non-overlapping and separated by a number of years.
Appendix II.XII.V shows results are robust to dropping the second event window.
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using the standard Liang-Zeger method likely understates the amount of available inde-
pendent variation within my sample and should produce overly conservative standard
errors (Abadie et al., 2017). As such, I produce a second set of test statistics using a ran-
domization inference approach inspired by Fisher (1925) and similar to what is employed
by Robbins et al. (2017). Namely, I rank the genuine treatment group’s coefficient within a
distribution of 1000 placebo coefficients as well as provide the standard deviation of that
placebo distribution. These test statistics, being based off the empirical distribution of co-
efficients observed when randomly assigning control states into treatment using the same
type of clustering observed in the actual treatment states, should address the design-based
clustering concerns without raising the same over-clustering concerns. As such, they are
my preferred test statistics. For more details on this procedure and on why alternatives
such as wild cluster bootstrapping are unreliable in this setting, please refer to Appendix
II.XII.I.
One reasonable concern with the within-state regression is that estimation of β1 will
be biased by the endogeneity of subsidyi,t to potential nursing home policy responses, ow-
ing to nursing home resident counts and Medicaid resident shares entering into the effec-
tive subsidy formula. Nursing homes selection into higher subsidy rates may cause esti-
mates of β1 to be biased if this selection is systematically associated with nursing home em-
ployment and wage levels. Additionally, since the formula for effective subsidy amounts
divides by resident-day counts in some states, this may generate division bias when ex-
amining per resident-day outcomes, thereby mechanically linking subsidy rates and some
outcome measures.
In order to address these specific problems with the reduced form regression, I adopt
an instrumental variable approach that purges from the variation in subsidy rates any se-
26
lection effects and that reduces the extent of any mechanical bias. Specifically, I instrument
for the simulated nursing home effective subsidy rates subsidyi,t using subsidy∗i , the max-
imum effective subsidy amount offered to firm i calculated using the actual subsidy for-
mula and its pre-treatment characteristics. The first and second stage instrumental variable
regression equations used thus are as follows:
(1a) subsidyi,t = βstage1 ∗ subsidy∗i + µi,w + γt,s + ηi,t
(1b) Yi,t = β1 ∗ ˆsubsidyi,t + µi,w + γt,s + εi,t,w
Note that when calculating subsidy∗i , I replace all time-varying nursing home charac-
teristics in the subsidy formula with their average from the period two to four years prior
to the policy change. I begin this period two years prior to treatment in order to minimize
the risk that any policy anticipation effects enter into the instrument. I then average over
a three-year range in order to reduce the influence of any idiosyncratic nursing home an-
nual shocks on the instrument as well as to ensure that nursing homes which happen to
have a year of missing data will still have a valid instrument calculated as an average over
the remaining available years. The F-statistic associated with this first stage regression is
49.7,22 easily exceeding the conventional weak instrument test threshold of 10, as might be
expected given the stickiness of nursing home resident pool characteristics over relatively
short time periods.
22This figure is the first stage regression F-statistic conditional on state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy
event fixed effects, within the subset of years when subsidies are being offered. Repeating this regression
within the full treatment sample increases the F-statistic, since the simulated subsidy and simulated subsidy
instrument are both 0 when subsidies are not being offered.
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II.IV.II The Within-and-Across-State Empirical Approach
My second research design is an extension of my within-state empirical approach.
In this approach, for each treatment state adopting or repealing a payroll subsidy, I select
a set of control states. The set of states included in the control group varies by specifica-
tion, as detailed in subsection IV.IV, but never includes states in which other major policy
changes occurred during the subsidy event study window. Within these control states, I
use their paired treatment state’s subsidy formula to simulate placebo subsidies that are
the effective subsidy rates the control states’ nursing homes would have been offered had
each control state adopted their paired treatment state’s payroll subsidy design.23 I then
regress nursing home level outcomes on the simulated effective subsidy rates that would
have been offered to nursing homes had all control states adopted subsidies, an interaction
between the simulated subsidy rates and a dummy variable that is 1 for states that actually
offered subsidies and 0 otherwise, and then a set of state-by-year and nursing home fixed
effects. The regression equation used is:
(2) Yi,t = β1 ∗ subsidyi,t,p + β2 ∗ treated_statei,p ∗ subsidyi,t,p + µi,p + γt,s,p + εi,t,p
In this equation, i indexes nursing homes, t indexes years, s indexes states, and p
indexes the treatment and control state group pairs for each policy event. As before, Yi,t
is a time-varying nursing home level outcome variable. The variable subsidyi,t,p is the ef-
fective subsidy amount (measured again in 2017 dollars per nursing home resident-day)
that would be offered to nursing home i in year t as calculated using the subsidy formula
for the treated state in treatment-control pair p. The variable treated_statei,p is an indicator
23When the treatment state uses an allocated payment style subsidy formula, I adjust the statewide total
subsidy amount in the control state so that it matches expenditure in the treatment state in per Medicaid
resident-day terms.
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that is 1 if nursing home i is in a state that genuinely offered subsidies within that pair p
and is 0 otherwise. As such, β1 is the estimated effect of placebo subsidy receipt in the con-
trol states and so presumably reflects the effect of any pre-trends associated with subsidy
receipt, of any nursing home industry shocks correlated with subsidy receipt occurring at
the same time as subsidy adoption, or of mechanical endogeneity between outcomes and
treatment generated by the subsidy formulas. The coefficient β2 on the interaction term
is the genuine effect of subsidy receipt in the treatment states, estimated relative to the
placebo effect. The term µi,p is a nursing home-specific fixed effect that is allowed to vary
across treatment windows in treatment states and control states. Finally, γt,s,p is a year
fixed effect for each treatment state and for each control state and εi,t,p is an error term.
The regression specified above also suffers from the same problem as the within-state re-
gression with subsidy endogeneity to nursing home characteristics. I address this problem
the same way as in the within-state regressions by instrumenting for subsidyi,t,p with a
simulated subsidy calculated using only pre-treatment nursing home characteristics. Fi-
nally, in each case, I analytically calculate clustered standard errors with one cluster for
each treatment event and one cluster for each treatment event’s control group.
II.IV.III The Difference-in-Differences Approach
For comparability with prior literature, I also estimate a traditional difference-in-
differences specification where nursing home level outcome variables are regressed on a
dummy variable that is 1 in states and years where subsidies are in place and 0 otherwise24
along with nursing home fixed effects and year by treatment control group pair fixed ef-
fects. The difference-in-differences regression equation is specified below:
24In the case of Montana’s second policy event, where an existing payroll subsidy is cut but not fully
eliminated, this indicator is 1 prior to the cut and 0 afterward.
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(3) Yi,t = β1 ∗ policys,t + µi,p + γt,p + εi,t,p
In this equation, i indexes nursing homes, t indexes years, s indexes states, and p
indexes the treatment and control state group pairs for each policy event. Similar to as in
the prior research designs, Yi,t is an outcome variable varying at the nursing home by year
level, policys,t is an indicator variable that is 1 when a subsidy is being offered in state s
in year t and 0 otherwise, µi,p is a nursing home fixed effect that is allowed to vary across
treatment events, γt,p is a year by treatment-control group pair fixed effect, and εi,t,p is an
error term. Note that calculation of standard errors for this regression will vary by choice
of control group and will be discussed when these are introduced below. As expected, this
research design yields results attenuated relative to the within-state and within-and-across
state research designs, with the full results obtained using this approach being available in
Appendix II.XIII.
II.IV.IV Choice of Control States
I estimate each of the two types of across-state regressions on one of three different
samples of control states. In the first sample, for each policy event, I pair nursing homes
from treatment states with nursing homes in the same years from all non-subsidy states
that have no other major policy changes occurring at the same time.25 This control group
has the benefit of helping to control for any national pre-trends, or shocks contemporane-
ous to subsidy adoption, correlated with the characteristics that cause nursing homes to
receive different subsidy amounts in subsidy states.
25When several treatment states make policy changes at the same time, control state nursing homes will
appear more than once in the sample. However, these duplicate nursing homes have different simulated
placebo subsidy amounts depending on which treatment event they are paired with and do not share fixed
effects in common.
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In the second sample, I pair treatment states with geographically neighboring states
that did not undergo other major policy changes of their own. The motivation behind this
approach is to better control for any pre-trends or shocks correlated with subsidy receipt
that are common among geographically proximal states due to regional labor market or
other factors.
Finally, in the third control set, I pair treatment states with a statistically constructed
synthetic control state developed in the fashion of Abadie et al.’s (2010) synthetic control
method. For the within-and-across-state approach, I construct synthetic control states that
match the treatment states as best as possible in terms of a set of conditional correlations
between nursing homes’ pre-trends in a number of key variables and the instrumented
subsidy amounts offered to them, conditioning on state and nursing home fixed effects.
For the difference-in-differences case, I construct synthetic controls that as best as possible
match the treatment states in terms of average pre-trends across all nursing homes in the
state. The motivation for constructing these synthetic control states is to build for each
subsidy state a control whose nursing homes are on similar wage, employment, and other
trends as their counterpart nursing homes in the paired treatment state, thereby controlling
for differences in trends associated with subsidy receipt regardless of their source.
I construct my synthetic control sample according to the following procedure. First,
for each policy event, I identify a set of candidate synthetic control donor states that do
not have other policy events occurring during the two-year symmetric window around
when the treatment state makes its policy change. Second, for each treatment and candi-
date donor state associated with each policy event, I calculate a set of data moments to
match between the two. In particular, for each state and each policy event, I calculate two
moments for each of seven variables. The seven variables used are:
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• Minutes of direct care worker employment per resident-day
• Minutes of nurse employment per resident-day
• Minutes of nursing assistant employment per resident-day
• Average nursing home direct care worker hourly wage
• Total direct care worker payroll per resident-day
• Total number of nursing home residents
• Share of nursing home residents on Medicaid
These seven variables were chosen because they are either outcomes of interest or, in the
case of resident counts and shares of residents on Medicaid, because they are important
inputs into the subsidy formulas. The two moments calculated for each variable above in
each state and for each policy event are:
• Coefficient βSubsidy from the following regression, which is estimated in each state:
Xi,t = β0 + βSubsidy ∗ subsidyi,t + µi + ηt where Xi,t is one of the seven outcome vari-
ables above, subsidyi,t is the simulated subsidy amount offered to nursing home i
based on the subsidy formula for the policy event for which moments are being cal-
culated, µi is a nursing home fixed effect, and ηt is a year fixed effect. Note that for
each state, this regression is estimated within a one-year symmetric window of data
centered around the year prior to when the policy event actually occurred. Addi-
tionally, in these regressions I instrument for subsidyi,t using subsidy∗i , which is the
simulated subsidy amount for nursing home i using only pre-policy event nursing
home characteristics, constructed in the same way as in the within-state regressions.
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• Coefficient βDiD from the following regression, estimated separately within each
state: Xi,t = β0 + βDiD ∗ policyt + µi where Xi,t is one of the seven outcome variables
above, policyt is a dummy variable that is 1 when payroll subsidies are being offered
and 0 otherwise, and where µi is a nursing home-specific fixed effect. Note that for
each state, this regression is estimated within a one-year symmetric window of data
centered around the year prior to when the policy event actually occurred.
Next, I apply the synthetic controls method of Abadie et al. (2010) to the set of seven βSubsidy
coefficients to develop synthetic control weights that, when applied to the synthetic con-
trol donor states, yield a weighted combination of the donor states that as closely as pos-
sible matches the genuine treatment state in terms of the distribution of pre-trends across
nursing homes receiving varying subsidy rates.26 Note that since using these βSubsidy co-
efficients as synthetic control moments is a form of matching on conditional correlations,
it may intuitively be thought of as related to matching based on the cross products of the
instrumented subsidy amounts and the seven different matching variables. In addition
to performing this procedure for the βSubsidy coefficients, I repeat this procedure using the
βDiD coefficients as the synthetic control moments.
Finally, I build the synthetic control states used in the within-and-across-state re-
gressions by applying the state-level synthetic control weights from the βSubsidy case as
probability weights to each state’s set of nursing homes. I do the same for the difference-
in-differences regressions but using the weights from the βDiD case. Note that variation in
the number of nursing homes across states may cause larger synthetic control donor states
to contribute more to their synthetic control than smaller states, thereby causing their con-
26When calculating each set of synthetic control weights, rather than using Abadie et al.’s weighting proce-
dure, I weight all moments to be of equal importance so as to ensure the weights I use are constant regardless
of my outcome variable.
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tribution to the synthetic control state to vary from that required by the synthetic control
weights. In order to address this problem, I re-weight each synthetic control donor state’s
nursing homes so that they constitute an equal share by weight of the final synthetic con-
trol state’s donor pool. Specifically, I do this by multiplying each synthetic control donor
state’s weight by the average number of nursing homes in each donor state within its syn-
thetic control divided by its total number of nursing homes. With these treatment event
specific synthetic control states constructed, the final dataset used for the difference-in-
differences and within-and-across-state specifications consists of the nursing home-year
observations from each treatment event and from its paired synthetic control, coupled with
the appropriate weights for each synthetic control.
The synthetic control procedure above, in addition to building off of Abadie et al.’s
(2010) foundational work on the method, is similar to the approach of Robbins et al. (2017)
for constructing synthetic controls with a sample of many treated locations. Like in Rob-
bins et al. (2017), I conduct inference on my synthetic control coefficient estimates using
a randomization inference type procedure that compares the genuine estimated synthetic
control coefficient to a distribution of 1000 placebo coefficients. I estimate each placebo
coefficient by replacing the observations from each treatment event with data from a ran-
domly selected control state, applying the original treatment state’s subsidy formula to the
new placebo state, constructing for that placebo state a synthetic control comparison group
of its own according to the same procedure as above, and then estimating my regressions
using the paired placebo and synthetic control sample. I conduct inference in this fashion
because, as Robbins et al. (2017) observe, calculating standard errors by clustering at the
treatment and synthetic control levels may fail to capture all variation in the estimated co-
efficient created by the procedure for generating synthetic controls. As such, I report the
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rank of each estimated coefficient within the distribution of placebo estimates, report the
standard deviation of the placebo distribution, and take the estimated coefficients to be
statistically significant at the 5 percent level if it falls in the top or bottom 2.5 percent of the
placebo coefficient distribution.
II.V Data and Measurement
I gather data on nursing home direct care worker employment per resident-day, res-
ident counts, and shares of residents on Medicaid from a longitudinal dataset of nursing
home-year observations spanning the universe of nursing homes certified to accept either
Medicare or Medicaid residents. These observations are drawn from a set of annual nurs-
ing home surveys conducted by state agencies. Responses are self-reported by nursing
homes to inspectors during nursing homes’ annual Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) certification inspections and refer to values from a two week reference pe-
riod prior to inspection. These data also include information on nursing home resident
average acuity (a measure of the average severity of resident care needs), nursing home
occupancy rates, nursing home addresses, whether or not a nursing home is owned by a
for-profit company, and other items. After collection by state agencies, these data are then
reported to CMS and stored in their Certification and Survey Provider Enhanced Report-
ing (CASPER) database, formerly known as the Online Survey Certification and Reporting
(OSCAR) database.
I obtained historical copies of CMS’s OSCAR/CASPER nursing home survey data
from Brown University’s publicly available Long Term Care Focus (LTCFocus) database
for the years 2000 to 2015 and from the Cowles Research Group for the years 1996-1999.
The raw survey data are not processed by CMS in any substantial way and suffer from
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a number of data quality issues that require correction. These corrections are detailed
in Appendix II.XI and consist of a mix of dropping observations reporting implausible
staffing levels, dropping duplicate observations from the data, and manually correcting
observations reporting clearly erroneous shares of residents on Medicaid.27
In addition to these nursing home survey data, I obtained data on nursing home
direct care worker payroll and average hourly wages for most free-standing Medicare-
certified nursing homes from 1996-2015.28 These data are drawn from CMS’s Healthcare
Cost Reporting Information System (HCRIS) database, which is composed of formal cost
reports submitted by nursing homes to Medicare. I inflation adjust dollar figures in these
data using the Consumer Price Index so that they are all denominated in 2017 dollars and
then convert the total payroll figures into payroll per resident-day terms. Unfortunately,
the HCRIS wage and payroll data are affected by a high reporting error rate. These errors
sometimes generate extreme outliers, such as $10,000 average hourly wages, which greatly
affect standard errors and state-specific data moments. Consistent with practice in prior
literature (e.g., see Dafny et al., 2016), I trim the top and bottom 5 percent of the payroll per
resident-day and average hourly wage data within each state and year, thereby restricting
the distribution of these variables to remain within a qualitatively reasonable range.29 Note
27For example, nursing homes reported resident counts by Medicaid, Medicare, and other payer type across
three columns on a worksheet. They sometimes transposed the values across these columns, implying implau-
sibly dramatic shifts in nursing home resident pool composition that last for only a single year, which I correct
by transposing back to match the nursing home’s more general pattern.
28The definition of direct care workers used in this payroll data are broader than what I can observe in the
Medicaid data. In the Medicaid survey data available to me, I can separately observe employment of nursing
assistants, licensed practical nurses, and registered nurses. The payroll data, however, report values for all of
these workers bundled together and including medication assistants, certain types of contractors that may be
performing some administrative duties, and a small number of other related workers.
29I apply a constant level of trimming within each state to maintain a comparable level of trimming in
each sample even as the set of control states change. I use the 5 percent trimming threshold based off of the
judgment in prior literature that it best eliminates spurious observations from the HCRIS dataset. Results
are robust to varying this trimming threshold. In general, reducing the degree of trimming increases both
standard errors and point estimates in the within-state wage and payroll regressions.
36
that the sample of nursing homes with payroll data is 39 percent smaller than the full
sample, due primarily to missing observations in the cost report data for nursing homes
that do not accept Medicare residents as well as for smaller, often highly Medicare-focused
nursing homes that face less comprehensive reporting requirements.
Given these employment and wage data, I construct my estimation sample and sim-
ulated payroll subsidy rates as follows. First, for a payroll subsidy policy change to be
eligible for inclusion in the treatment group, its payroll subsidy formula must have been
specified in a way that permits me to simulate subsidy rates for specific nursing homes.30
Second, for a subsidy to be eligible for inclusion, it must be the case that no substantial
confounding policy changes occurred when the subsidy policy changed, in the year after
the change, or in the four years prior to the policy change.31 While only the two years
immediately prior to treatment enter into the symmetric treatment windows used in my
primary regressions, the additional years prior to a window’s start are kept free of con-
founding policy events in order to minimize the risk of policies designed to phase in over
time affecting nursing homes in my estimation sample.32 Applying these requirements
limits the set of 25 states adopting payroll subsidies of some kind to just 12, with 14 policy
events among them.33 A table listing the set of treated states and some details about each
of their policy regimes is available in Appendix II.X.III. For these policy events, simulat-
30This requirement notably excludes a subsidy adopted in Texas, where subsidy amounts were calculated
using a partially recursive formula that depended on detailed resident medical characteristics and wage rates
for particular types of workers. It also excluded a number of states that conditioned payments on employee
satisfaction surveys and staff turnover rates.
31Please refer to Appendix II.X.II for details on which policy events are considered to be substantial enough
to be a confounding event. Broadly, they consist of other major Medicaid policy changes that are likely to
disproportionately affect nursing homes with large shares of their residents on Medicaid and so which also
would be likely to receive relatively large effective subsidy amounts.
32In practice, nearly all treatment events excluded from the sample are excluded due to a confounding
event occurring within one year of the change in payroll subsidy policy.
33While I use all 14 policy events in my main estimation sample, all primary results are robust to restricting
the sample to one event per state. See Appendix II.XII.V for details.
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ing the maximum effective subsidy amounts offered to nursing homes is a straightforward
matter of applying the state subsidy formulas to the observed nursing home characteris-
tics and then inflation adjusting the subsidy amounts to 2017 dollars. Note that I obtained
details on state payroll subsidy formulas and information on the presence of confounding
policy events in all 50 states from 1996 to 2015 through extensive archival research, relying
mainly on primary source documents produced by state Medicaid agencies. For more de-
tails on the process of collecting this policy regime information, please refer to Appendix
II.X.I.
With an understanding of the source data and sample now in hand, it is useful to
consider some summary statistics for the nursing homes in my estimation sample. Ta-
ble II.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of nursing homes in subsidy states
within the two-year symmetric windows around each policy event, as well as separately
for the subset of nursing homes for which payroll data is available. The average nursing
home within the treatment sample offers 197 minutes of direct care worker employment
per nursing home resident-day, with that staffing being split between certified nursing as-
sistants (CNAs) and licensed nurses in an approximately 2:1 ratio. The average direct care
worker hourly wage paid at these nursing homes was $22.21 per hour, the average res-
ident count was 88, the average share of residents on Medicaid was 62 percent, and the
average increase (or decrease) in subsidies offered was $2.32 per resident-day. Nursing
homes in the sample with payroll data are similar, though have 13 more residents on aver-
age. This similarity in terms of shares of residents on Medicaid and Medicare may be sur-
prising, given the cost report data lose non-Medicare-certified nursing homes. However,
the loss of these non-Medicare nursing homes is offset by the loss of many low resident
count, very high Medicare share nursing homes not reporting wage and payroll data in
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the HCRIS dataset. In addition to these within-treatment sample summary statistics, Table
II.2 presents summary statistics comparing the full treatment sample of nursing homes to
all nursing homes from the same years in other states. The two samples are very similar.
Finally, Figure II.1 visually presents the main source of variation used in my within-state
empirical approach, graphing the simulated subsidy amounts offered to nursing homes
against nursing homes’ average shares of residents on Medicaid.34 In this figure, variation
from daily rate states is visible in the form of nursing home observations arrayed on lines,
with each line being generated by some state’s fixed daily rate subsidy amount being in-
teracted with nursing home’s share of residents on Medicaid. Variation from hourly rate
and allocated payment rate states is also visible, though is not arrayed on lines in the same
way as in daily rate states due to the dependence of subsidy amounts in these states on
more than just Medicaid resident shares.
II.VI Results
II.VI.I Within-State Primary Results
My principal findings on the employment effects of subsidies are listed in Table II.3.
Table II.3 reports the effect of a $1 increase in effective subsidy amount offered per nurs-
ing home resident-day on minutes of direct care worker employment per resident-day
(DCW Staffing), nursing assistant employment per resident-day (CNA Staffing), and li-
censed nurse employment per resident-day (Nurse Staffing).35 The instrumental variable
34When states repeal subsidies, the pre-repeal value of the subsidy is shown. For the second of Montana’s
two policy events, Montana cut its subsidies but did not entirely repeal them. In this case, the change in
subsidies is shown.
35The measure of nurse employment per resident-day pools licensed practical nurse and registered nurse
employment. I pool these worker types because while the difference in nursing home employment levels
and nursing home workplace duties of nursing assistants versus nurses tends to be consistent across states
and time, this is much less the case for licensed practical nurses versus registered nurses. Subsidy effects
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(IV) regressions indicate that a $1 increase in subsidy per resident-day causes a statistically
significant 4.9 minute increase in direct care worker employment per resident-day, com-
posed of a 3.1 minute nursing assistant effect and a 1.8 minute nurse effect. Each of these
estimates is statistically significant per the randomization inference procedure, with each
representing the largest effect size observed out of a pool of 1000 placebo estimates.
Table II.3 also presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for each
outcome. The OLS estimates are in all cases larger than the IV estimates. To the extent
that this difference is meaningful to comment on, it could be suggestive of either greater
responsiveness to subsidies by nursing homes selecting into higher subsidy rates, positive
selection on staffing into higher subsidy rates, or some sort of mechanical bias generated
by the construction of the treatment and outcome variables. Note that while the OLS es-
timates exhibit standard errors of similar size to the instrumental variable estimates, the
OLS estimates of the effect of subsidies on direct care worker and nursing assistant em-
ployment per resident-day are not statistically significant in the randomization inference
tests.
Additionally, Table II.3 reports the mean effect of the policy across nursing homes,
calculated by scaling the simulated subsidy rates offered to nursing homes by the esti-
mated regression coefficients and dividing by the corresponding outcome variables. The
mean effect of the subsidies, per the instrumental variable estimates, was to increase nurs-
ing home staffing of direct care workers and nursing assistants by approximately 6.4 per-
cent and to increase it for nurses by approximately 7.4 percent, figures several times larger
than those estimated in Foster and Lee (2015).
qualitatively similar to the pooled effects are observed for both worker types, though appear to be stronger
for registered nurses.
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Table II.4 presents the same regressions as Table II.3, but using average direct care
worker hourly wages (Avg DCW Wage) and direct care worker payroll per resident-day
(DCW PPR) as outcome variables.36 The instrumental variable average hourly wages
result suggests that for each subsidy dollar offered per resident-day, nursing homes in-
creased the average wage paid to direct care workers by 13 cents, equivalent to a 1.5 per-
cent wage increase at the mean nursing home. This effect is statistically significant and
similar to the effect estimated in the OLS case. Note that because these wage estimates are
for the average wage paid to all direct care worker nursing home employees, I cannot dis-
tinguish between wage increases for a fixed pool of employees and compositional changes
in that pool of workers toward employees receiving higher wages. However, the relative
homogeneity of the employment effects across nurses and nursing assistants in percentage
terms, as reported in Table II.3, suggests changes in workforce composition are unlikely to
be the explanation. Meanwhile, the effect of a $1 subsidy per resident-day on direct care
worker payroll per resident-day is 1.12 in the instrumental variable estimates but statisti-
cally insignificant and very imprecisely estimated, perhaps due to the payroll data sample
being smaller and subject to greater measurement error than the staffing data. The ordi-
nary least squares regression yields a larger payroll per resident-day estimate, though it
also is not statistically significant in the randomization inference test. Unfortunately, these
payroll per resident-day coefficients are estimated with too little precision to determine if
nursing homes are induced to spend more or less than one dollar per dollar of subsidy
offered.
36Results estimating employment effects within the sample of nursing homes for which there is payroll
data available may be found in Table II.5. They are larger than the results for the full sample though the nurse
and nursing assistant employment effects are similar to one another in relative terms.
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Given these subsidy effect estimates, I calculate what they imply in terms of elas-
ticities of nursing home employment, wages, and payroll to subsidies for the mean nurs-
ing home. When calculating these elasticities, I calculate percentage changes in subsidy
amounts as being made relative to states’ average Medicaid payment rates for a day of
nursing home resident care.37 I calculate that the elasticity of direct care worker employ-
ment per resident-day to subsidy payments on top of state average Medicaid payment
rates is 4.5. The elasticities for licensed nurse employment and nursing assistant employ-
ment are remarkably similar, being 4.5 and 4.7 respectively. Finally, the implied elasticity
of average direct care worker hourly wages to subsidies is 1.1, while the same elasticity im-
plied by the (statistically insignificant) point-estimate for the effect on payroll per resident-
day is 1.5.38 These employment elasticities in particular are quite large but not implausible
relative to the elasticities estimated by Hackmann (2018).39 In particular, Hackmann esti-
mates that the elasticity of nurse staffing to a nursing home-specific increase in Medicaid
payment rates is approximately 1.1, or 0.9 for the elasticity to a universal increase in Med-
icaid payment rates. Hackmann further estimates that 45 percent of these general rate
increases are captured by nursing homes as profits, with the residual 55 percent going
37Specifically, for each outcome variable, I calculate these elasticities as follows. First, I take the outcome
variable’s corresponding instrumental variable coefficient, scale it by the mean subsidy amount offered, and
then divide by the mean of the outcome variable across all nursing homes and across all years in the sample.
Then, I obtain the final elasticity by dividing this by the mean subsidy amount offered divided by the mean of
the state average per resident-day Medicaid payment rate across all nursing homes in all states and years in
the sample. The data on average Medicaid per resident-day payment rates for each state were obtained from
LTCFocus and are available only from 2000 to 2009. I obtain estimates of the average rates from 1996-1999 and
2010-2015 by projecting the observed 2000 and 2009 average rates backward and forward respectively using
the mean annual change in payment rates observed in each state from 2000 to 2009.
38The elasticities obtained by re-estimating the primary within-state regressions after summing the sim-
ulated subsidy amounts with state average Medicaid per resident-day payment rates and then logging all
variables are similar to these and may be found in Appendix II.XII.III.
39Note that this is true only for the nurse staffing elasticities. The large and similarly sized elasticities
for both nurses and nursing assistants in this study are unique. Both Hackmann and Foster and Lee (2015)
estimate very differently sized nurse and nursing assistant effects, with Hackmann finding only a very small
nursing assistant elasticity.
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toward a mix of employment per resident-day increases and private pay nursing home
price reductions. The large magnitude of the elasticities found in this study relative to
Hackmann’s, at least in the case of nurses, could be explained if the incremental nature
of the payroll subsidies made it difficult for nursing homes to divert them into increased
profits or reduced prices. Indeed, the relative magnitudes of these employment elastici-
ties as well as the fact that the coefficient for the effect of subsidies on direct care worker
payroll per resident-day exceeds one both are suggestive of subsidy pass-through rates of
100% though, once again, the imprecision in my estimate of the payroll coefficient prevents
drawing firm conclusions.40
All of the subsidy effect estimates reported so far examine the impact of subsidies
at the average subsidized nursing home. Potentially, nursing home responses to subsidies
may vary by nursing home size. If so, from a nursing home resident welfare perspective, it
is likely more important to consider the effect of subsidies on nursing home employment
and wages experienced by the average nursing home resident. In order to examine the
effects experienced by the average resident, I re-estimate all of the primary within-state
regressions while weighting nursing homes by their within-sample mean number of resi-
dents and report the instrumental variable results in Table II.6. These results are somewhat
larger than in the unweighted case, suggesting that the average nursing home resident ex-
perienced similar or greater increases in direct care worker employment per resident-day
than occurred at the average nursing home. Additionally, note that for this and all ensuing
tables, I report only the instrumental variable subsidy effect estimates. I do this in the in-
40Unfortunately, I do not directly observe nursing home profits or private pay prices and so cannot test
how either of these respond to subsidies. However, I can test for subsidy effects on certain other margins
that nursing homes might adjust in response to subsidies: resident counts, occupancy, share of residents on
Medicaid, and nursing home resident average care needs. These effects are discussed in Appendix II.XII.II.
Results from these regressions are inconclusive: estimated effects are statistically insignificant but imprecisely
estimated.
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terest of brevity and because the relationship between the instrumental variable and ordi-
nary least squares results observed in Tables II.3 and II.4 continues essentially unchanged
through the ensuing analyses.
II.VI.II Within-State Heterogeneous Effects Results
The incentives for nursing homes to respond to payroll subsidies likely vary by the
type of payroll subsidy they are facing. Nursing homes in daily rate subsidy states and
hourly rate subsidy states are required to match subsidy dollars received for their Medicaid
residents with additional expenditure on non-Medicaid residents. Nursing homes in these
states thus may be expected to exhibit larger responses to subsidies than nursing homes
in allocated payment subsidy states provided that these matching requirements do not
deter nursing homes from taking up the subsidies. However, if the matching requirements
do reduce take-up, then allocated payment type subsidies might elicit greater responses
than the hourly rate and daily rate subsidies. I test if nursing homes exhibit different
responses to allocated payment style subsidies by re-estimating my primary regressions
after interacting the simulated subsidy amount variable with an indicator variable that is
1 if a nursing home is in an allocated payment style subsidy state and 0 otherwise. For
the instrumental variable regressions, in the first stage regressions for simulated subsidies
and the simulated subsidy interaction term, I include both the subsidy instrument and
the instrument interacted with the indicator variable. In terms of the relative prevalence
of different subsidy types, note that approximately 39 percent of nursing homes in the
treatment sample are from allocated payment style subsidy states, with 11 percent being
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from hourly rate style subsidy states and the remaining 50% being from daily rate style
subsidy states.41
I report the results from these subsidy type interaction regressions in Table II.7. The
estimated effects for the daily rate and hourly rate style states are substantially larger than
in the pooled regressions, with the effect of a $1 increase in subsidies on direct care worker
employment per resident-day rising to 8.0 minutes and the effect on average direct care
worker hourly wages rising to 23 cents. The interaction terms, meanwhile, all suggest that
allocated payment style subsidies are markedly less effective than daily rate and hourly
rate style subsidies, with the effect of allocated payment subsidies on direct care worker
employment per resident-day being a statistically significant 5.3 minutes lower per sub-
sidy dollar. The point estimate of the average hourly wages effect is also 16 cents lower,
though this interaction is not statistically significant. These results imply that the effect
of allocated payment style subsidies was to increase direct care worker employment per
resident-day by only 2.7 minutes per subsidy dollar per resident-day and to increase aver-
age direct care worker hourly wages by only 7 cents per subsidy dollar per resident-day.
Given the large magnitude of these interaction terms, I test to see if the allocated payment
style subsidy effects, obtained by summing the interaction terms with the baseline effects,
retain their statistical significance. All of these effects lose their significance at the five
percent level in the randomization inference tests, though the subsidy effect on direct care
worker employment does retain its significance at the ten percent level with a ranking at
the 97th percentile of the placebo distribution.
41Note that this distribution of nursing homes across subsidy types reflects why I do not present results
separating effects by daily rate and hourly rate types. Separately estimating the effect of hourly rate and daily
rate style subsidies is severely hampered by low statistical power resulting from there being relatively few
hourly rate states and relatively few nursing homes in those states. For more details on which states adopted
which type of subsidy, please refer to Appendix II.X.III.
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The interaction results in Table II.7 suggest that daily rate and hourly rate subsidy
states’ expenditure matching requirements elicit large subsidy responses from nursing
homes. They further suggest that subsidy take up was high in daily rate and hourly rate
style subsidy states. However, these results should be interpreted with some caution. First,
the smaller effect estimates for allocated payment style subsidies might partially result
from greater measurement error in my simulated subsidy amounts for nursing homes in
these states. Allocated payment state subsidy amounts depend on nursing home charac-
teristics during a base year, while I observe nursing home characteristics only for the two-
week reporting window before a nursing home survey. To the extent that nursing home
characteristics during survey windows vary from their annual average characteristics, this
introduces a source of measurement error that may partially attenuate subsidy effect esti-
mates. Note that this type of measurement error does not affect daily rate or hourly rate
subsidy states, as subsidy amounts offered to nursing homes in these states depend only
on their characteristics at the time of the offer. Second, to the extent that states select into
subsidy types based on their Medicaid programs’ ability to administer and enforce subsidy
requirements, subsidy effectiveness may vary across subsidy types due to policy regime
characteristics unrelated to the subsidy formulas themselves. While I do not expect either
of these sources of bias to explain the entire reduction in subsidy effectiveness for allocated
payment style subsidy states, one should keep in mind that the actual reduction may be
overstated.
In addition to heterogeneity by subsidy characteristics, nursing homes’ incentives to
respond to payroll subsidies may also vary by nursing home characteristics. In particular,
if not-for-profit homes have a greater altruistic motive to increase spending on nursing
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home staffing and care quality, for-profit nursing homes may be less responsive to subsi-
dies than not-for-profit nursing homes.42
Similar to how I test for differences by subsidy design type, I test if for-profit nursing
homes exhibit a smaller response to payroll subsidies by re-estimating my primary regres-
sions with the addition of an interaction between the simulated subsidy amount variable
and an indicator variable that is 1 if a nursing home is a for-profit nursing home and 0
otherwise. Note that two-thirds of nursing homes in the treatment sample are for-profit
nursing homes. Table II.8 presents the results of these regressions. Coefficients on the
interaction term between effective subsidy amounts offered and for-profit status are gen-
erally negative across all outcome variables, suggesting that for-profit nursing homes may
not respond to payroll subsidies as aggressively as not-for-profit nursing homes. How-
ever, none of the estimates from these instrumental variable regressions are statistically
significant per the randomization inference tests and so these results should only be taken
as suggestive.
II.VI.III Within-State Assumption Validation Tests
The core assumption undergirding the within-state empirical analysis is that the ef-
fective payroll subsidy amounts offered to nursing homes are orthogonal to pre-trends in
direct care worker wages and employment. I explore this assumption in Table II.9, where
I report the estimates from five regressions estimated on different time periods for each
category of direct care worker employment per resident-day and on average direct care
worker hourly wages. Each row reports the result of a regression of the listed outcome
42A long literature has examined whether for-profit status affects hospital care quality and other margins
of behavior, including Duggan (2002), and finds mixed results but with some evidence for differences. The
literature examining this question for nursing homes is less developed.
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variable on the instrumented subsidy amount offered within a one-year symmetric win-
dow centered around the adoption of a policy change or, depending on the row, around a
different year before or after the change. Although it is possible to use data centered one
year prior to the real policy change for nursing homes in all states, due to data time-span
limitations, it is not possible to do so for two years prior in Utah and it is not possible to do
so for three years prior in an additional five states. Differences between the three and two
years prior coefficients thus should be interpreted with caution due to variation in sample
composition across these regressions.
The estimates from Table II.9 suggest that there was at most a modest negative as-
sociation between pre-trends in employment per resident-day and eventual subsidy re-
ceipt. Perhaps the most extreme pre-trend observed is for the effect of subsidies on direct
care worker employment per resident-day estimated one year prior to the subsidies ac-
tually being offered is -1.9 minutes. Even in this case, the pre-trend effect is reasonably
small relative to the magnitude of the primary employment effects and the pre-trends es-
timated for two and three years prior to subsidy adoption tend to be more mixed in size
and sign. Overall, the evidence is suggestive of the treatment effects on employment being
at most modestly attenuated by selection into subsidy adoption on negative employment
per resident-day trends at the type of nursing homes eventually receiving higher subsi-
dies. While this may raise some concerns that the contemporaneous treatment effects on
employment may reflect some form of mean reversion, the contemporaneous effects are
more than double the size of the one year prior pre-trends in absolute value and either
persist or grow in the year after first adoption of treatment, a finding inconsistent with
mean reversion. Meanwhile, the estimates for average direct care worker hourly wages
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also suggest that there is at most modest selection into subsidy adoption on positive wage
trends at the type of nursing homes eventually receiving higher subsidies.
In addition to these formal tests, we can also visually inspect for the presence of
pre-trends at any part of the distribution of effective subsidy amounts by nonparametri-
cally regressing different outcome pre-trends on the change in subsidies offered to nurs-
ing homes. It is important to use the change in subsidy amounts in order to distinguish
between cases where subsidies are repealed and where they are established, since the pre-
trends of greatest concern are of opposite sign across these two cases. Figure II.2 displays
the results of nonparametrically regressing the change in minutes of direct care worker
employment per resident-day, calculated from two years to one year prior to treatment,
on the change in subsidy amount experienced by each nursing home.43 Note that the gray
bands in this plot represent 95 percent confidence intervals, calculated without any use
of clustering, while the dashed line is the kernel density of the distribution of changes in
subsidy amounts offered.
Figure II.2 suggests that for nursing homes facing either eventual increases or de-
creases in subsidization, direct care worker employment per resident-day pre-trends were
reasonably stable, if somewhat decreasing, in the magnitude of eventual subsidy change.
The most dramatic differences in pre-trends were experienced for nursing homes in rela-
tively sparse portions of the distribution of changes in subsidy amounts. Considering that
there are more nursing homes in states adopting payroll subsidies than in states cutting
them, these results cumulatively suggest that employment pre-trends are working against
43The nursing homes receiving the top 5 percent largest subsidy changes are trimmed from the figure, due
to the sparseness of their distribution preventing reasonably precise nonparametric estimation. This is also
true of Figure II.3.
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the within-state approach finding a positive subsidy effect on employment, with the most
severe pre-trend violations being contained to a relatively small number of nursing homes.
Figure II.3 presents similar results as in Figure II.2, but uses one-year changes in
nursing home average direct care worker hourly wages as the outcome variable. The re-
sults from this figure qualitatively echo those in the employment per resident-day case,
though pre-trends appear to be more decreasing in the dense part of the positive future
subsidy change distribution here than in the employment case. This figure lends itself
to similar conclusions as above but with stronger evidence suggesting that the estimated
subsidy effect on wages may be an underestimate.
My nonparametric pre-trend checks suggest that the parallel trends assumption for
nursing homes receiving different ultimate subsidy amounts is most violated for nursing
homes qualifying for small subsidy amounts and so likely with very low shares of their res-
idents on Medicaid. In order to test if these nursing homes are disproportionately driving
my estimated effects, I adopt two approaches. First, I re-estimate my primary regressions,
but drop the bottom 5 percent and then 10 percent of nursing homes by subsidy amounts
offered as well as separately by shares of residents on Medicaid. Dropping these less sub-
sidized and less likely to be subsidized nursing homes does not substantially affect the
estimated employment and wage effects. Tables presenting these results may be found in
Appendix II.XII.IV.
As a second approach, I re-estimate my primary within-state regressions using a lo-
cally linear semiparametric estimator that identifies the effect of subsidies using only vari-
ation in subsidy amounts among similarly subsidized nursing homes. Figure II.4 presents
the results of regressing minutes of direct care worker employment per resident-day on
simulated subsidy amounts using Epanechnikov kernel weights within one standard de-
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viation bandwidths at varying points along the distribution of the mean simulated subsidy
amounts offered to nursing home while subsidies were in place.44 Within each one stan-
dard deviation bandwidth, the regression uses state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy
event fixed effects as before. The dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals,
calculated using a policy event clustered bootstrap procedure, and the dotted line is the
kernel density of the changes in subsidy amounts offered.
The results in Figure II.4 suggest that even when estimating without the influence
of nursing homes with relatively extreme subsidization levels, there still are positive and
reasonably stable effects of subsidies on employment per resident-day within the densest
part of the change in subsidy distribution.45 This suggests that the primary effects are
not driven solely by comparison of subsidized nursing homes to the barely subsidized
nursing homes that may have experienced different employment pre-trends. Figure II.5
presents the same results as in Figure II.4 but using average direct care worker hourly
wages as the outcome variable. The estimated wage effects exhibit a pattern very similar
to the employment effects and so do not appear to be driven disproportionately by nursing
homes receiving very large or very small subsidy offers.
Another possible concern with the within-state estimates of subsidy effects on em-
ployment is that, instead of identifying increases in employment per resident-day that vary
in size across nursing homes receiving different subsidy amounts, they might just reflect
employment reallocation across nursing homes within subsidy states. That is, reductions
in employment at low subsidy nursing homes and increases at high subsidy ones could
44Similar to the prior nonparametric case, I trim the top 5 percent of observations by subsidy amount
offered due to estimates being extremely imprecise for these points.
45I do not use the instrumental variable approach in this semiparametric setting for econometric reasons
but would note that replacing all uses of simulated subsidies here with the fitted values from the full sample’s
instrumental variable first stage regression does not yield qualitatively different results.
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cause the within-state estimator to find positive employment effects of subsidies, even if
there is no market-wide response.
In order to test the employment reallocation explanation, I check if its hypothesized
employment reductions at low subsidy nursing homes actually occurred. I conduct this
test by locally linearly estimating the difference-in-differences employment regression us-
ing Epanechnikov kernel weights within one standard deviation bandwidths along the
distribution of the mean simulated subsidy amounts offered to nursing home while subsi-
dies were in place and using the same fixed effects as in the fully parametric difference-in-
differences regression. Figure II.6 presents these semiparametric difference-in-differences
results using minutes of direct care worker employment per resident-day as the outcome
variable and trimming, due to sparseness of observations, the top 5 percent of nursing
homes by the absolute subsidy amount offered. Although the estimates are imprecise,
the point estimates suggest that only a very small number of nursing homes receiving es-
sentially no subsidies whatsoever exhibited staffing declines relative to the control states.
These locally linear estimates thus find too few firms with negative subsidy adoption ef-
fects to be consistent with the hypothesis that the within-state estimates are driven solely
by employment shifting across nursing homes.
II.VI.IV Within-and-Across-State Results
In this section, I relax the within-state empirical approach’s assumption that nursing
homes receiving different subsidy amounts were on similar trends in direct care worker
employment and hourly wages. I do so by presenting the results from my within-and-
across-state regressions, which allow for differential trends between variably subsidized
nursing homes provided those trends are held in common across similar nursing homes in
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the treatment and control states. Tables II.10, II.11, and II.12 give results from regressions
of direct care worker employment and wage outcomes on the simulated subsidy rates
offered to nursing homes in treatment states relative to the similarly calculated placebo
subsidy rates offered in control states conditional on state-by-year and nursing home-by-
policy event fixed effects. In these tables, the “Placebo Effect” coefficients report the effect
of the placebo subsidies in the control group, while the “Subsidy Effect” coefficients report
the additional effect of subsidies in treatment states on top of the placebo subsidy effects.46
Table II.10 presents within-and-across-state results for the sample using all uncon-
founded states in the control group. The subsidy effect estimates here are very similar to
the original within-state subsidy effect estimates, while the placebo subsidies are estimated
to have almost no effect. Overall, these results suggest that the within-state instrumental
variable subsidy effect estimates are reasonably reliable and not contaminated by differ-
ential pre-trends associated with subsidy receipt of a type common across all states at the
time of subsidy adoption.
Table II.11 presents within-and-across-state results using the geographic neighbors
control group sample. These results point toward similar though smaller direct care worker
employment effects than in the within-state analysis case, while the subsidy effect on
wages is estimated to be larger. The placebo effects remain small. This set of results suggest
that the original within-state estimates of subsidy effects are not contaminated by differen-
tial pre-trends associated with subsidy receipt of a sort common to both treatment states
and their geographic neighbors.
46As a complement to these findings, I conduct pre-trend validation tests for each of the within-and-across-
state specifications. I do these tests in a fashion analogous to those done for my within-state regressions.
The results from these tests are supportive of the different within-and-across state control groups helping to
eliminate some of the variation in pre-trends observed across nursing homes in the within-state sample. For
more details, please refer to Appendix II.XIV.
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Finally, Table II.12 presents within-and-across-state results for the synthetic control
sample. Here, as in the geographic neighbors case, estimates of subsidy effects on employ-
ment per resident-day are somewhat smaller than in the within-state analysis, with some
placebo effects being observed for nursing assistant staffing in particular. The wage effects,
however, remain essentially unchanged. These results once again speak favorably of the
within-state instrumental variable subsidy effect estimates, suggesting that those results
are not being driven by differential trends in employment and wages correlated with sub-
sidy receipt of a sort that can be controlled for through my synthetic controls procedure.
The evidence resulting from this within-and-across-state analysis, coupled with the
evidence from the within-state validation tests, bolsters the credibility of the within-state
analysis’s claim to identification. The within-state validation tests suggest that any differ-
ential pre-trends correlated with subsidy receipt in treatment states are at most modest in
size and likely working against the main employment results. While modest pre-trends
could be interpreted as signaling an impending larger trend break, the synthetic controls
within-and-across-state analysis shows that this did not occur in other states exhibiting
similar pre-trends. Meanwhile, the geographic neighbors and all other states analyses indi-
cate that, for the within-state analysis’s estimated subsidy effects to be a spurious result of
differential pre-trends across nursing homes, these pre-trends must be unique to the treat-
ment states and not shared either nationally or by nearby states. Finally, although these
tests cannot rule out within-state effects being driven by employment and wage shocks
that are correlated with subsidy receipt, contemporaneous to subsidy receipt, and unique
to the treatment states, my effort to purge confounding policy events from the treatment
sample through archival research on state policy environments eliminates the most likely
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causes of such confounding shocks. Cumulatively, this evidence strongly points toward
the credibility of my within-state subsidy effect estimates.
II.VII Concluding Discussion
My findings from this chapter demonstrate that the establishment of nursing home
payroll subsidies by state Medicaid programs have substantial positive effects on direct
care worker employment and hourly wages at subsidized nursing homes. My primary
empirical approach uses a within-state across-firm identification strategy and finds that
for every $1 increase in effective payroll subsidy per resident-day, there is a 4.9 minute in-
crease in direct care worker employment per resident-day and a 13 cent increase in average
direct care worker hourly wages. These effects correspond to a 6.4 percent increase in direct
care worker employment and a 1.5 percent increase in average direct care worker hourly
wages at the mean nursing home. Furthermore, taking payroll subsidies as increases rel-
ative to state average Medicaid reimbursement rates, I find that the elasticity of nursing
home employment per resident-day to Medicaid subsidy payments is 4.5 and the corre-
sponding direct care worker average wage elasticity is 1.1. These estimates are reasonably
large relative to similar parameters found in prior research (Foster and Lee, 2015; Hack-
mann, 2018) and are consistent with 100% pass-through of the subsidies to labor, pointing
toward incremental nursing home payroll subsidies being powerful incentives for affect-
ing nursing home behavior. Finally, in terms of implications for nursing home residents,
the estimated subsidy effects appear to be stronger when weighting nursing homes by
their resident counts, suggesting the average nursing home resident experienced a larger
change in staffing than what occurred at the average nursing home.
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These primary within-state results prove robust to a wide range of validation tests.
Within the treatment states, pre-trends in nursing home direct care worker employment
and wages are not substantially associated with eventual subsidy amounts offered. The
small associations that do exist suggest that, if anything, the estimated subsidy effects
may be attenuated by pre-trends. These within-state results are not being driven by nurs-
ing homes receiving outlier subsidy amounts or by nursing homes with very low shares
of residents on Medicaid, two subsets of nursing homes that appear to exhibit the great-
est differential pre-trends. Evidence from the within-and-across-state results suggest that
the observed subsidy effects are not an artifact of confounding shocks contemporaneous
to subsidy adoption or pre-trends correlated with subsidy receipt that are common across
either subsidy states and all other control states, subsidy states and their geographic neigh-
bors, or subsidy states and their paired synthetic control states. As a whole, this evidence
bolsters the credibility of the within-state instrumental variable payroll subsidy effect esti-
mates.
A number of possible avenues for future research extend from this work. While
high nursing home direct care worker employment to resident ratios are an important in-
put in the delivery of high quality nursing home care, I do not have data on resident-level
outcomes and so cannot directly investigate the health effects of these subsidies. Better
understanding of these health effects would be valuable both for better quantifying the ul-
timate welfare impact of these subsidies and for shedding light on whether nursing homes
respond to payroll subsidies by substituting additional labor for other inputs. Additional
research using resident-level health data might be able to shed greater light on the implica-
tions of these subsidies for nursing home resident welfare. Next, most nursing home pay-
roll subsidies enacted since 2005 have been part of a broader nursing home policy reform
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package. While my research points toward strong positive effects of nursing home payroll
subsidies on employment and wages when adopted as a policy on their own, understand-
ing the degree to which payroll subsidies do or do not complement pay-for-performance
programs, minimum staffing requirement increases, and other policies with which they are
often bundled would be of substantial value. Finally, better understanding of the market-
level circumstances that influence payroll subsidy efficacy would be valuable for under-
standing where subsidies could be most beneficially adopted and for developing a richer
understanding of the incentives facing nursing homes themselves. This last avenue for
further research will be examined in greater depth in the subsequent chapter.
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II.VIII Figures
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This figure graphs nursing homes’ shares of residents on Medicaid against the simulated subsidy amounts per resident-day
offered to them when subsidy policies are in place. Medicaid resident shares are within-sample averages. For Montana’s
second policy event, where a payroll subsidy is cut but not fully eliminated, subsidy amounts presented are nursing home
specific average changes in subsidy amounts. A small number of nursing homes receiving subsidy amount changes greater
than $10 per resident-day are trimmed. Observations shown are a 40 percent random sample of nursing homes, selected to
avoid cluttering the graph.
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Figure II.2: Nonparametric Effect of Subsidies on Pre-policy Change in Direct Care Worker
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This figure presents nonparametric estimates of the effect of the change in effective subsidy amount offered to each nursing
home on the change in minutes of direct care worker employment per resident-day experienced by each nursing home from
two years prior to the change in subsidies to the year immediately prior to the change in subsidies. Changes in subsidies
are used to distinguish between cases where subsidies are adopted and where they are eliminated. The gray bands are
confidence intervals, estimated without clustering adjustments. The dashed line is the kernel density of the eventual change
in subsidy amounts offered to nursing homes, with differences in its height representing relative differences in the number
of nursing homes. Negative changes reflect nursing homes in states which cut their payroll subsidies. These results are
shown for a sample of nursing homes where the top 5 percent by magnitude of eventual subsidy change are trimmed, due
to sparseness among these nursing homes preventing estimation of nonparametric estimates with meaningful confidence
intervals. Nonparametric estimates here are produced using an Epanechnikov kernel and a locally linear estimator.
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Change in Subsidy, Top 5% Trimmed by Absolute Value
 
This figure presents nonparametric estimates of the effect of the change in effective subsidy amount offered to each nurs-
ing home on the change in average direct care worker (DCW) hourly wages offered by each nursing home from two years
prior to the change in subsidies to the year immediately prior to the change in subsidies. Changes in subsidies are used
to distinguish between cases where subsidies are adopted and where they are eliminated. The gray bands are confidence
intervals, estimated without clustering adjustments. The dashed line is the kernel density of the eventual change in subsidy
amounts offered to nursing homes, with differences in its height representing relative differences in the number of nursing
homes. Negative changes reflect nursing homes in states which cut their payroll subsidies. These results are shown for a
sample of nursing homes where the top 5 percent by magnitude of eventual subsidy change are trimmed, due to sparse-
ness among these nursing homes preventing estimation of nonparametric estimates with meaningful confidence intervals.
Nonparametric estimates here are produced using an Epanechnikov kernel and a locally linear estimator.
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Figure II.4: Locally Linear Regression of Direct Care Worker Employment on Subsidies per
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Simulated Subsidy Amount Offered
This figure presents locally linear estimates from the regression of direct care worker (DCW) minutes per resident-day on
simulated subsidy amounts conditional on state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These regressions
are estimated within two-year symmetric treatment windows around each policy change. The line represents the results
from estimating this regression using Epanechnikov kernel weights in one standard deviation bandwidths along the mean
simulated subsidy amount offered to each nursing home when it is being offered subsidies. For Montana’s second policy
event, where a payroll subsidy is cut but not fully eliminated, subsidy amounts used are nursing home specific average
changes in subsidy amounts. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals calculated using a policy event clustered
bootstrap procedure. The dotted line is the kernel density of the absolute value in the change in subsidy amounts offered
to nursing homes, with differences in its height representing relative differences in the number of nursing homes. The top
5 percent of nursing homes by change simulated subsidy amount are trimmed from the graph, due to their sparseness
preventing estimation with a meaningful level of precision.
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Figure II.5: Locally Linear Regression of Direct Care Worker Average Hourly Wages on
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Simulated Subsidy Amount Offered
This figure presents locally linear estimates from the regression of direct care worker (DCW) average hourly wages on sim-
ulated subsidy amounts conditional on state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These regressions
are estimated within two-year symmetric treatment windows centered around each policy change. The line represents the
results from estimating this regression using Epanechnikov kernel weights in one standard deviation bandwidths along the
mean simulated subsidy amount offered to each nursing home when it is being offered subsidies. For Montana’s second pol-
icy event, where a payroll subsidy is cut but not fully eliminated, subsidy amounts used are nursing home specific average
changes in subsidy amounts. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals calculated using a policy event clustered
bootstrap procedure. The dotted line is the kernel density of the absolute value in the change in subsidy amounts offered
to nursing homes, with differences in its height representing relative differences in the number of nursing homes. The top
5 percent of nursing homes by change simulated subsidy amount are trimmed from the graph, due to their sparseness
preventing estimation with a meaningful level of precision.
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Figure II.6: Locally Linear Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Subsidy
Adoption on Direct Care Worker Employment per Resident-Day, Estimated in Bandwidths
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Simulated Subsidy Amount Offered
This figure presents locally linear estimates from the regression of minutes of direct care worker (DCW) employment per
resident-day on an indicator variable that is 1 when subsidies are being offered and 0 otherwise, on treatment and control
group-specific year fixed effects, and on nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. The sample includes all treatment states
and all unconfounded control states. The line represents the results from estimating this regression using Epanechnikov
kernel weights in one standard deviation bandwidths along the mean simulated subsidy amount offered to each nursing
home when it is being offered subsidies. For Montana’s second policy event, where a payroll subsidy is cut but not fully
eliminated, subsidy amounts used are nursing home specific average changes in subsidy amounts. The dashed lines are
95 percent confidence intervals calculated using a policy event clustered bootstrap procedure. The dotted line is the kernel
density of the absolute value in the change in subsidy amounts offered to nursing homes, with differences in its height
representing relative differences in the number of nursing homes. The top 5 percent of nursing homes by change simulated




Table II.1: Summary Statistics for Full Treatment Sample vs. Subset with Payroll Data
Full Subsidy Sample Payroll Sample Subset
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
DCW Staffing Minutes 196.85 185.58 62.36 186.53 183.19 41.29
CNA Staffing Minutes 127.42 122.70 37.92 124.06 121.26 32.47
Nurse Staffing Minutes 69.43 61.20 39.23 62.48 61.08 17.04
DCW Average Hourly Wage 22.21 22.40 4.99 22.13 22.34 4.98
Share of Residents on Medicaid 62.46 66.26 23.08 66.49 67.89 15.77
Share of Residents on Medicare 12.62 8.11 17.80 10.90 9.41 7.74
Share of Residents on Private 24.92 20.97 18.15 22.61 20.17 14.12
Resident Count 88.37 86.00 47.74 101.27 100.00 44.34
Percent Occupancy 86.47 90.78 13.05 87.78 91.67 11.55
Absolute Value of Change in Subsidies 2.32 2.08 1.51 2.48 2.29 1.34
Observations 12259 7207
This table lists means, medians, and standard deviations for key variables within two samples. The sample on the left is
the set of all nursing home observations from subsidy states within a two-year symmetric window around each policy
change used in estimation. Note that this sample is slightly larger than the within-state estimation sample, since it includes
nursing homes observed an insufficient number of times for instrument construction. The sample on the right is the same,
but limited to the Medicare-certified nursing homes for which payroll and wage data are available. Staffing variables are
denominated in minutes per resident-day of either direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), or
licensed nurse employment. Direct care worker average hourly wages are denominated in 2017 dollars per hour. Pct
Medicaid, Pct Medicare, and Pct Private refer to percentage shares of nursing home residents funded by each source, with
Pct Private including all non-Medicaid and non-Medicare residents. Absolute Value of Change in Subsidy refers to the
absolute value of the changes in effective subsidy amount per resident-day offered to nursing homes before and after a
policy event. Absolute values of changes are used here to simplify comparison between subsidy adoption states and
subsidy repeal states. The observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations.
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Table II.2: Summary Statistics for Full Treatment Sample vs. All Other States
Full Subsidy Sample All Other States
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
DCW Staffing Minutes 196.85 185.58 62.36 197.88 187.20 64.33
CNA Staffing Minutes 127.42 122.70 37.92 128.35 123.96 41.36
Nurse Staffing Minutes 69.43 61.20 39.23 69.53 61.68 37.68
DCW Average Hourly Wage 22.21 22.40 4.99 21.36 20.95 4.51
Share of Residents on Medicaid 62.46 66.26 23.08 62.64 67.13 23.18
Share of Residents on Medicare 12.62 8.11 17.80 13.28 9.26 16.84
Share of Residents on Private 24.92 20.97 18.15 24.08 20.00 18.20
Resident Count 88.37 86.00 47.74 92.12 83.00 59.57
Percent Occupancy 86.47 90.78 13.05 84.61 89.16 14.41
Observations 12259 184368
This table lists means, medians, and standard deviations for key variables within two samples. The sample on the left is
the set of all nursing home observations from subsidy states within a two-year symmetric window around each policy
change used in estimation. Note that this sample is slightly larger than the within-state estimation sample, since it includes
nursing homes observed an insufficient number of times for instrument construction. The sample on the right is the set of
all nursing home observations from all other states in the same years. Staffing variables are denominated in minutes per
resident-day of either direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), or licensed nurse employment. Direct
care worker average hourly wages are denominated in 2017 dollars per hour. Pct Medicaid, Pct Medicare, and Pct Private
refer to percentage shares of nursing home residents funded by each source, with Pct Private including all non-Medicaid
and non-Medicare residents. The observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations.
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Table II.3: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment Minutes per Resident-Day by
Worker Type to Subsidies per Resident-Day
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing
OLS
Subsidy 7.317* 4.749* 2.567*
(1.872) (1.376) (0.700)
Fisher Rank 0.916 0.851 0.983*
Fisher SD [1.796] [1.306] [0.525]
Mean Effect 9.420% 9.251% 10.471%
IV
Subsidy 4.942* 3.126* 1.814
(2.198) (1.219) (1.028)
Fisher Rank 1.000* 1.000* 1.000*
Fisher SD [1.137] [0.889] [0.479]
Mean Effect 6.362% 6.089% 7.400%
Clusters 14 14 14
Obs 11685 11685 11685
All estimates are coefficients from independent regressions of minutes of direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing
assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse employment per resident-day on simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on
state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These regressions are estimated within two-year
symmetric windows around each policy change. Simulated subsidies are the simulated maximum subsidy amount a
nursing home could receive in terms of dollars per resident-day given its observed characteristics, which is instrumented
for in the IV case using the amount simulated using the same formula but a fixed set of pre-subsidy adoption
characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event level.
Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the
coefficient. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the percentile rank of the listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo
coefficients, each calculated on a randomly selected placebo sample. Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent
tails of the placebo effect distribution are denoted with a * and a + respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard deviation
of the distribution of placebo coefficients. The “Mean Effect” is the mean of the effect of subsidies across all subsidized
nursing homes, calculated by scaling the simulated subsidy rates offered to nursing homes by the estimated regression
coefficients and dividing by the corresponding outcome variables. The cluster count is the number of policy events in the
sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.4: Response of Direct Care Worker Average Hourly Wages and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day




Fisher Rank 0.979* 0.901
Fisher SD [0.055] [0.663]




Fisher Rank 0.982* 0.925
Fisher SD [0.064] [0.701]
Mean Effect 1.508% 2.298%
Clusters 14 14
Obs 7719 7785
All estimates are coefficients from independent regressions of direct care worker (DCW) average hourly wages and direct
care worker payroll per resident-day on simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and
nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. For more on the construction of the sample, instrument, mean effects, and test
statistics, please refer to the notes attached to Table II.3.
Table II.5: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment per Resident-Day to Subsidies per
Resident-Day in Sample With Valid Payroll Data for All Variables
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 7.979+ 5.396* 2.582 0.064 0.908
(3.865) (2.219) (1.840) (0.053) (1.194)
Fisher Rank 1.000* 1.000* 0.999* 0.890 0.924
Fisher SD [1.584] [1.329] [0.627] [0.066] [0.710]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 7036 7036 7036 7036 7036
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions estimated within the subset of nursing
homes that have valid observations for both their average direct care worker hourly wage and their direct care worker
payroll per resident-day. Note that this sample is smaller than the samples used in the main wage and payroll regressions,
since those samples require nursing homes have valid observations for only the outcome variable being examined.
Outcome variables include direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per
resident-day. These are regressed on simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and
nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. All results reported are from instrumental variable regressions; For more on
the construction of the sample, instrument, and test statistics, please refer to the notes attached to Table II.3.
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Table II.6: Resident Count Weighted Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages,
and Payroll per Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 6.544+ 3.769* 2.774+ 0.157* 1.613
(3.084) (1.738) (1.402) (0.055) (1.164)
Fisher Rank 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 0.968+ 0.944
Fisher SD [1.780] [1.261] [0.668] [0.079] [0.780]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 11685 11685 11685 7719 7785
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions where nursing homes are weighted by
their mean number of residents within each policy event’s two-year symmetric treatment window. Outcome variables
include direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well
as direct care worker average hourly wages and direct care worker payroll per resident-day. These are regressed on
simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed
effects. All results reported are from instrumental variable regressions. For more on the construction of the sample,
instrument, and test statistics, please refer to the notes attached to Table II.3.
Table II.7: Heterogeneous Effects of Subsidies per Resident-Day by Subsidy Type on Direct
Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day: Allocated Payment Type
Subsidies vs All Other Subsidy Types
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 7.957* 4.770* 3.186+ 0.231* 2.988*
(3.304) (1.730) (1.617) (0.091) (1.314)
Fisher Rank 0.999* 1.000* 0.998* 0.961+ 0.967+
Fisher SD [2.773] [1.993] [1.085] [0.137] [1.793]
Subsidy X Allocated Type −5.289 −2.851 −2.438 −0.161 −3.036+
(3.549) (1.885) (1.766) (0.108) (1.630)
Fisher Rank 0.007* 0.016* 0.004* 0.123 0.026+
Fisher SD [2.986] [2.209] [1.176] [0.158] [1.963]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 11682 11682 11682 7719 7785
All estimates labeled “Subsidy” are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of minutes of direct
care worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse employment per resident-day or of either
average direct care worker hourly wages or direct care worker payroll per resident-day on simulated subsidy amounts
offered conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. All estimates labeled
“Subsidy X Allocated” are coefficients from the interaction in those regressions between subsidy amounts offered and an
indicator variable that is 1 in allocated payment type subsidy states and 0 otherwise. All results reported are from
instrumental variable regressions. Note that one first stage regression is estimated for each of the subsidy and the subsidy
interaction term, with each first stage regression including both the main subsidy instrument and the main subsidy
instrument interacted with the allocated payment indicator variable. For more on the construction of the sample,
instrument, and test statistics, please refer to the notes attached to Table II.3.
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Table II.8: Heterogeneous Effects of Subsidies per Resident-Day by Nursing Home For-
Profit Status on Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 5.896* 3.853* 2.042+ 0.153* 1.778
(2.164) (1.176) (1.015) (0.069) (1.284)
Fisher Rank 1.000* 0.999* 0.999* 0.985* 0.898
Fisher SD [1.235] [0.913] [0.497] [0.064] [0.686]
Subsidy X For Profit −1.254* −0.922+ −0.332 −0.024 −0.795
(0.470) (0.446) (0.190) (0.037) (0.674)
Fisher Rank 0.357 0.456 0.275 0.658 0.190
Fisher SD [1.063] [0.775] [0.445] [0.057] [1.088]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 11682 11682 11682 7719 7785
All estimates labeled “Subsidy” are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of minutes of direct
care worker, certified nursing assistant, and licensed nurse employment per resident-day or of either average direct care
worker (DCW) hourly wages or direct care worker payroll per resident-day on simulated subsidy amounts offered
conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. All estimates labeled “Subsidy X
For-Profit” are coefficients from the interaction in those regressions between subsidy amounts offered and an indicator
variable that is 1 for-profit nursing homes and 0 otherwise. All results reported are from instrumental variable regressions.
Note that one first stage regression is estimated for each of the subsidy and the subsidy interaction term, with each first
stage regression including both the main subsidy instrument and the main subsidy instrument interacted with the
for-profit indicator variable. For more on the construction of the sample, instrument, and test statistics, please refer to the
notes attached to Table II.3.
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Table II.9: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-
Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day, Estimated within 1 Year Symmetric Windows Centered
Around Varying Years Relative to Subsidy Adoption or Repeal
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
3 Years Before
Subsidy −0.194 −0.640 0.446* 0.120+ 2.575*
(1.316) (1.283) (0.085) (0.058) (0.713)
Clusters 8 8 8 8 8
Obs 3034 3034 3034 1956 1994
2 Years Before
Subsidy −0.043 0.304 −0.348 0.064 0.475
(1.832) (0.963) (1.039) (0.068) (0.912)
Clusters 13 13 13 10 10
Obs 4114 4114 4114 2136 2230
1 Year Before
Subsidy −1.924 −1.786 −0.137 0.024 0.734
(2.863) (1.824) (1.164) (0.047) (0.743)
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 4882 4882 4882 2980 2986
Contemporaneous
Subsidy 5.228 3.822+ 1.404 0.128* 1.059
(3.123) (1.813) (1.393) (0.047) (1.144)
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 5578 5578 5578 3448 3484
1 Year After
Subsidy 1.368 −0.145 1.513 −0.002 0.977
(1.822) (1.016) (0.890) (0.038) (0.882)
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 5166 5166 5166 3306 3348
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of direct care worker (DCW), certified
nursing assistant (CNA), or nurse minutes per resident-day or of average direct care worker hourly wages on simulated
subsidy amounts offered conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These
regressions are estimated within a one-year symmetric window, with the window being centered around the actual policy
change in the “Contemporaneous” panel and being centered the specified number of years before or after the genuine
policy change in the other panels. Note that the results and sample sizes here for the contemporaneous results vary from
the primary results, due to restriction to a one-year window here rather than to a two-year window. Standard errors in
parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event level. Significance levels implied by these standard
errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the coefficient. All results reported are from instrumental
variable regressions. For more on the construction of the simulated subsidy and instrument variables, please refer to the
notes attached to Table II.3.
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Table II.10: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Subsidy States, Relative to the Effect of
Placebo Subsidies in All Unconfounded Control States
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Placebo Effect −0.029 −0.013 −0.016 −0.007 0.163
(0.524) (0.380) (0.161) (0.013) (0.180)
Subsidy Effect 4.963* 3.129* 1.832+ 0.139* 0.950
(2.220) (1.254) (1.021) (0.053) (1.172)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 316998 316998 316998 202550 203992
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions estimated in a sample including all
subsidy states and all unconfounded control states. Outcome variables include direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing
assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care worker average hourly wages and
direct care worker payroll per resident-day. All regressions regress one of those outcomes on the simulated effective
subsidy amount that was or would have been offered to each nursing home, an interaction term between this variable and
a dummy variable that is 1 in treatment states and 0 in control states, state-by-year-by-policy event fixed effects, and
nursing home fixed effects. All regressions are estimated within two-year symmetric windows around each policy event.
The “Placebo Effect” coefficient reports the effect of the placebo subsidies within the control group, while the “Subsidy
Effect” coefficient reports the interaction term that reflects the effect of subsidies in the treatment group over and above the
placebo effect in the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy
event by treatment vs. control group level. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p
<0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the coefficient. The cluster count is the number of treatment policy events and paired
control groups in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
All results reported are from instrumental variable regressions.
Table II.11: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Subsidy States, Relative to the Effect of
Placebo Subsidies in Geographically Neighboring Control States
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Placebo Effect 0.099 0.383 −0.284 −0.076+ −0.218
(1.162) (0.886) (0.420) (0.045) (0.387)
Subsidy Effect 3.507+ 1.897 1.609+ 0.229* 1.173
(1.992) (1.254) (0.876) (0.070) (0.914)
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
Obs 38840 38840 38840 26295 26450
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions estimated in a sample including all
subsidy states and their paired geographic neighbor states. Outcome variables include direct care worker (DCW), certified
nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care worker average hourly wages
and direct care worker payroll per resident-day. The “Placebo Effect” coefficient reports the effect of the placebo subsidies
within the control group, while the “Subsidy Effect” coefficient reports the interaction term that reflects the effect of
subsidies in the treatment group over and above the placebo effect in the control group. Standard errors are calculated
analytically and clustered at the treatment state-neighbor pair level, resulting in one cluster per geographic neighbor. For
more on the regression specification or on the construction of the sample, instrument, and test statistics, please refer to the
notes attached to Table II.10.
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Table II.12: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Subsidy States, Relative to the Effect of
Placebo Subsidies in Synthetic Control States
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Placebo Effect 1.334 1.171 0.163 −0.019 0.863*
(1.238) (0.851) (0.470) (0.048) (0.419)
Fisher Rank 0.978* 0.974+ 0.918 0.583 0.972+
Fisher SD [0.986] [0.756] [0.394] [0.065] [0.645]
Subsidy Effect 3.600 1.946 1.653 0.152* 0.250
(2.487) (1.467) (1.113) (0.070) (1.232)
Fisher Rank 0.983* 0.952+ 0.983* 0.934 0.521
Fisher SD [1.495] [1.158] [0.620] [0.082] [0.966]
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 76584 76584 76584 46947 47303
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions estimated in a sample including all
subsidy states and their synthetic control states. Outcome variables include direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing
assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care worker average hourly wages and
direct care worker payroll per resident-day. The “Placebo Effect” coefficient reports the effect of the placebo subsidies
within the control group, while the “Subsidy Effect” coefficient reports the interaction term that reflects the effect of
subsidies in the treatment group over and above the placebo effect in the control group. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the
percentile rank of the listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 such coefficients, each calculated on a randomly
constructed placebo sample. Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent tails subsidy of the placebo effect
distribution are denoted with a * and a + respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard deviation of the distribution of
placebo coefficients. For more on the regression specification or on the construction of the sample, instrument, and test
statistics, please refer to the notes attached to Table II.10.
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II.X Policy Appendix
II.X.I Details On Collection of Policy Information
I compiled information about state Medicaid nursing home policy regimes from
1994-2017 from across a number of sources.47 As no sources in the academic literature
had previously documented information about the size and design of nursing home pay-
roll subsidies, I obtained that information through a careful review of historical primary
source documents coupled with efforts to reach out to Medicaid state offices. Informa-
tion about other major reforms was developed in a similar way. The procedure used for
collecting this information was as follows.
My preferred type of resources to consult for information about state payroll subsidy
formulas and other policies were the Medicaid policy and reimbursement manuals pub-
lished by state Medicaid programs. These manuals were used to specify the details of state
nursing home policies and state Medicaid nursing home payment formulas. If a payroll
subsidy-like policy was offered at some point, manuals published at the time often, though
not always, would describe them in great detail. While most states do not make histori-
cal copies of these manuals readily available online, I was able to obtain copies of these
manuals for many years through the Internet Archive (archive.org), which hosts historical
copies of state Medicaid programs’ websites, and through reaching out to state Medicaid
agencies and requesting them. While manuals were usually not available for all years, they
often would contain information useful for inferring policy regime information in years for
which I could not obtain a manual. In particular, manuals often gave dates when specific
47In addition to information on nursing home Medicaid policies, I also obtained some information on
broader changes in long-term care policy, such as Medicaid of home and community based care.
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provisions were updated or first implemented and sometimes would preserve repealed or
expired policies in the manual text alongside a note specifying their last date in effect.
When state policy and reimbursement manuals were not available, in many cases I
was able to obtain comparable information from archives of the provider letters and emails
sent by state Medicaid offices to nursing homes.48 These letters often would mention when
major policy changes were occurring and would describe them in sufficient detail for my
purposes. In addition to the reimbursement manuals and provider letters, archival copies
of state Medicaid programs’ websites49 were useful in a number of states where the web-
sites were used for directly posting information about new policies. In some states, details
of nursing home reimbursement and other policies were specified either in legislation or
as part of the state administrative code. In these states, archival copies of the relevant por-
tions of law and code50 were useful in identifying major policy changes. Finally, in some
states, I was able to obtain copies of Medicaid state plan amendments,51 which occasion-
ally would list when major nursing home policy reforms occurred. Since states varied in
terms of how they tended to document their Medicaid policies, I consulted all of the above
sources for as many years as possible. The above process generally yielded good coverage
of state policy environments, though information gaps are relatively more likely to remain
in the 1990s and in a number of typically very small states that outsourced administration
of their Medicaid nursing home reimbursement system to private accounting firms.
48These letters often were archived on state Medicaid programs’ own websites. When not available there,
the Internet Archive (archive.org) once again proved valuable.
49Typically, these copies were available through the Internet Archive (archive.org).
50These were available usually through either state secretary of state websites, state law libraries, or
through the Internet Archive (archive.org).
51These are available directly from state sources for some years, federal sources for others, and from the
Internet Archive (archive.org) copies of state and federal websites for still other years.
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In addition to these governmental primary source documents, I relied on some past
work by other researchers and government agencies. Surveys conducted by the North
Carolina Division of Family Services (NCDFS 1999; 2000), surveys by the Paraprofessional
Healthcare Institute (Harmuth and Dyson 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2006; 2009), and a Govern-
ment Accountability Office report on nursing home quality initiatives (GAO 2000) pro-
vided some information on when various policy changes occurred as well as some de-
tails about payroll subsidy formulas. Data collection efforts by Brown University’s Long
Term Care Focus project (LTCFocus) and a number of papers in the existing literature
(Grabowski et al., 2004; Feng et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2012a; Foster and Lee, 2015) were
useful for obtaining information about Medicaid average payment rates and about when
various policies were in place52, though these sources did not include details about payroll
subsidy formulas. I also obtained information about state nursing home minimum staffing
requirements through correspondence with the University of California, San Francisco’s
Dr. Charlene Harrington and through reference to a number of papers on the subject (Har-
rington, 2005a,b, 2010; Park and Stearns, 2009; Lin, 2014). Information from all of the above
sources were valuable for helping flag times and states where policies were in place, allow-
ing me to better calibrate the reliability of my primary source document based procedure.
Where the information from these sources contradicted primary source documents, and
where these contradictions could not be resolved through further more detailed examina-
tion of as many primary source materials as possible, I used whatever was listed in the
original governmental sources.
52In particular, LTCFocus offers information on when where nursing home bed taxes are in place, on adop-
tion of case mix reimbursement, on the share of Medicaid long term care spending going to nursing home care
versus home and community based care, on adoption of bed hold policies, and some information on adoption
of wage pass-throughs.
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Finally, when the above procedure left gaps in my state policy records, I reached out
to state Medicaid offices via phone and email. The conversations that ensued often were
helpful for clarifying details about how payroll subsidies were implemented and about
policy changes occurring within years for which I could find no clear records otherwise.
II.X.II Details On Defining Confounding Policy Events
In addition to adoption of payroll subsidies, state Medicaid programs have exper-
imented with a wide array of policy changes. By my tally, over 100 major non-payroll
subsidy policy changes have occurred across all states between 1996 and 2015. Often, pay-
roll subsidies are adopted in conjunction with these other changes, as was the case in over
ten states between 1996 and 2015. I exclude from my sample any policy event where one
of these other major policy events occurred in the same year as, the year after, or the four
years prior to the treatment event. This time window was chosen as other policy changes
occurring within it would either directly contaminate the two-year symmetric study win-
dow around a state’s treatment event or would occur close enough to its start that policies
operating at a lag may have an effect within the window. States are also excluded from en-
tering into control groups in the across-state analyses when they have major policy changes
occurring within their corresponding treatment state’s two-year symmetric study window.
Not all policy changes need be considered a major confounding policy event. Rather,
policies only need to be excluded if they are likely to substantially affect nursing homes in
a way that is correlated with the subsidy amounts offered to nursing homes. This suggests
that policies disproportionately affecting nursing homes with large shares of residents on
Medicaid deserve particular scrutiny. As such, I consider the following types of policy
changes to be confounding:
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• Adoption of substantial Medicaid nursing home pay-for-performance programs
• Changes to nursing home minimum staffing requirements
• Large changes in Medicaid nursing home reimbursement rates not associated with
payroll subsidy changes, namely: 20 percent increases or 10 percent decreases in
Medicaid daily payment rates (corresponding roughly with the 1 percent tails of the
reimbursement rate change distribution)53
• Substantial changes in the structure of the Medicaid reimbursement system (e.g.,
changing from retrospective to prospective reimbursement)
• Adoption of a payroll subsidy not included within the treatment sample (e.g., be-
cause the subsidy formula cannot be simulated without access to confidential data)
• Adoption of some other type of labor incentive policy (e.g., adoption of payments
that are a function of employee turnover rates or employee satisfaction surveys)
I take these policy changes to be major confounding events for a variety of reasons. First,
all but the minimum staffing requirements directly have a disproportionate effect on nurs-
ing homes with larger shares of their residents on Medicaid. Although minimum staffing
requirements bind on all nursing homes, they too may be expected to bind disproportion-
ately on high Medicaid share nursing homes since high Medicaid nursing homes tend to
have lower staffing ratios. Second, many of these policies generate incentives similar to
payroll subsidies and so would be particularly difficult to distinguish from them. Finally,
I restrict to “large” and “substantial” policy changes in a number of cases in order to dis-
tinguish major policy events from the kind of year-to-year minor policy changes that were
53Note that data on these changes are available only in the 2000s.
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otherwise pervasive during this time period.54 This requirement is also useful for screen-
ing out symbolic policies, e.g. policies offering public recognition and a token prize for
high performance on various quality metrics, and pilot policies where only a few nursing
homes are affected in a given year.55
A final issue relates to how I treat data for time periods where I have no policy infor-
mation available. As a general rule, I take time periods to be confounded unless evidence
strongly suggests otherwise. Data from prior to when I have any state policy regime infor-
mation available is thus assumed to be unacceptable for study. When I am missing infor-
mation on a time period between two periods for which I do have information, I consider
this time period to be free of confounding policy events only if two conditions are met.
First, the information available around the documentation gap must be sufficiently de-
tailed as to show that the state was keeping high-quality records of policy changes around
that time, suggesting that the absence of records is relatively more likely to correspond
with an absence of policy changes than with the disappearance of disorganized, poorly
kept records. Second, comparison of the state policy regime before and after the infor-
mation gap must reveal no major differences in policy and must not contain anything else
suggesting policy changes occurred between regime observations. Unless these two condi-
tions are met, I assume data from policy information gaps are confounded and unsuitable
for study.
54Similarly, I also exclude policy changes that may be impactful in the long run but not within the timescale
of my analysis. I placed in this category policies intending to limit demand for nursing homes by encouraging
expanded usage of substitute long-term care services, such as home and community-based care, as well as
policies intending to limit supply for nursing homes by placing further restrictions on certifying new nursing
home beds.
55Adopting a stricter definition that classifies minor changes to state case mix adjustment systems and other
types of very small programs as confounding events shrinks the treatment sample by four policy events. This
attenuates the estimated employment and wage effects in the main within-state regressions, but the difference
in results obtained using the two samples is not statistically significant.
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II.X.III Details of State Specific Nursing Home Payroll Subsidies
The table below lists each subsidy policy event used in this study. The table lists
for each state what type of subsidy they adopted (allocated, daily, or hourly) and when the
policy change occurred, listing subsidy adoption and repeal dates separately. Subsidy start
and repeal years are listed in terms of calendar years. Note that in most cases, the policy
change occurred in the middle of the year, when most states transition between fiscal years.
Start and repeal years are listed as “Not in Sample” if a confounding event prevents their
inclusion. A repeal year is listed as “NA” if the subsidy either was not repealed or, when
repealed, the subsidy amounts offered to each nursing home were added as a flat sum
to their per Medicaid resident daily reimbursement rates. The table also lists the mean
subsidies per resident-day as the average across all nursing home observations in the two
years after subsidy adoption or as the average over the two years before repeal. Averages
over two years are listed both because some states – in particular, Massachusetts – adjusted
their rates in the second year of being offered and because nursing home-specific effective
subsidy rates could vary from year to year as nursing home characteristics changed. Note
that Massachusetts and Montana both have two policy events each: Massachusetts has an
adoption and a repeal, while Montana has an adoption and a later reduction. Finally, the
table also lists the number of nursing homes observed in each state at any point within the
treatment sample.
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State Subsidy Type Start Year Repeal Year Mean Subsidy / Resident-Day Nursing Home Count
FL Daily 2000 Not in Sample $1.80 742
KS Daily 1999 NA $1.45 408
LA Daily 1999 Not in Sample $1.36 360
MA Allocated 2000 2008 $2.85; $3.34 to 0 548
ME Allocated Not in Sample 2011 $5.22 to 0 108
MT Allocated 1999 2011 $2.73; $3.87 to $2.59 103
ND Hourly 2001 NA $3.80 87
UT Daily 1998 NA $2.82 87
VA Hourly 1999 NA $1.71 280
VT Allocated 1999 NA $8.62 46
WA Daily 2008 NA $1.06 239
WY Hourly 2000 NA $2.72 40
II.XI Data Cleaning Appendix
The raw Medicaid and Medicare certification inspection survey data suffer from a
number of problems that require correction, despite some pre-processing already having
been done to the data for the years 2000-2015 by the LTCFocus project. First, while the
certification inspections generating these data are in principle conducted annually, occa-
sionally state agencies fail to conduct annual inspections on schedule or entirely. When
nursing homes have their surveys conducted off-schedule (e.g., as a result of one survey
being conducted in January and the next in December of the same year), the LTCFocus
data address this by assigning to each year the survey conducted closest to that year’s
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midpoint. I replicate this same correction procedure within my version of the same data
from 1996-1999.
Second, the survey data were subject to a number of data entry and reporting errors
that I correct through manual review. These errors potentially are a result of the data
collection process involving complicated forms and multiple stages of manual data entry
and re-entry. One such issue is that data on resident counts by payer status (Medicaid,
Medicare, and all others) sometimes were entered into the wrong column, resulting in
errors like entries for Medicaid and Medicare residents being transposed. For example,
one can observe nursing homes with hundreds of residents reporting 70-20-10 Medicaid-
Medicare-Other resident splits nearly every year for a decade that then, for a single year
in the middle of the decade, report a 20-70-10 split. When this type of problem clearly
presents itself, I manually correct it by transposing back the data to match the nursing
home’s typical resident share split.
A number of other problems affecting the data on resident counts by payer type oc-
casionally produce obviously incorrect values, but are harder to precisely diagnose. For
example, sometimes nursing homes report exactly even splits of residents by payer sta-
tus across the categories of residents the nursing home admits (e.g., 33-33-33, or 50-0-50).
When these exactly even splits are reported only for a small number of years and represent
vary large deviations from the nursing home’s usual resident allocation, I judge the exactly
even splits as likely to be spurious data. In these and similar cases, I keep the nursing
home’s resident count the same and reallocate residents across payer categories to match
the mean of the nursing home’s resident allocations observed in the years surrounding the
problematic data point or data points.
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A final set of problems that I correct through manual review is the presence of obser-
vations from nursing homes surveyed in the midst of opening or closing. These nursing
homes tend to report employment totals consistent with their eventual or former resident
population but extremely low resident counts, resulting in very unlikely staffing ratios. I
address this problem in part by dropping nursing home observations with two or fewer
residents, but I also manually drop these nursing home observations when the nursing
homes have greater than two residents and appear to report erroneous data.
Although I correct the above data issues by way of manual review, I did not review
every single data point in my dataset. Rather, I reviewed all data for any nursing home
with more than 5 observations and an observation meeting one of the following criteria:
• its initial observation in the dataset had a resident count an order of magnitude dif-
ferent from its immediately ensuing data
• its share of residents on Medicaid changed by 40 percentage points or more in a
single year
• its number of total residents, Medicare residents, or Medicaid residents deviated
from its median number in some year by a factor of 4 or more
• its share of residents on Medicaid (or its actual resident total) was reported as 0,
although the median value was 40 percent (or 50 residents) or more
Note that within the estimation sample, only 415 nursing home year observations were
manually corrected. Re-estimating the within-state employment per resident-day and di-
rect care worker wage results after dropping all manually edited data points yields essen-
tially identical point estimates as to when the corrections are included. Re-estimating with
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all observations but without corrections attenuates point estimates and expands standard
errors.
In addition to these issues corrected through manual review, I also dropped cer-
tain observations according to some more general trimming rules. The motive for these
trimming rules is that a variety of data entry errors, and in particular misplaced decimal
point errors, were fairly common in the data collection process, resulting in some wildly
inaccurate resident count and employment figures. I drop nursing home observations if
they had registered nurse employment to resident-day ratios equal to 0 or exceeding 3.2
hours per resident-day, licensed practical nurse ratios less than 0.05 hours per resident-day
or exceeding 4 hours per resident-day, or nursing assistant ratios less than 0.5 hours per
resident-day or exceeding 6 hours per resident-day. These trimming thresholds were sug-
gested by the Cowles Research Group, which calibrated them based off of interviews with
nurses and other subject area experts. I additionally drop nursing homes that report more
than 8 hours of total direct care worker hours per nursing home bed, a cleaning standard
used in the LTCFocus data. Finally, I drop the small number of additional nursing homes
reporting internally inconsistent observations, such as observations where the number of
nursing home residents reported exceeds the number of beds in the facility.
An additional concern with these data are that some nursing homes appear to have
duplicate observations in the sample, listing precisely identical resident counts, shares of
residents on Medicaid and Medicare, and employee staffing ratios by employee type in
consecutive years. In these cases, I randomly select one of the duplicate observations and
drop the others.
A final concern with these data relates to the difficulty in linking nursing homes over
time. This process is complicated by states occasionally adjusting nursing home provider
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numbers as well as due to provider numbers sometimes changing in response to nursing
home changes in formal ownership, certification status, and the like. In order to address
this, for the years 2000 to 2015, I use a panel identifier constructed by LTCFocus to track
specific facilities over time. I then link between the 1996-1999 sample and the 2000-2015
sample using the reported facility provider numbers in 1999 and 2000. I then address
the relatively small number of observations that fail to match between 1999 and 2000 or
between years in the 1996-1999 sample using a matching procedure that links nursing
homes using nursing home names and addresses.
II.XII Within-State Empirical Approach Appendix
II.XII.I Standard Errors
The primary test statistics I use in the within-state regressions are calculated using a
randomization inference procedure inspired by Fisher (1925). Details on the method used
for doing so are as follows. For each policy event, I randomly select a control state that,
at the same time, had no other major policy events occurring. I assign that control state
to replace the genuine treatment state for that policy event within my sample. Then, I cal-
culate the effective subsidy amount that would have been received by each nursing home
in the control state had it adopted the treatment state’s subsidy formula.56 I then conduct
my regression of interest on this randomly constructed placebo sample and obtain a re-
gression coefficient. I then repeat this procedure 1000 times to obtain a distribution of such
coefficients. Given this distribution, I report its standard deviation and the percentile rank
of the genuine treatment group’s coefficient within it, taking any observations appearing
56When the treatment state uses an allocated payment style subsidy formula, I adjust the statewide total
subsidy amount in the control state to match expenditure in the treatment state in per Medicaid resident-day
terms.
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in the top or bottom 2.5 percent of the effect distribution as being statistically significant at
the 5 percent level.
The randomization inference approach above should address the design-based justi-
fication for clustering standard errors while avoiding the pitfalls of other approaches that
produce undersized test statistics. Note that, strictly speaking, this randomization infer-
ence procedure does not test coefficients against the null hypothesis of subsidies having
zero effect unless the mean effect of placebo subsidies in the control states is zero. As such,
to the extent that the subsidy formulas generate any mechanical bias linking outcomes
with the subsidy amount variables, these randomization inference test statistics test the
observed subsidy effects less any mechanical bias against a null hypothesis of zero and so
should be viewed as more conservative than other methods. However, note that the instru-
mental variable placebo effect estimates from the within-and-across state analysis using all
control states are close to 0, suggesting that this procedure does in effect test against a null
hypothesis of zero in at least the instrumental variable case.
In addition to the randomization inference test statistics, I present secondary test
statistics based off of standard errors calculated analytically and clustered at the policy
event level. Given that I have only 14 policy events, I likely have too few clusters for an-
alytic clustering to provide reliable standard error estimates (Cameron et al., 2008). How-
ever, standard solutions like wild cluster bootstrapping perform poorly when clusters are
few in number and very heterogeneous in size (Ibragimov and Müller, 2016), as is the
case in my setting where clusters include states with wildly varying nursing home counts
like Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, and Florida. Since wild cluster bootstrap-based test
statistics turn out to be generally similar to those obtained using analytic clustering in
my setting but carry the disadvantage of being more complicated without necessarily be-
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ing superior, I only present the analytic standard errors as the comparison alternative to
my preferred randomization inference-based approach. Note that, as a fourth alternative,
I could calculate p-values according to the method proposed by Ibragimov and Müller
(2016), which is valid even for small numbers of clusters of heterogeneous size. For their
method, test statistics are obtained for each regression by estimating it separately within
each cluster and then t-testing the set of coefficients from each cluster specific regression.
This approach, however, seems likely to produce undersized test statistics in my setting
since it does not allow for taking much advantage of the available independent within-
state variation in treatment.
II.XII.II Estimates of Other Nursing Home Responses to Payroll Subsidies
In addition to effects on employment and wages, one may also be interested in the
effect of payroll subsidies on other possible nursing home responses. Table II.13 presents
within-state estimates of the effect of payroll subsidy receipt on nursing home resident
counts, nursing home occupancy rates, an index of the severity of nursing home residents’
care needs (Resident Acuity), and the share of nursing home residents on Medicaid. Per
the randomization inference tests, no statistically significant subsidy effects on any of these
outcomes are found at the 5 percent level in either the instrumental variable or ordinary
least squares regressions. The point estimates and analytically clustered standard errors,
however, are suggestive in the instrumental variable regressions of negative subsidy ef-
fects on resident counts, occupancy rates, and shares of residents on Medicaid coupled
with increases in average resident care needs. The ordinary least squares regressions show
still more negative effects on resident counts and occupancy rates, similar effects on resi-
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dent care needs, and a similarly sized but opposite signed positive effect on nursing home
shares of residents on Medicaid.
While the positive point estimates of subsidy effects on resident acuity are sensible
in that they imply nursing homes take on residents with greater care needs as the cost of
providing that care falls, the effects on resident counts and resident Medicaid shares are
counterintuitive. While it is worth stressing that none of these effects are statistically signif-
icant, they perhaps deserve some comment nonetheless. First, negative effects on resident
counts and positive effects on Medicaid shares in the ordinary least squares estimates may
be a result of mechanical endogeneity between these outcomes and the subsidy amount
offered, since subsidy amounts per resident-day are generally increasing in the share of
residents on Medicaid (generating multiplication bias) and decreasing in nursing home
resident counts (generating division bias). The fact that switching to the instrumental
variable strategy shifts these estimates away from the expected direction of the mechanical
bias would seem to support this hypothesis. Furthermore, the fact that the randomization
inference method finds no statistically significant OLS effect on resident count, despite
producing reasonably tight standard deviations, suggests that the distribution of placebo
estimates is not centered with mean 0, consistent with the resident count placebo effect
estimate distribution having been shifted by the proposed mechanical bias as well.
The instrumental variable estimate of a negative subsidy effect on Medicaid shares
cannot be explained by this same mechanical bias, though may be due instead to non-
classical measurement error. As nursing homes approach the 100 percent of residents on
Medicaid upper bound, the distribution of Medicaid resident share shocks they face be-
comes censored on the right since no shock can push them above a 100 percent Medicaid
share. These nursing homes, due to state subsidy formulas that offer effective subsidy
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amounts increasing in a nursing home’s share of residents on Medicaid, also face higher
effective subsidy amounts. As a result, there is a correlation between even instrumented
subsidy amounts and negative Medicaid resident share shocks. This could, in turn, explain
the negative coefficient estimate. The estimated effects on resident counts, occupancy, and
Medicaid resident shares thus should be regarded as potentially spurious.57
II.XII.III Log-Log Within-State Estimates
In the main body of this research, I calculate the elasticities of employment and
wages to subsidies given the subsidy effect estimates and the characteristics of the average
nursing home. An alternative approach is to obtain them by re-estimating the within-state
approach’s primary regressions after log transforming the subsidy and outcome variables.
As in the main body of the text, the log transformed subsidy variable and subsidy instru-
ment are summed with state-wide sample-average Medicaid per resident-day payment
rates prior to log transformation. The results from adopting this alternative approach are
reported in Table II.14. These elasticities are similar to those calculated in the main text.
II.XII.IV Robustness to Dropping Low Medicaid Share and Low Subsidy Rate
Nursing Homes
One concern about the within-state research design is that nursing homes with very
low shares of residents on Medicaid or nursing homes otherwise receiving very low sub-
sidy amounts may be on different trends in wages and employment than other nursing
homes. In order to see if these potential differential pre-trends bias the within-state sub-
sidy effect estimates, I re-estimate the primary within-state results dropping these nursing
57Additionally, regressing pre-treatment trends in shares of residents on Medicaid on eventual changes in
subsidy amounts offered yields rather substantial negative pre-trends, further suggesting against interpreting
these effects as unbiased.
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homes. Table II.5 presents these results dropping the bottom 5 percent of nursing homes
in terms of the absolute value of the mean change in subsidy amounts they faced. This 5
percent threshold falls at nursing homes receiving less than a 24.3 cent change in subsidy
amount per resident-day. Table II.16 is similar but sets the threshold at the bottom 10 per-
cent, or nursing homes receiving a change in subsidy amount per resident-day of less than
84.7 cents. Table II.17 gives these results for models estimated after dropping the bottom 5
percent of nursing homes in terms of within-treatment-sample average share of residents
on Medicaid, so all nursing homes with 1.2 percent or fewer residents on Medicaid. Finally,
Table II.18 drops all nursing homes with average share of residents on Medicaid below the
10 percent threshold, amounting to nursing homes with average Medicaid resident shares
under 32.5 percent.
Across these four different cases, there is remarkably little variation in the estimated
effect of subsidies on employment per resident-day and on average direct care worker
hourly wages. While subsidy employment effect estimates attenuate somewhat when
dropping the bottom ten percent of nursing homes by amount of subsidies received, drop-
ping the bottom ten percent of nursing homes by share of residents on Medicaid increases
point estimates. Cumulatively, this evidence is not consistent with differential pre-trends
or other unusual behavior among less subsidized or among low Medicaid resident share
nursing homes driving the primary within-state results.
II.XII.V Robustness to Restricting to One Policy Event per State
One concern with the within-state results is that inclusion of states with more than
one policy event may yield biased results, potentially due to the characteristics used in the
simulated subsidy instrument for the second policy event including nursing home obser-
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vations from the first policy event’s treatment period. To allay concerns that inclusion of
these second policy events is biasing the primary results in some way, I re-estimate the
within-state results dropping the second policy events occurring in Montana and Mas-
sachusetts, the only states with more than one policy event in the treatment sample. These
results are in Table II.19 and are not substantially different from the full sample results:
point estimates are essentially the same and carry similar randomization inference based
test statistics.
II.XIII Difference-in-Differences Results Appendix
Prior literature relied on state difference-in-differences research designs to estimate
the effect of payroll subsidy adoption on average nursing home staffing ratios. My state
difference-in-differences estimates of the wage and employment effects of subsidy adop-
tion using the set of all unconfounded control states as the control group are listed in Table
II.20. These results are uniformly statistically insignificant, though point estimates suggest
that the effect of subsidy adoption is to increase average employment of direct care workers
across all nursing homes by 1.7 minutes per resident-day, an effect driven almost entirely
by a staffing increase among nursing assistants. While statistical insignificance due to re-
duced precision in this setting should not be surprising — the difference-in-differences
regression greatly reduces the amount of identifying variation used and so should have
less power — this point estimate is almost an order of magnitude smaller than the 11.4
minute per resident-day average effect implied by the main within-state results.58 While
5811.4 minutes being approximately equal to the average subsidy amount offered, $2.32, times the effect of
subsidies on direct care worker staffing, 4.9 minutes per resident-day per subsidy dollar.
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also statistically insignificant, the point estimate for the effect on average direct care worker
hourly wages is 22 cents, a figure closer to the implied average effect of 31 cents from the
within-state analysis.59 The comparable results using the geographic neighbor state ap-
proach are listed in Table II.21 and are similar in terms of wage results though smaller in
terms of employment per resident-day results. Finally, the results from the difference-in-
differences estimates using the synthetic controls approach are available in Table II.22 and
are very similar to the results from the all unconfounded control states case.
The small magnitude of the difference-in-differences employment results, coupled
with the relatively full sized wage results, lend themselves to a number of interpretations.
One possibility is that the expected selection into treatment on negative employment per
resident-day trends and positive hourly wage trends severely biases the estimated effects
of subsidy adoption, even within geographically paired states and among states matched
on pre-trends exhibited immediately prior to treatment. A second interpretation is that the
difference-in-differences estimates may be attenuated by measurement error, generated by
their inability to capture variation in the degree of subsidization across states adopting
differently sized subsidies and within the few states which phased in their full subsidy
payments over two years. A third interpretation is that these difference-in-differences esti-
mates represent the genuine state average subsidy effects and that the within-state subsidy
estimates yield positive employment effects only because they are picking up reallocation
of workers across nursing homes within states. For this hypothesis to be true, nurse and
nursing assistant labor, even in relatively large states like Florida and Massachusetts, must
be supplied inelastically. The reasonably large positive difference-in-differences wage ef-
fects observed are consistent with this explanation, since market level wage increases cou-
5931 cents being approximately equal to the average subsidy amount offered, $2.32, times the effect of
subsidies on the average direct care worker hourly wages, 13 cents per subsidy dollar.
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pled with variation in subsidies across firms could be the mechanism through which this
reallocation occurs. However, this hypothesis is not consistent with the semiparametric
difference-in-differences evidence presented in Figure II.6 showing that employment does
not decline at less subsidized nursing homes.
In order to provide additional evidence about which of these explanations is most
likely, I conduct pre-trend tests here analogous to those used in the within-state pre-trend
tests. Here, I conduct the difference-in-differences regressions within one-year symmetric
treatment windows, varying the center of those windows through a range of years from
three years prior to subsidy adoption to one year after subsidy adoption. The results from
these regressions for the all states control group case are in Table II.23. These results point
toward the presence of positive pre-trends in staffing and wages immediately prior to sub-
sidy adoption, but with large negative pre-trends in the years still prior to those. While the
estimated coefficients generally are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, the
pre-trend magnitudes are large relative to the main difference-in-differences estimates.
Table II.24 presents similar results to those in Table II.23, except for the geographic
neighbors case, with the results being qualitatively similar to those found in the all states
case. Note that in both cases, subsidy adoption effects tend to be larger in the year after
subsidy adoption than in the year of subsidy adoption, potentially reflecting that the subsi-
dies are more likely to be completely phased in during the second year relative to the first.
Finally, Table II.25 presents these same results for the synthetic control sample. Relative to
the other results, the synthetic controls procedure successfully helped to shrink the mag-
nitude of pre-trend differences in the time period immediately prior to subsidy adoption.
This is to be expected, as these are the pre-trends used in constructing the synthetic control
states. However, even given the small immediate pre-trends, there appears to remain sub-
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stantial negative pre-trend differences in the treatment windows centered two and three
years prior to the actual adoption of subsidies.
Cumulatively, the evidence from these tests suggest that the difference-in-differences
estimates of subsidy efficacy are not trustworthy. It appears that the twin problems of low
statistical power and selection into subsidy adoption on employment and wage trends are
very difficult to surmount using state-level policy variation. While these difference-in-
differences estimates could be read to suggest that the within-state estimates are spurious
and driven solely by shifting in employment across nursing homes, there is little evidence
per Figure II.6 of there being reductions in employment at the nursing homes from which
employment supposedly would have shifted. Overall, these results comport with expec-
tations that the difference-in-differences research design may be a poor tool for use in this
setting.
II.XIV Within-and-Across-State Pre-trends Appendix
In order to further test the validity of the subsidy effect estimates from the within-
and-across-state empirical approach, I estimate pre-trend tests for these regressions similar
to those used in the within-state case. In particular, within a one-year symmetric window
of data centered at varying years before and after the policy change, I regress direct care
worker employment per resident-day, average hourly wages, and payroll per resident-day
on instrumented subsidy amounts offered and on instrumented placebo subsidy amounts
offered, conditional on state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects.
Results for the all unconfounded control states case are in Table II.26. These exhibit
subsidy effect pre-trends reasonably similar to those in the within-state results. Table II.27
presents these results for the sample using the paired geographic neighbors control group.
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The estimated pre-trends in subsidy effects, while not necessarily small in magnitude, are
statistically insignificant and inconsistent across time periods. Furthermore, note that the
geographic neighbors control group seems to have had some success in suppressing pre-
trend differences, reducing the magnitude of employment per resident-day pre-trends in
the years just prior to subsidy adoption, though at the apparent cost of larger wage pre-
trends. Finally, Table II.28 presents these results using the synthetic control group, yielding
estimates similar to the results in the all unconfounded controls case. Cumulatively, this
evidence suggests that the within-and-across-state approaches contribute to identification
by partially suppressing the influence of pre-trend differences in employment and wages
across nursing homes, as well as by controlling for any shocks correlated with subsidies
contemporaneous to subsidy adoption and common between the treatment and control
groups. However, these approaches do not completely purge the sample of the influence
of all possible pre-trend differences across subsidized nursing homes, as pre-trend corre-
lations with future subsidy receipt retain non-zero magnitudes in many cases.
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II.XV Appendix Tables
Table II.13: Response of Resident Count, Occupancy, Resident Acuity, and Share of Resi-
dents on Medicaid to Subsidies per Resident-Day
Residents Occupancy Resident Acuity Pct Medicaid
OLS
Subsidy −2.024* −1.726* 0.051* 1.124+
(0.768) (0.609) (0.018) (0.571)
Fisher Rank 0.448 0.483 0.922 0.948
Fisher SD [0.567] [0.567] [0.018] [0.377]
Mean Effect −7.759% −4.932% 1.160% 4.282%
IV
Subsidy −1.090 −0.876 0.046* −1.116*
(0.700) (0.689) (0.013) (0.415)
Fisher Rank 0.083 0.348 0.950+ 0.444
Fisher SD [0.350] [0.487] [0.020] [0.387]
Mean Effect −4.179% −2.502% 1.031% −4.251%
Clusters 14 14 14 14
Obs 11685 11685 11685 11683
All estimates are coefficients from independent regressions of nursing home resident counts, nursing home occupancy
rates, nursing home resident acuity, and the share of nursing home residents on Medicaid on simulated subsidy amounts
offered conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These regressions are
estimated within two-year symmetric windows around each policy change. Simulated subsidies are the simulated
maximum amount a nursing home could receive in terms of dollars per resident-day given its observed characteristics,
which is instrumented for in the IV case using the amount simulated using the same formula but a fixed set of pre-subsidy
adoption characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event level.
Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the
coefficient. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the percentile rank of the listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo
coefficients, each calculated on a randomly selected placebo sample. Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent
tails subsidy of the placebo effect distribution are denoted with a * and a + respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard
deviation of the distribution of placebo coefficients. The “Mean Effect” is the mean of the effect of subsidies across all
subsidized nursing homes, calculated by scaling the simulated subsidy rates offered to nursing homes by the estimated
regression coefficients and dividing by the corresponding outcome variables. The cluster count is the number of policy
events in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.14: Elasticity of Direct Care Worker Employment Minutes per Resident-Day, Aver-
age Hourly Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing DCW Avg Wage DCW PPR
OLS
Subsidy 6.197* 6.251* 5.770* 1.334* 3.698*
(1.596) (1.822) (1.614) (0.452) (1.360)
Fisher Rank 0.890 0.816 0.969+ 0.996* 0.799
Fisher SD [1.582] [1.944] [1.161] [0.466] [1.109]
IV
Subsidy 4.140+ 3.990+ 4.187+ 1.659* 2.756
(1.996) (1.917) (2.316) (0.562) (2.365)
Fisher Rank 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 0.994* 0.931
Fisher SD [0.993] [1.233] [0.930] [0.552] [1.172]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 11685 11685 11685 7719 7785
All estimates are coefficients from independent regressions of log nursing home employment per resident-day by worker
type, log direct care worker (DCW) average hourly wage, or log direct care worker payroll per resident-day on log
simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed
effects. Prior to logging the simulated subsidy amounts, they are summed with their state’s average daily Medicaid
payment rate from within the sample, in order to allow for interpretation of the subsidies as a payment increase relative to
the baseline Medicaid payments. These regressions are estimated within two-year symmetric windows around each policy
change. Simulated subsidies are the simulated maximum amount a nursing home could receive in terms of dollars per
resident-day given its observed characteristics, which is instrumented for in the IV case using the amount simulated using
the same formula but a fixed set of pre-subsidy adoption characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated
analytically and clustered at the policy event level. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by
either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the coefficient. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the percentile rank of the listed
coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo coefficients, each calculated on a randomly selected placebo sample.
Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent tails subsidy of the placebo effect distribution are denoted with a * and a
+ respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard deviation of the distribution of placebo coefficients. The “Mean Effect” is
the mean of the effect of subsidies across all subsidized nursing homes, calculated by scaling the simulated subsidy rates
offered to nursing homes by the estimated regression coefficients and dividing by the corresponding outcome variables.
The cluster count is the number of policy events in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing
home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.15: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Sample Excluding Bottom 5 percent of
Nursing Homes by Subsidy Amount
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 5.252+ 3.398+ 1.853 0.103 0.947
(2.883) (1.822) (1.154) (0.059) (1.121)
Fisher Rank 0.999* 1.000* 0.996* 0.934 0.877
Fisher SD [1.457] [1.168] [0.558] [0.066] [0.748]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 11150 11150 11150 7617 7744
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions where the bottom 5 percent of nursing
homes by the absolute value of the change in subsidization are dropped (i.e., dropping nursing homes with less than a 24.3
cent change in subsidy per resident-day). Outcome variables include direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant
(CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care worker average hourly wages and direct care
worker payroll per resident-day. These are regressed on simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on state-by-year
fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These regressions are estimated within two-year symmetric
windows around each policy change. Simulated subsidies are the simulated maximum amount a nursing home could
receive in terms of dollars per resident-day given its observed characteristics, which is instrumented for using the amount
simulated using the same formula but a fixed set of pre-subsidy adoption characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event level. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are
denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the coefficient. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the percentile rank of the
listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo coefficients, each calculated on a randomly selected placebo sample.
Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent tails subsidy of the placebo effect distribution are denoted with a * and a
+ respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard deviation of the distribution of placebo coefficients. The cluster count is the
number of policy events in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in
the sample.
Table II.16: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Sample Excluding Bottom 10 percent of
Nursing Homes by Subsidy Amount
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 3.884* 2.323* 1.560 0.090 0.703
(1.743) (1.019) (0.933) (0.057) (1.043)
Fisher Rank 0.999* 0.995* 0.998* 0.890 0.807
Fisher SD [1.540] [1.250] [0.574] [0.072] [0.761]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 10606 10606 10606 7313 7475
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions where the bottom 10 percent of nursing
homes by the absolute value of the change in subsidization are dropped (i.e., dropping nursing homes with less than a 84.7
cent change in subsidy per resident-day). Outcome variables include direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant
(CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care worker average hourly wages and direct care
worker payroll per resident-day. These are regressed on simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on state-by-year
fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These regressions are estimated within two-year symmetric
windows around each policy change. Simulated subsidies are the simulated maximum amount a nursing home could
receive in terms of dollars per resident-day given its observed characteristics, which is instrumented for using the amount
simulated using the same formula but a fixed set of pre-subsidy adoption characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event level. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are
denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the coefficient. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the percentile rank of the
listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo coefficients, each calculated on a randomly selected placebo sample.
Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent tails subsidy of the placebo effect distribution are denoted with a * and a
+ respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard deviation of the distribution of placebo coefficients. The cluster count is the
number of policy events in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in
the sample.
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Table II.17: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Sample Excluding Bottom 5 percent of
Nursing Homes by Share of Residents on Medicaid
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 5.364+ 3.322+ 2.041 0.102+ 1.042
(2.911) (1.679) (1.305) (0.051) (1.168)
Fisher Rank 1.000* 1.000* 0.997* 0.953+ 0.906
Fisher SD [1.368] [1.081] [0.553] [0.062] [0.689]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 11186 11186 11186 7646 7760
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions where the bottom 5 percent of nursing
homes by their own sample average share of residents on Medicaid are dropped (i.e., dropping nursing homes with less
than 1.2 percent of residents on Medicaid). Outcome variables include direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing
assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care worker average hourly wages and
direct care worker payroll per resident-day. These are regressed on simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on
state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These regressions are estimated within two-year
symmetric windows around each policy change. Simulated subsidies are the simulated maximum amount a nursing home
could receive in terms of dollars per resident-day given its observed characteristics, which is instrumented for using the
amount simulated using the same formula but a fixed set of pre-subsidy adoption characteristics. Standard errors in
parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event level. Significance levels implied by these standard
errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the coefficient. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the percentile
rank of the listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo coefficients, each calculated on a randomly selected
placebo sample. Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent tails subsidy of the placebo effect distribution are
denoted with a * and a + respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard deviation of the distribution of placebo coefficients.
The cluster count is the number of policy events in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing
home-year observations in the sample.
Table II.18: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Sample Excluding Bottom 10 percent of
Nursing Homes by Share of Residents on Medicaid
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 5.976+ 3.939+ 2.036 0.130+ 1.024
(3.018) (1.940) (1.220) (0.065) (1.198)
Fisher Rank 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 0.938 0.904
Fisher SD [1.591] [1.264] [0.590] [0.080] [0.671]
Clusters 14 14 14 14 14
Obs 10744 10744 10744 7486 7635
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions where the bottom 10 percent of nursing
homes by their own sample average share of residents on Medicaid are dropped (i.e., dropping nursing homes with less
than 32.5 percent of residents on Medicaid). Outcome variables include direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing
assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care worker average hourly wages and
direct care worker payroll per resident-day. These are regressed on simulated subsidy amounts offered conditional on
state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These regressions are estimated within two-year
symmetric windows around each policy change. Simulated subsidies are the simulated maximum amount a nursing home
could receive in terms of dollars per resident-day given its observed characteristics, which is instrumented for using the
amount simulated using the same formula but a fixed set of pre-subsidy adoption characteristics. Standard errors in
parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event level. Significance levels implied by these standard
errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the coefficient. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the percentile
rank of the listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo coefficients, each calculated on a randomly selected
placebo sample. Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent tails subsidy of the placebo effect distribution are
denoted with a * and a + respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard deviation of the distribution of placebo coefficients.
The cluster count is the number of policy events in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing
home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.19: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Sample Including Only One Policy Event
per State
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy 4.892 3.116+ 1.774 0.135+ 0.952
(2.942) (1.600) (1.379) (0.068) (1.540)
Fisher Rank 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 0.983* 0.926
Fisher SD [1.136] [0.906] [0.483] [0.063] [0.646]
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12
Obs 9756 9756 9756 6167 6225
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions where the second policy event in
multi-policy event states is dropped (i.e., the second event in Massachusetts and Montana). Outcome variables include
direct care worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct
care worker average hourly wages and direct care worker payroll per resident-day. These are regressed on simulated
subsidy amounts offered conditional on state-by-year fixed effects and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects. These
regressions are estimated within two-year symmetric windows around each policy change. Simulated subsidies are the
simulated maximum amount a nursing home could receive in terms of dollars per resident-day given its observed
characteristics, which is instrumented for using the amount simulated using the same formula but a fixed set of
pre-subsidy adoption characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy
event level. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on
the coefficient. The listed “Fisher Rank” is the percentile rank of the listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo
coefficients, each calculated on a randomly selected placebo sample. Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent
tails subsidy of the placebo effect distribution are denoted with a * and a + respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard
deviation of the distribution of placebo coefficients. The cluster count is the number of policy events in the sample, while
the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
Table II.20: Difference-in-Differences Effect of Subsidy Adoption on Direct Care Worker
Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day in Subsidy States Relative to in All
Control States
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy Adoption 1.651 1.594 0.057 0.222 0.650
(1.213) (1.227) (0.326) (0.134) (0.933)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 326852 326852 326852 207280 208096
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of minutes of direct care worker (DCW),
certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse employment per resident-day or of the average direct care worker
hourly wages on an indicator variable that is 1 in states and years where subsidies are being offered and 0 otherwise. These
regressions are conditional on nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects and year fixed effects shared between each pair
of treatment and control states. The regressions are estimated within a two-year symmetric window around each policy
change using the set of all unconfounded control states as the control group for each policy event. Standard errors in
parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event by treatment vs. control group level. Significance
levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1). The cluster count is the number of
treatment policy events and paired control groups in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing
home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.21: Difference-in-Differences Effect of Subsidy Adoption on Direct Care Worker
Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day in Subsidy States Relative to in Geo-
graphically Neighboring Control States
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy Adoption 0.359 0.332 0.027 0.210 0.466
(0.661) (0.610) (0.245) (0.133) (0.753)
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
Obs 39789 39789 39789 26731 26856
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of minutes of direct care worker (DCW),
certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse employment per resident-day or of the average direct care worker
hourly wages on an indicator variable that is 1 in states and years where subsidies are being offered and 0 otherwise. These
regressions are conditional on nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects and year fixed effects shared within each pair of
treatment and control states. The regressions are estimated within a two-year symmetric window around each policy
change using paired geographically neighboring states as the control group for each policy event. Standard errors in
parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the treatment state-neighbor pair level, resulting in one cluster per
geographic neighbor. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1). The
cluster count is the number of treatment policy events and paired control groups in the sample, while the observation
count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
Table II.22: Difference-in-Differences Effect of Subsidy Adoption on Direct Care Worker
Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day in Subsidy States Relative to in Syn-
thetic Control States
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
Subsidy Adoption 1.493 1.826+ −0.333 0.315* 1.694+
(1.002) (0.894) (0.502) (0.116) (0.910)
Fisher Rank 0.851 0.886 0.403 0.995* 0.935
Fisher SD [1.420] [1.357] [0.462] [0.118] [1.155]
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 49115 49115 49115 31497 31649
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of minutes of direct care worker (DCW),
certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse employment per resident-day or of the average direct care worker
hourly wages on an indicator variable that is 1 in states and years where subsidies are being offered and 0 otherwise. These
regressions are conditional on nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects and year fixed effects shared between each pair
of treatment and synthetic control states. The regressions are estimated within a two-year symmetric window around each
policy change using the set of all unconfounded control states as the control group for each policy event. Standard errors in
parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event by treatment vs. synthetic control group level.
Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1). The listed “Fisher Rank”
is the percentile rank of the listed coefficient within a distribution of 1000 placebo coefficients, each calculated on a
randomly selected placebo sample. Rankings in the extreme 2.5 percent and 5 percent tails subsidy of the placebo effect
distribution are denoted with a * and a + respectively. The “Fisher SD” is the standard deviation of the distribution of
placebo coefficients. The cluster count is the number of treatment policy events and paired control groups in the sample,
while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.23: Difference-in-Differences Effect of Subsidy Adoption on Direct Care Worker
Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day in Subsidy States Relative to in All
Control States, Estimated within 1 Year Symmetric Windows Centered Around Varying
Years Relative to Subsidy Adoption or Repeal
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
3 Years Before
Subsidy Adoption −3.364* −2.173* −1.190* −0.295* −1.521*
(1.219) (0.896) (0.454) (0.075) (0.567)
Clusters 16 16 16 16 16
Obs 69608 69608 69608 43210 43376
2 Years Before
Subsidy Adoption −1.860+ −1.183+ −0.677 0.019 −0.973+
(0.965) (0.655) (0.527) (0.114) (0.541)
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26
Obs 101664 101664 101664 59774 59946
1 Year Before
Subsidy Adoption 1.501 0.694 0.806* 0.075 −0.823
(0.937) (0.779) (0.248) (0.129) (0.920)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 126888 126888 126888 75362 75766
Contemporaneous
Subsidy Adoption 0.255 0.351 −0.096 0.165 0.444
(1.128) (0.968) (0.365) (0.126) (0.953)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 145638 145638 145638 84426 84866
1 Year After
Subsidy Adoption 0.778 0.928 −0.150 0.086 1.014
(0.792) (0.752) (0.349) (0.081) (0.675)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 133394 133394 133394 79890 80408
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of minutes of direct care worker (DCW),
certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse employment per resident-day or of the average direct care worker
hourly wages on an indicator variable that is 1 in states and years where subsidies are being offered and 0 otherwise. These
regressions are conditional on nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects and year fixed effects shared between each pair
of treatment and control states. The regressions are estimated within a one-year symmetric window centered at the time
specified in the panel relative to when the actual policy change occurred. The full sample included here includes as
controls all unconfounded control states. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the
policy event by treatment vs. control group level. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by
either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1). The cluster count is the number of treatment policy events and paired control groups in the
sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.24: Difference-in-Differences Effect of Subsidy Adoption on Direct Care Worker
Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day in Subsidy States Relative to in Ge-
ographically Neighboring Control States, Estimated within 1 Year Symmetric Windows
Centered Around Varying Years Relative to Subsidy Adoption or Repeal
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
3 Years Before
Subsidy Adoption −4.423* −3.561* −0.861 −0.680* −3.981+
(1.584) (1.321) (0.570) (0.298) (2.000)
Clusters 23 23 23 23 23
Obs 8824 8824 8824 5570 5652
2 Years Before
Subsidy Adoption −2.053+ −1.553+ −0.500 0.030 −1.685
(1.100) (0.832) (0.419) (0.055) (1.062)
Clusters 35 35 35 34 34
Obs 12802 12802 12802 7820 7882
1 Year Before
Subsidy Adoption 0.703 0.171 0.531+ 0.166 1.378
(0.978) (0.768) (0.305) (0.157) (1.279)
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
Obs 16040 16040 16040 9954 9912
Contemporaneous
Subsidy Adoption −1.153 −0.663 −0.490 0.135 −0.497
(0.823) (0.603) (0.416) (0.163) (0.831)
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
Obs 18228 18228 18228 11458 11530
1 Year After
Subsidy Adoption 1.281 0.680 0.601 −0.007 1.064
(0.862) (0.783) (0.429) (0.127) (0.717)
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
Obs 16744 16744 16744 10924 11078
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of minutes of direct care worker (DCW),
certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse employment per resident-day or of the average direct care worker
hourly wages on an indicator variable that is 1 in states and years where subsidies are being offered and 0 otherwise. These
regressions are conditional on nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects and year fixed effects shared between each pair
of treatment and control states. The regressions are estimated within a one-year symmetric window centered at the time
specified in the panel relative to when the actual policy change occurred. The full sample included here includes only
subsidy states and their geographic neighbors. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at
the treatment state-neighbor pair level, resulting in one cluster per geographic neighbor. Significance levels implied by
these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1). The cluster count is the number of treatment policy
events and paired control groups in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year
observations in the sample.
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Table II.25: Difference-in-Differences Effect of Subsidy Adoption on Direct Care Worker
Employment, Wages, and Payroll per Resident-Day in Subsidy States Relative to in Syn-
thetic Control States, Estimated within 1 Year Symmetric Windows Centered Around Vary-
ing Years Relative to Subsidy Adoption or Repeal
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
3 Years Before
Subsidy Adoption −3.923* −3.181* −0.741* −0.606* −4.837*
(1.279) (0.983) (0.333) (0.203) (2.025)
Clusters 16 16 16 16 16
Obs 9972 9972 9972 6140 6228
2 Years Before
Subsidy Adoption −0.993 −0.368 −0.624 0.128 −2.116*
(1.113) (0.639) (0.591) (0.140) (0.906)
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26
Obs 15536 15536 15536 8992 9036
1 Year Before
Subsidy Adoption 0.245 0.176 0.067 0.044 0.014
(0.144) (0.122) (0.081) (0.053) (0.428)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 18928 18928 18928 11278 11332
Contemporaneous
Subsidy Adoption 0.098 0.344 −0.246 0.274* 1.189
(1.033) (0.811) (0.471) (0.101) (0.976)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 21996 21996 21996 13078 13142
1 Year After
Subsidy Adoption 1.067 1.315+ −0.248 0.032 0.546
(0.687) (0.760) (0.341) (0.124) (0.830)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 20214 20214 20214 12346 12488
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions of minutes of direct care worker (DCW),
certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse employment per resident-day or of the average direct care worker
hourly wages on an indicator variable that is 1 in states and years where subsidies are being offered and 0 otherwise. These
regressions are conditional on nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects and year fixed effects shared between each pair
of treatment and synthetic control states. The regressions are estimated within a one-year symmetric window centered at
the time specified in the panel relative to when the actual policy change occurred. The sample included here consists of
just treatment states and their synthetic control states. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and
clustered at the policy event by treatment vs. control group level. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are
denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1). The cluster count is the number of treatment policy events and paired control
groups in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.26: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Subsidy States, Relative to the Effect of
Placebo Subsidies in All Control States, Estimated within 1 Year Symmetric Windows Cen-
tered Around Varying Years Relative to Subsidy Adoption or Repeal
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
3 Years Before
Placebo Effect 0.152 0.078 0.073 0.031 0.093
(0.251) (0.161) (0.107) (0.022) (0.118)
Subsidy Effect −0.447 −0.797 0.350+ 0.097 2.150*
(1.360) (1.351) (0.167) (0.063) (0.884)
Clusters 16 16 16 16 16
Obs 68778 68778 68778 42724 42972
2 Years Before
Placebo Effect 0.047 0.193* −0.146 0.003 0.164
(0.216) (0.089) (0.169) (0.010) (0.214)
Subsidy Effect 0.111 0.183 −0.072 0.047 0.856
(1.966) (1.053) (1.101) (0.064) (0.661)
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26
Obs 100708 100708 100708 59242 59494
1 Year Before
Placebo Effect −0.850 −0.494 −0.356 −0.002 0.038
(0.673) (0.448) (0.237) (0.017) (0.256)
Subsidy Effect −1.612 −1.498 −0.113 0.026 0.299
(2.885) (1.874) (1.148) (0.055) (0.778)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 125580 125580 125580 74660 75172
Contemporaneous
Placebo Effect 0.104 0.121 −0.016 0.001 0.159
(0.389) (0.262) (0.156) (0.018) (0.238)
Subsidy Effect 5.622+ 4.064* 1.556 0.137* 0.705
(2.976) (1.825) (1.248) (0.053) (1.151)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 140704 140704 140704 82272 83006
1 Year After
Placebo Effect 0.340 0.181 0.159* −0.002 0.005
(0.204) (0.185) (0.067) (0.008) (0.179)
Subsidy Effect 0.556 −0.453 1.009 −0.042 1.053
(2.290) (1.239) (1.146) (0.028) (0.850)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 129098 129098 129098 77732 78426
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions. Outcome variables include direct care
worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care
worker average hourly wages and direct care worker payroll per resident-day. All regressions regress one of those
outcomes on the simulated effective subsidy amount that was or would have been offered to each nursing home, an
interaction term between this variable and a dummy variable that is 1 in treatment states and 0 in control states,
state-by-year-by-policy-event fixed effects, and nursing home fixed effects. The regressions are estimated within a one-year
symmetric window centered at the time specified in the panel relative to when the actual policy change occurred. The
sample here includes all subsidy states and all unconfounded control states. The “Placebo Effect” coefficient reports the
effect of the placebo subsidies within the control group, while the “Subsidy Effect” coefficient reports the interaction term
that reflects the effect of subsidies in the treatment group over and above the placebo effect in the control group. Standard
errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event by treatment vs. control group level.
Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the
coefficient. The cluster count is the number of treatment policy events and paired control groups in the sample, while the
observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.27: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Subsidy States, Relative to the Effect of
Placebo Subsidies in Geographically Neighboring Control States, Estimated within 1 Year
Symmetric Windows Centered Around Varying Years Relative to Subsidy Adoption or Re-
peal
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
3 Years Before
Placebo Effect −1.217 −0.808 −0.410 0.132 0.805
(2.089) (1.495) (0.839) (0.207) (1.155)
Subsidy Effect 0.874 0.106 0.769 −0.022 0.663
(2.234) (1.703) (0.849) (0.221) (1.429)
Clusters 23 23 23 23 23
Obs 8772 8772 8772 5546 5632
2 Years Before
Placebo Effect −0.786 0.152 −0.938 0.205+ 1.814+
(1.190) (0.976) (0.605) (0.116) (0.972)
Subsidy Effect 0.472 0.081 0.391 −0.193 −0.650
(1.725) (1.213) (0.932) (0.139) (1.284)
Clusters 35 35 35 34 34
Obs 12742 12742 12742 7790 7858
1 Year Before
Placebo Effect −1.079 −1.202 0.123 −0.119+ −0.542
(1.436) (0.981) (0.555) (0.063) (0.369)
Subsidy Effect 0.221 0.466 −0.244 0.153 0.717
(2.200) (1.535) (0.892) (0.091) (0.955)
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
Obs 15970 15970 15970 9910 9888
Contemporaneous
Placebo Effect 0.376 0.852 −0.476 −0.074+ 0.171
(1.092) (0.668) (0.506) (0.042) (0.322)
Subsidy Effect 4.124+ 2.312 1.810+ 0.227* 0.840
(2.305) (1.465) (0.946) (0.069) (1.329)
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
Obs 17806 17806 17806 11258 11350
1 Year After
Placebo Effect 0.268 0.535 −0.266 0.052+ −0.178
(1.011) (0.813) (0.397) (0.027) (0.493)
Subsidy Effect −1.018 −1.537 0.518 −0.079+ 0.785
(1.876) (1.260) (0.907) (0.041) (1.018)
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
Obs 16358 16358 16358 10722 10894
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions. Outcome variables include direct care
worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care
worker average hourly wages and direct care worker payroll per resident-day. All regressions regress one of those
outcomes on the simulated effective subsidy amount that was or would have been offered to each nursing home, an
interaction term between this variable and a dummy variable that is 1 in treatment states and 0 in control states,
state-by-year-by-policy-event fixed effects, and nursing home fixed effects. The regressions are estimated within a one-year
symmetric window centered at the time specified in the panel relative to when the actual policy change occurred. The
sample here includes all subsidy states and their paired geographic neighbor states. The “Placebo Effect” coefficient
reports the effect of the placebo subsidies within the control group, while the “Subsidy Effect” coefficient reports the
interaction term that reflects the effect of subsidies in the treatment group over and above the placebo effect in the control
group. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the treatment state-neighbor pair level,
resulting in one cluster per geographic neighbor. Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either
* (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the coefficient. The cluster count is the number of treatment policy events and paired
control groups in the sample, while the observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
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Table II.28: Response of Direct Care Worker Employment, Wages, and Payroll per
Resident-Day to Subsidies per Resident-Day in Subsidy States, Relative to the Effect of
Placebo Subsidies in Synthetic Control States, Estimated within 1 Year Symmetric Win-
dows Centered Around Varying Years Relative to Subsidy Adoption or Repeal
DCW Staffing CNA Staffing Nurse Staffing Avg DCW Wage DCW PPR
3 Years Before
Placebo Effect −1.396 −1.969* 0.573+ 0.104 −0.363
(0.814) (0.621) (0.317) (0.066) (0.247)
Subsidy Effect 1.102 1.251 −0.149 0.024 2.606*
(1.565) (1.479) (0.341) (0.089) (0.910)
Clusters 16 16 16 16 16
Obs 21396 21396 21396 11556 11686
2 Years Before
Placebo Effect −1.394+ −0.397 −0.996* 0.061 −0.009
(0.771) (0.482) (0.396) (0.109) (0.738)
Subsidy Effect 1.551 0.772 0.778 −0.011 1.028
(2.101) (1.154) (1.158) (0.126) (0.967)
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26
Obs 25624 25624 25624 14430 14524
1 Year Before
Placebo Effect −0.908 −0.971 0.063 0.039 0.381
(2.152) (1.488) (0.685) (0.042) (0.583)
Subsidy Effect −1.554 −1.021 −0.533 −0.015 −0.043
(3.536) (2.351) (1.316) (0.066) (0.938)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 30580 30580 30580 17398 17510
Contemporaneous
Placebo Effect 1.238 1.192 0.046 −0.023 1.333*
(2.063) (1.376) (0.864) (0.031) (0.554)
Subsidy Effect 4.488 2.992 1.494 0.161* −0.468
(3.600) (2.271) (1.510) (0.059) (1.255)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 35072 35072 35072 19560 19710
1 Year After
Placebo Effect 1.217 1.063* 0.154 0.003 −0.930
(0.741) (0.491) (0.383) (0.054) (0.575)
Subsidy Effect −0.321 −1.334 1.014 −0.047 1.988+
(2.398) (1.320) (1.206) (0.060) (1.010)
Clusters 28 28 28 28 28
Obs 32140 32140 32140 18520 18628
All estimates are coefficients from independent instrumental variable regressions. Outcome variables include direct care
worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse minutes per resident-day as well as direct care
worker average hourly wages and direct care worker payroll per resident-day. All regressions regress one of those
outcomes on the simulated effective subsidy amount that was or would have been offered to each nursing home, an
interaction term between this variable and a dummy variable that is 1 in treatment states and 0 in control states,
state-by-year-by-policy-event fixed effects, and nursing home fixed effects. The regressions are estimated within a one-year
symmetric window centered at the time specified in the panel relative to when the actual policy change occurred. The
sample here includes all subsidy states and their synthetic control states. The “Placebo Effect” coefficient reports the effect
of the placebo subsidies within the control group, while the “Subsidy Effect” coefficient reports the interaction term that
reflects the effect of subsidies in the treatment group over and above the placebo effect in the control group. Standard
errors in parentheses are calculated analytically and clustered at the policy event by treatment vs. control group level.
Significance levels implied by these standard errors are denoted by either * (p <0.05) or +(p<0.1) and placed on the
coefficient. The cluster count is the number of treatment policy events and paired control groups in the sample, while the
observation count is the number of nursing home-year observations in the sample.
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III Chapter 3: Market Structure and the Efficacy of Nursing Home Payroll Subsi-
dies
III.I Introduction
In the preceding chapter, I found that nursing home payroll subsidies were, on av-
erage, a very effective tool for increasing nursing home employment and wages. Chap-
ter 2 further found evidence suggestive of non-profit nursing homes exhibiting greater
responses to subsidies and evidence suggesting that subsidies are more effective when
offered with marginal subsidy rates less than 100%. This chapter builds on Chapter 2’s
work investigating heterogeneity in the efficacy of payroll subsidies and examines another
potentially important source of heterogeneity in the efficacy of payroll subsidies: local
variation in the degree of competition faced by nursing homes. Contributing evidence on
how market concentration affects nursing homes’ response to payroll subsidies is of im-
portance not only because of rising general interest in the effects of market power, but also
because it adds to an existing literature on market power in the labor market for nurses
(Staiger et al., 2010; Prager and Schmitt, 2019). Moreover, understanding how market con-
centration affects subsidy efficacy is of substantial practical importance for policy makers.
While only about 30% of nursing homes are located in concentrated markets, most nursing
home markets are concentrated. Furthermore, nursing homes are distributed across states
so that in most states the average nursing home is in a concentrated market, meaning that
taking the effect of market concentration into account should be of importance to most
policymakers.
Market concentration has the potential to affect nursing home responses to payroll
subsidies through both a product market power and a labor market power channel. The
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product market channel relates to how competition affects nursing homes’ incentives to
offer high quality care and are largely rooted in competition between nursing homes for
residents.60 This competition occurs on two margins: resident payer mix and occupancy.
For the first, nursing homes compete to attract private pay (non-Medicaid) residents, who
typically are charged a rate substantially higher than the rate nursing homes receive from
Medicaid. Since Medicaid payment rates are set for nursing homes by state Medicaid
programs, private pay residents are the only residents for whom nursing homes have dis-
cretion in setting prices. Nursing homes thus may compete for these residents both on care
quality and on price.61 Similarly, nursing homes may compete for private insurance and
Medicare short stay residents, both of whom pay higher rates than Medicaid residents,
though doing so may require some repositioning of services offered since, although simi-
lar in many respects, short stay and long stay residents do not have identical care needs.
Competition for these resident types also is done in large part on the basis of care qual-
ity, since nursing homes do not have discretion in setting Medicare payment rates, though
nursing homes should have discretion in negotiating with private insurers.
The second component of product market competition in this setting is that nursing
homes compete to attract residents of all kinds in order to fill their beds and achieve high
occupancy rates, allowing them to spread their fixed costs over a wider pool of residents.
60In some states, Medicaid also generates some financial incentives to provide care quality through adop-
tion of pay-for-performance programs. Programs that condition a large share of payments on performance
measures beyond just conditioning payments on homes meeting some minimal standards, however, are fairly
rare and a rather recent development.
61Nursing home discretion in setting private pay prices is partially limited by Medicaid regulations as
well. When dealing with customers who will eventually take up Medicaid, nursing homes have an incentive
to bargain with them over some total asset transfer, allow them to shift all other assets to family members
or charitable causes, and then bill the resident the agreed upon amount immediately on admission. This
would allow the nursing home to immediately shift the resident on to Medicaid and thereby start receiving
Medicaid payments as well. State Medicaid programs impose a number of rules in order to prevent this,
including imposing maximum daily private pay rates that must be respected if a resident is to be eventually
transitioned on to Medicaid without delay.
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To the extent that this competition is largely over Medicaid residents, nursing homes can-
not compete on price and so must compete on service quality or other amenities. In any
case, whether competition is over private pay residents or residents more generally, com-
petition between nursing homes should be based in large part on care quality, with market
concentration reducing competition and weakening the incentive to provide high quality
care.
If a lack of competition substantially softens nursing homes’ incentive to provide
high quality care, then nursing homes in noncompetitive product markets may be reluctant
to take up subsidies when marginal subsidy rates are less than 100%.62 Nursing homes
in noncompetitive markets that take up subsidies also may be more adept at diverting
subsidies away from labor. Cumulatively, this points toward the expected effect of product
market concentration being to reduce the efficacy of payroll subsidies in general. This
would also imply that the substantial effects of payroll subsidies on employment found in
Chapter 2 are being driven by even larger subsidy effects among the approximately 70%
of nursing homes that are located in competitive markets.
While these competitive effects are possible, it is worth noting that competitive in-
centives to provide high quality nursing home care may well be weak even in competitive
markets. There are a variety of potential reasons for this, including information asymme-
tries regarding nursing home quality which may be difficult for consumers to resolve if a
nursing home must be chosen on a short deadline. Additionally, nursing homes histori-
cally have faced, and sometimes still face, severe regulatory constraints on expanding their
bed counts. These regulations, and in particular Certificate of Need (CON) laws, were par-
ticularly common in the 1980s and 1990s, with research by Gertler (1989) and Ching et al.
62Even when marginal subsidy rates statutorily are set at 100%, if a nursing home was planning to reduce
its payroll relative to its base year payroll, it does not face an effective marginal subsidy rate of 100%.
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(2015) suggesting that these regulations rationed large shares of Medicaid eligible persons
out of nursing homes. When these circumstances generate excess demand for nursing
home care, nursing home competition should be less fierce since nursing homes cannot
expand and compete to attract the excess demand. If these forces reduce competitive pres-
sure for nursing homes even in the presence of potential competitors, there may be little
practical difference in the incentives faced by nursing homes in more and less concen-
trated markets, leading in turn to little practical difference in the effect of subsidies across
markets. Indeed, evidence drawn from structural models of the nursing home industry
suggest that product market competition has surprisingly little effect on nursing home
care quality and staffing levels in general (Lin, 2015; Hackmann, 2018), suggesting that the
product market competition channel may be weak in practice.
The second channel through which market concentration may affect nursing homes’
response to payroll subsidies is the labor market power channel. Nursing homes with
fewer product market competitors necessarily also face less competition for workers from
other nursing homes. This effect presumably is negligible in the market for relatively un-
specialized workers. Nursing assistants, for example, generally only require a high school
degree and face relatively minimal occupational licensing requirements. Nursing homes
often compete with generic retail employers for these workers and so likely face abundant
competition for these workers in most markets. While nursing homes may still have some
dynamic monopsony power over these workers due to a variety of frictions generating im-
perfect competition, the degree of monopsony power nursing homes have in the market
for nursing assistants seems unlikely to vary dramatically with the number of other nurs-
ing homes in their vicinity. However, for more specialized workers like registered nurses
and licensed practical nurses, the local pool of potential employers is much more limited
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and nursing home market concentration might non-trivially reduce their number of po-
tential employers. Moreover, nursing home product market concentration is most likely to
occur in relatively low population areas where the number of hospitals and other health-
care providers is likely to be lower, meaning that nursing home market concentration may
be associated with greater monopsony power over specialized healthcare workers even if
it is not the primary cause of it. Given that there is substantial evidence to suggest that
hospitals in concentrated markets have monopsony power in the market for nurses and
pharmacists (Staiger et al., 2010; Prager and Schmitt, 2019), it is reasonable to expect that
nursing homes in more concentrated markets may have monopsony power over nurses as
well.
Regardless of the source, nursing home monopsony power may affect nursing home
responses to payroll subsidies in a number of ways. First, monopsonistic nursing homes
seeking to hire in response to subsidies must raise wages and so face rising average costs
of labor that dampen the degree to which subsidies can increase nursing home staffing.
Unless increasing wages also elicits substantially more effort from nursing homes’ exist-
ing employees, the net effect should be to dampen the degree to which subsidies enable
the nursing home to improve care quality, potentially making subsidy uptake less desir-
able and so reducing payroll subsidy efficacy. Second, if nursing homes have varying
amounts of monopsony power over different types of workers, monopsonistic nursing
homes should have a greater incentive to spend subsidies hiring those workers over which
they have least monopsony power, since hiring more such workers should not necessi-
tate wage increases. Given that nursing homes likely have more monopsony power over
nurses than nursing assistants, this suggests that labor market power should lead nursing
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homes to spend their subsidies disproportionately on nursing assistants relative to nursing
homes homes in more competitive markets.
In order to shed empirical light on the above hypothesized effects of nursing home
competition on payroll subsidy efficacy, in this chapter, I extend the within-state, across-
nursing home research design from Chapter 2 to include an interaction term between sub-
sidies and a binary indicator variable flagging when nursing homes are located in a con-
centrated product market. I estimate that nursing homes located in concentrated markets
exhibit smaller increases in licensed nurse employment per resident-day and direct care
worker payroll per resident-day in response to subsidies than do nursing homes located
in competitive markets. The differential effect of subsidies on nursing assistant employ-
ment per resident-day in concentrated markets, meanwhile, is more ambiguous. These
effects are consistent with both or either of the product market competition and labor mar-
ket monopsony channels dampening nursing homes’ incentives to respond to subsidies.
These findings require caution in their interpretation, however, as they do not exhibit a ro-
bust pattern of statistical significance across all specifications and so should only be viewed
as suggestive, rather than as statistically conclusive.
III.II Research Design
This chapter’s empirical approach closely follows the within-state approach from
Chapter 2, which regresses outcomes on subsidies conditional on state-by-year and nurs-
ing home by policy event fixed effects. In this chapter’s first specification, an interaction
term between subsidies and a dummy variable indicating whether or not a nursing home
is in a concentrated market is added to the baseline Chapter 2 regression. In this chapter’s
112
second specification, a year-by-concentrated market status fixed effect is also added. These
regressions are specified below:
(1) Yi,t = β1 ∗ subsidyi,t + β2 ∗ subsidyi,t ∗ concentratedi + µi,w + γt,s + εi,t,w
(2) Yi,t = β1 ∗ subsidyi,t + β2 ∗ subsidyi,t ∗ concentratedi + concentratedFEi,t
+µi,w + γt,s + εi,t,w
In these equations, as also in Chapter 2, i indexes nursing homes, t indexes years,
s indexes states, and w indexes the two year, symmetric policy event specific windows in
which the regressions are estimated. The term Yi,t is a time-varying nursing home level
outcome variable, subsidyi,t is the simulated maximum effective subsidy amount offered
to nursing home i in year t measured in 2017 dollars per nursing home resident, and
concentratedi is a binary indicator variable for whether a nursing home is in a concen-
trated product market. The coefficient β1 is the effect on Yi,t of increasing the maximum
effective subsidy amount per resident-day offered to a nursing home in an unconcentrated
market by $1, the coefficient β2 is the differential effect of subsidies on Yi,t in concentrated
markets relative to in unconcentrated markets, concentratedFEi,t is a year by concentrated
market dummy fixed effect, µi,w is a nursing home-specific fixed effect that is allowed to
vary across event windows in any state with more than one treatment event, γt,s is a state-
by-year fixed effect, and εi,t,w is an idiosyncratic nursing home level error term which ex-
hibits policy event window level clustering. Note that for conducting statistical inference,
I calculate standard errors using policy event clustered Liang-Zeger standard errors.
As in Chapter 2, I address the endogeneity of subsidies amounts offered to the sub-
sidy policy itself by instrumenting for the simulated nursing home effective subsidy rates
subsidyi,t using subsidy∗i , the maximum effective subsidy amount offered to firm i calcu-
lated using the actual subsidy formula and its pre-treatment characteristics. I calculate
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subsidy∗i and employ the instrument the same way as in Chapter 2, but with a few modi-
fications. First, I add an interaction between subsidy∗i and concentratedi to the right hand
side of the first stage regression for subsidyi,t and, in the case of specification (2), also add
the additional fixed effects in the first stage regression. Second, I must conduct an addi-
tional first stage regression for the interaction term subsidyi,t ∗ concentratedi, employing
the same right hand side variables as in the subsidyi,t first stage regression.
Given the inclusion of the new interaction term, it is worth considering what the
identifying assumptions in specifications (1) and (2) for the parameter of interest, β2, ac-
tually are and how stringent they might be. In order for specification (1) to successfully
identify the difference in subsidy efficacy between the concentrated and unconcentrated
market samples, it must either be the case that nursing homes with characteristics qualify-
ing them for different subsidy amounts be on parallel trends across all nursing homes or
that any pre-trends associated with subsidy receipt among the concentrated market nurs-
ing homes be the same as those associated with subsidy receipt among the unconcentrated
market nursing homes. It also must be the case that no national or state-specific shocks to
outcomes of interest occur that disproportionately affect nursing homes in either concen-
trated or unconcentrated markets.63
The identifying assumptions for specification (2) are similar to those for specification
(1), but slightly weaker. Specification (2)’s inclusion of year-by-market concentration sta-
tus fixed effects allows for annual, nationwide shocks that disproportionately affect nurs-
ing homes in either concentrated or unconcentrated markets. However, any state-specific
shocks to nursing homes in these different types of markets remain problematic. Both of
these specifications contrast with a potential third approach that would include state-by-
63This would not be required if nursing homes in concentrated and unconcentrated markets received the
same subsidy amounts on average, but Table III.3 shows that this is not the case.
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year-by-concentrated market status fixed effects. This third approach would effectively be
equivalent to estimating the effect of subsidies separately within each of the samples of
concentrated and unconcentrated nursing homes and then comparing the estimates after-
wards. This third specification would likely have superior identification in that it would
allow for state-specific shocks to nursing homes in concentrated or unconcentrated mar-
kets. However, power considerations in this setting severely limit its practical applica-
tion.64 Given this constraint, specification (2) represents the research design with the least
demanding identifying assumptions and so is my preferred specification.
As a final caution regarding identification, it is important to observe that the con-
ditions outlined above are necessary for identifying the difference in the causal effect of
subsidies received by nursing homes in concentrated and unconcentrated markets. These
conditions are not sufficient, however, for guaranteeing that that difference in causal effects
of subsidies is itself a causal effect of differences in market structure. That interpretation re-
quires that whether or not a market is concentrated be exogenous to any other local market
characteristics that may affect the efficacy of subsidies. To some extent, this orthogonality
assumption is strengthened by the fact that Medicaid agencies in many states used Certifi-
cate of Need laws to systematically block nursing home entry into a range of markets for
decades. This ensures that nursing home market structure within my sample, especially in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, bears a closer resemblance to the market structure dictated
by conditions 10-20 years prior to observation than would be the case in other industries.
Despite this, the exogeneity assumption here remains quite strong, since many factors po-
64Results using this specification are generally uninformative. The standard errors obtained generally are
very large, even relative to the baseline subsidy effects in Chapter 2. This is not surprising given that the
state-by-year-by-concentration status fixed effects eliminate large quantities of useful variation from the con-
centrated market subsample and virtually all useful variation in this sample for some states, resulting in a
severely underpowered research design that delivers very imprecise estimates.
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tentially affecting both market structure and subsidy efficacy may well remain reasonably
constant even over the span of decades. For example, nursing home product markets tend
to be more competitive in densely populated urban areas, where the efficacy of subsidies
also may vary due to differences in labor supply elasticities or consumer characteristics.65
Overall, this market-level identifying assumption is very strong and suggests caution in
the interpretation of my results.
III.III Data and Measurement
This chapter relies on the same sample of nursing home payroll subsidies and the
same nursing home data detailed in the second chapter of this dissertation. For more on
the construction of the sample, on how subsidy amounts offered to each nursing home
are calculated, or on the source of the nursing home staffing and other data, please refer
to Chapter 2. One major measurement issue that is not addressed in Chapter 2, however,
is this chapter’s approach for measuring nursing home market concentration, which is
detailed below.
My preferred approach for measuring market concentration begins by defining a
nursing home’s relevant product market as the set of all nursing homes, regardless of
any differences in specialization or type of residents served, within 15 miles of its loca-
tion. I measure nursing home locations using geographic coordinates when available in
the OSCAR/CASPR nursing home data, but when not available I assign nursing homes
to their zip code’s geographic centroid. I opted to use a relatively small geographic area
for defining a nursing home’s product market in order to account for the marked impor-
65Despite this possibility, subsidy efficacy does not vary much between the bottom quartile of nursing
homes by county population relative to all other nursing homes. This suggests that any differential effects of
subsidies in concentrated markets likely do not merely reflect differences in local population size.
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tance of geographic differentiation in nursing home markets which results from proximity
to home and loved ones being a very important amenity for most nursing home residents.
My choice of a 15 mile radius in particular was influenced by calculations by Hackmann
(2018). Using nursing home resident population data from the Minimum Data Set from
2000 to 2002, Hackmann found that the median nursing home resident traveled less than
5 miles from their home to reach their nursing home, while the 90th percentile resident
traveled less than 15 miles. This suggests that nursing homes located within 15 miles of
one another likely are competitive with each other for all or most potential residents lo-
cated between them and a reasonable amount of residents located on their extremes. In
order to facilitate robustness checks later in this chapter, I also calculate market definitions
based off of a 30-mile radius around each nursing home as well as simply taking a nursing
home’s county as its relevant product market. I note, however, that a 30-mile radius seems
overly expansive relative to the actual distribution of resident distances traveled, while
using counties as a market definition might yield misleading results for nursing homes
located near county borders.
Given these product market definitions, I then calculate nursing home market con-
centration using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that is computed by summing the
squares of 100 times the market shares of each nursing home in a given market. In my
preferred definition of market concentration, I define each nursing home’s market share
as its total number of residents divided by the total number of nursing home residents in
its market, but for robustness purposes also calculate HHIs based off of nursing homes’
shares of more lucrative non-Medicaid residents. In my preferred approach to calculating
HHIs, I also adjust for the presence of nursing homes owned by firms with multiple es-
tablishments in a given market by treating these nursing homes as one entity, summing
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their market shares prior to squaring. Once again, for robustness purposes, I also calculate
HHIs where I treat all nursing home establishments as independent. On balance, how-
ever, it seems preferable to treat nursing homes owned by the same firm as a single unit
since coordination with respect to staffing decisions, at least for scarcer types of workers
like registered nurses, seems likely given nursing home administrators’ perennial com-
plaints about nursing shortages. Note that identification of which nursing homes belong
to the same parent company was not an entirely trivial task and was based off of data
on parent company names reported by nursing homes in select years. Please refer to the
Multi-Establishment Firm Identification Appendix for more details on how this problem
was solved.
With these Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measures of market concentration in hand,
I constructed time invariant market concentration measures by calculating nursing home-
specific over time HHI means within the treatment sample. I then constructed binary indi-
cators for a nursing home being in a concentrated market by defining any market with an
HHI exceeding 2500 as concentrated. I chose this particular threshold to correspond with
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s HHI threshold for a market being “moder-
ately concentrated”. This threshold also approximately corresponds with a rule of thumb
for defining nursing home markets with five or fewer nursing homes as concentrated, a
rule of thumb likely based on Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)’s influential work that found that
market conduct does not tend to vary substantially with the number of market participants
once the market includes five competitors. While the HHI and firm count based measures
correspond closely, I prefer the HHI based measure since it more naturally handles cases
where markets include some very small nursing homes by appropriately down-weighting
these nursing homes’ competitive contribution.
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In order to illustrate how some of these different market concentration measures
vary in practice, consider Table III.1. Table III.1 shows the share of nursing homes within
the treatment sample, as well as within the universe of nursing homes observed from
1996-2015, that reside in concentrated markets per various definitions. All market concen-
trations are calculated with multi-establishment firm adjustments and using total resident
count based market shares, but different concentration rates are presented using a 15-mile,
30-mile and county-based market definition. Within the treatment sample, about 30% of
nursing homes are in concentrated markets according to either the 15-mile or county-based
market definition, while only 11% are in concentrated markets per the 30-mile definition.
The shares of states and counties for which the mean nursing home resides in a concen-
trated market are also calculated and shown using the 15-mile and county market defi-
nitions. While most nursing homes do not reside in concentrated markets, the average
nursing home in 60 to 80% of states and counties is in a concentrated market, with the
precise share depending on one’s preferred market concentration definition.
In addition to Table III.1, Table III.2 summarizes the distribution of HHI market con-
centration measures experienced by nursing homes in the treatment sample and in the
universe of nursing homes using my preferred 15-mile market definition and the county-
based market definition variant. The distributions observed for these two approaches are
quite similar. The HHI distributions for market concentration variants that drop the multi-
establishment firm adjustments or that adopt a non-Medicaid resident based market shares
are very similar to these. The only substantial differences in the distribution of market con-
centrations across definitions are obtained when comparing the 30-mile market definition
to the 15-mile and county definitions, with market concentration measures being lower at
every quartile of the market concentration distribution for the 30-mile market definition.
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In order to better understand the differences between nursing homes in concentrated
and unconcentrated markets, Table III.3 presents summary statistics for nursing homes
in concentrated and unconcentrated markets (per my preferred 15-mile market concen-
tration definition) on nursing homes’ staffing ratios, average hourly direct care worker
wages, shares of residents on Medicaid, resident counts, occupancy rates, and subsidy of-
fers received. These summary statistics suggest that the largest difference between nursing
homes in concentrated and unconcentrated markets is in terms of size: the mean resident
count for nursing homes in concentrated markets was 68.6 compared to 96.6 in unconcen-
trated markets. The next largest differences were in terms of subsidies received and nurse
staffing ratios, with nurse staffing ratios being 10 minutes per resident-day lower and
largest subsidy offers ever received being 60 cents higher in concentrated markets than
in unconcentrated markets. Beyond this, nursing assistant staffing levels, shares of resi-
dents on Medicaid, and occupancy rates are qualitatively similar across the two groups.66
While there is a $4.50 difference in average direct care worker hourly wages across the two
sets of nursing homes, it is difficult to say to what extent this reflects differences in wages
and cost of living between concentrated and unconcentrated markets as opposed to dif-
ferences in employee composition at nursing homes in concentrated and unconcentrated
markets. Overall, these summary statistics point toward lower staffing ratios and smaller
nursing homes in concentrated areas, as well as higher average degrees of subsidization.
66Strictly speaking, the difference in means across the concentrated and unconcentrated market samples
for each variable shown in Table III.3 is statistically significant per a Welch’s t-test, with the exception of
the difference in mean nursing assistant staffing levels. However, it seems likely that many of the smaller
differences observed are not economically significant.
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III.IV Results
This chapter’s main results may be found in Table III.4, which presents instrumen-
tal variable estimates of β1, the effect of subsidies in unconcentrated markets (“Subsidy
Baseline” in the table), and β2, the differential effect of subsidies in concentrated markets
(“Subsidy Interaction” in the table), using my preferred 15-mile market definition with
multi-establishment firm adjustments and total resident count based market shares. Re-
sults are also estimated using a county-based market definition and are presented using
both specifications (1) and (2) for each market definition. The outcome variables examined
include direct care worker staffing in minutes per resident-day, nurse staffing, nursing
assistant staffing, the percentage share of total staffing minutes provided by nurses, the
average hourly wage paid by the nursing home to its direct care workers, and the nursing
home’s direct care worker payroll expenditure per resident-day. The percentage share of
total staffing minutes provided by licensed nurses is added here as an outcome of inter-
est, given that the prediction from the monopsony power channel that nursing homes in
concentrated markets may exhibit greater responses for nursing assistants than for nurses.
The results from Table III.4 on the differential effect of subsidies in concentrated
markets exhibit some features of interest, but do also not present a robust pattern of statis-
tical significance. What follows will be an interpretation of what the estimated coefficients
suggest if taken at face value, but it should be noted that since most coefficients are not
statistically significant at the 5% or even 10% level, these findings cannot be taken as con-
clusive.
Focusing at first on the results from specification (1) using my preferred 15-mile mar-
ket definition, available in the first column of Table III.4, the results point toward the differ-
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ential effect of subsidies in concentrated markets on overall staffing being small and posi-
tive. This small positive effect is itself composed of a negative differential effect on nurse
staffing and a positive differential effect on nursing assistant staffing. These staffing effects
are sufficiently small to have little net impact on the share of staffing minutes provided by
nurses. These staffing effects are coupled with a (potentially compositional) negative dif-
ferential effect on average hourly wages and a large, negative differential effect on direct
care worker payroll per resident-day, both of which are statistically significant at the 10%
level.
Moving to the second column of Table III.4, when year-by-concentrated market fixed
effects are added to these regressions, effect sizes grow and become markedly more neg-
ative, with the concentrated market differential effect of subsidies on direct care worker
staffing per resident day becoming a (statistically insignificant) -1.7 minutes. This effect
is driven in large part by a remarkably large -1.4 minute differential effect on nurse em-
ployment per resident-day, an effect that is statistically significant at the 5% level and large
enough to nullify nearly two-thirds of the positive effect of subsidies on nurse staffing ob-
served in unconcentrated markets. Meanwhile, the nursing assistant differential effect in
this specification has become small and negative, the net differential effect on the share of
staffing minutes provided by nurses has grown markedly negative, the (once again, po-
tentially compositional) differential effect on average hourly wages has grown to -14 cents
and has achieved statistical significance at the 5% level, and finally the differential effect
on payroll per resident has become a statistically significant at the 10 percent level -1.11
dollars relative to an unconcentrated market effect of 1.60 dollars.
These two pools of 15-mile market definition differential subsidy effects are, to some
extent, consistent with the expected effects of market power on subsidy efficacy. The neg-
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ative differential effects of subsidies on payroll per resident-day are suggestive of lower
subsidy take up or larger rates of subsidy diversion away from labor in more concentrated
markets, as might be expected if nursing homes face weaker incentives to compete on care
quality in those areas. The weaker effects on nurse staffing that occur in specification (2)
without an offsetting increase in nursing assistant staffing are also consistent with nurs-
ing homes in concentrated markets having weaker incentives to spend subsidies on care
quality, seeing as nurses are an impactful, high skill input into care quality. The fact that
the differential effect on nurse employment per resident-day is markedly more negative
than is observed for nursing assistants is also consistent with expectations that nursing
homes’ greater monopsony power over nurses will cause their reduced response to be
driven largely by reduced hiring of nurses rather than of nursing assistants. Also of note is
the difference between the results for specifications (1) and (2). The specification including
year-by-concentrated market fixed effects finds markedly more negative effects across the
board and suggests the presence of either some sort of nationwide positive staffing shocks
occurring in more concentrated markets following subsidy adoption or the presence of
some kind of competitive spillover in these areas that raises staffing for all affected nurs-
ing homes. This difference raises some doubts about the quality of my research design for
estimating these interaction terms in specification (1), and these doubts will receive fur-
ther scrutiny when validation tests for the primary regressions are conducted in the next
section.
Table III.4 also presents, in the table’s third and fourth columns, differential sub-
sidy effect results from models employing a market concentration measure that uses the
county-based market definition. When using this market definition, the differential sub-
sidy effects from the specification that includes no additional fixed effects are all negatively
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signed and relatively small in magnitude. Switching to specification (2), which adds year-
by-concentrated market fixed effects, larger and more negative staffing differential effects
are uncovered, though the differential effects on average hourly wages and payroll per
resident-day remain small. One interesting deviation in specification (2) from the com-
parable 15-mile market results is that the differential effect of subsidies in concentrated
markets nurse and nursing assistant are approximately the same in absolute terms. Note
that while no absolute wedge exists between the two, the implied proportional effect on
nurse staffing is much larger since nursing homes have lower baseline nurse staffing lev-
els. Overall, the results for the county-based market definition models are not markedly
different in terms of interpretation than those from the 15-mile market definition case and
once again stress the apparent importance of the year-by-concentrated market fixed effects.
III.V Validation and Robustness Tests
III.V.I Robustness
One concern with this chapter’s primary results is that they might not be robust to
changes in market concentration measurement that should otherwise be innocuous. In
order to demonstrate robustness to these measurement decisions, this section presents ta-
bles comparing estimates of the differential effect of subsidies in concentrated markets per
the preferred 15-mile market concentration definition and the county-based market con-
centration definition to estimates obtaining using using alternative market concentration
definitions.
The most dramatic difference in results relative to the primary findings are obtained
when switching to a 30-mile radius market definition. Table III.5 compares results esti-
mated using the preferred 15-mile market definition to those obtained using the 30-mile
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definition. In specifications including only nursing home and state-by-year fixed effects,
the differential effect of subsidies in concentrated markets on various staffing measures
is found to be about the same for both market definitions, though due to differences in
baseline staffing levels by worker type this nets out to a more negative differential effect
of subsides on the share of staffing minutes provided by nurses in the 30-mile case. The
largest difference across the two definitions for specification (1), the no additional fixed
effects case, is in the differential effect of subsidies on average hourly wages and direct
care worker payroll per resident day. Each of these parameters is larger and more nega-
tive in the 30-mile case than in the 15-mile market case, achieving magnitudes larger than
the baseline positive subsidy effects. Taken literally, these findings suggest that subsidy
receipt reduces average wages and payroll expenditure in markets that are concentrated
per the 30-mile definition.
These estimates are difficult to reconcile with the more modest staffing effects and
raise questions about whether the approximately 10% of nursing homes in concentrated
30-mile markets exhibit some sort of severe wage and payroll parallel trends assumption
violations. Note that the effects estimated using the 30-mile market definition when in-
cluding year-by-concentrated market fixed effects do not exhibit these remarkable wage
and payroll differential effects, and in fact show markedly more positive point estimates
across all coefficients than appear in the corresponding 15-mile regressions. Given that the
results from the 30-mile market definition vary so severely depending on the set of fixed
effects included and deliver implausible estimates in some specifications the 30-mile mar-
ket definition approach is unreliable. This may be because its results are overly sensitive
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to dynamics involving very small numbers of nursing homes owing to how few nursing
homes actually qualify as residing in a concentrated market according to this definition.67
Results from estimates using the other market concentration definitions are in greater
concordance with the primary results. Table III.6 compares results estimated using the
multi-establishment firm adjusted 15-mile market definition to those estimated similarly,
but treating all establishments as independently owned. Table III.7 makes the same com-
parisons, but using the county market definition. For each market definition and spec-
ification, there is a strong degree of correspondence across the multi-establishment firm
adjusted and independent establishment results. The only substantial differences are be-
tween the staffing results for the two approaches using the 15-mile market definition,
where the overall differential effect on staffing in concentrated markets is more positive
using the independent establishment definition due to more positive nursing assistant
staffing differential effects and less negative nurse staffing differential effects. Note, how-
ever, that these differences in the staffing differential subsidy effects do not appear to
translate into marked differences in average wage and payroll differential effects. Table
III.7 also exhibits minimal differences in the differential effects estimated using the county
multi-establishment firm adjusted and independent establishment market concentration
definitions. Cumulatively, I read these results to suggest that the primary findings in Ta-
ble III.4 are reasonably robust to whether or not multi-establishment firm adjustments are
used.
Tables III.8 and III.9 present results equivalent to those in Table III.4, but compar-
ing cases where the 15-mile and county market definitions are calculated using total resi-
dent count market shares versus using total non-Medicaid resident count market shares. If
67Note that this problem is exacerbated when studying wage and payroll outcomes, given wage and payroll
data are not available for all nursing homes.
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nursing home competition over non-Medicaid residents is fierce but nursing homes can re-
liably fill any excess capacity by taking in Medicaid residents as needed, these two market
definitions could yield substantially different findings. This, however, does not prove to be
the case. There are no substantial differences in the differential effects of subsidies in con-
centrated markets across the various specifications in the 15-mile market definition case.
The same is largely true when the exercise is repeated using the county market definition
case, with the exception of differences occurring when looking specifically at the payroll
per resident results. The direct care worker payroll per resident differential subsidy ef-
fects in concentrated markets are markedly more negative in the non-Medicaid resident
HHI case than in the total resident HHI case for the county market definition, yielding
results closer to what are otherwise found in the 15-mile market HHI case for these same
regressions.
The broad pattern found within these robustness tests is that the results obtained
using my preferred 15-mile market definition and my preferred approach to measuring
market concentration are generally not affected much by small adjustments to measure-
ment. The measurement choice with the largest impact on results is the decision not to use
the 30-mile market definition. This alternative market definition shrinks the pool of nurs-
ing homes labeled as residing in concentrated markets by two-thirds and seems to deliver
estimates that are relatively unstable and implausible in some respects, suggesting that not
using the 30-mile definition may be for the best.
III.V.II Validation
One of the key identifying assumptions for the differential effect of subsidies in more
concentrated markets is that any trend differences between nursing homes qualifying for
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different subsidy amounts in concentrated markets must be the same as the trend differ-
ences observed between nursing homes qualifying for different subsidy amounts in un-
concentrated markets. In order to better test the validity of this assumption, I regressed
the change in all outcomes of interest used in Table III.4 from two years prior to each
policy change to one year prior to each policy change on the change in the instrumented
subsidy offers received by each nursing home and an interaction between that change and
the concentrated market indicator. The extent to which the coefficients on the pre-trend in-
teraction terms substantially vary from zero will be informative about the degree to which
the parallel trends assumption described above appears to be violated in the years prior to
each policy event.
Table III.10 presents these pre-trend robustness test results for all of the specifica-
tions tested in Table III.4. Focusing at first on the 15-mile market definition, the differential
pre-trend associations with subsidies in concentrated markets are, though not statistically
significant in general, large and positive for all types of direct care worker staffing. The
concentrated market payroll differential effect is also large and positive relative to the
baseline subsidy effects in the specification including year-by-concentrated market fixed
effects. While these pre-trend tests do not exhibit a robust pattern of statistical signifi-
cance indicating systematic assumption test failures in the 15-mile market definition case,
the large magnitude of the results raises some concerns. Given that the primary effects in
Table III.4 also do not exhibit a robust pattern of statistical significance, large magnitude
pre-trend violations cast further doubt on their reliability. While the implied pre-trends are
positive and therefore work against the finding that subsidies have weaker effects in con-
centrated areas, the pre-trend violations implied are large enough that they would imply
highly implausible effect sizes if literally subtracted from the effects in Table III.4. Ta-
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ble III.10 also presents comparable pre-trend estimates for the county market definition,
yielding similar results with the exception of smaller and more negative payroll pre-trend
differential effects, prompting broadly similar concerns as to in the 15-mile market case.
Cumulatively, the presence of associations between subsidies and pre-trends in various
outcomes of interest that differ for nursing homes in concentrated and competitive mar-
kets provide some additional reason to doubt this chapter’s primary results, though the
pre-trend violations are insufficiently severe and insufficiently precisely estimated to con-
clude that the primary results are entirely uninformative.
In addition to the validation tests above for the primary results, I also repeat the pre-
trend test exercise using different market definitions and different market concentration
measures. Table III.11 presents pre-trend test results comparing the 15-mile and 30-mile
market definitions. As suspected from the robustness test results, the 30-mile market def-
inition results exhibit larger pre-trend violations than occur when using the 15-mile def-
inition, further contributing to the sense of unreliability surrounding the 30-mile market
definition results. Table III.12 presents pre-trend associations from the regressions using
the 15-mile market multi-establishment firm adjusted and unadjusted market concentra-
tion measures. There is little in terms of systematic pre-trend effect differences between
the two definitions. Much the same is true for the same comparisons made using the
county-based market definition, as may be observed in Table III.13. Comparison of pre-
trend associations with subsidies across the total resident count based and non-Medicaid
resident count based market concentration measures are presented in Table III.14 for the
15-mile market definition and in Table III.15 for the county-based market definition. The
results also do not exhibit substantially different pre-trend associations with the differen-
tial effect of subsidies in concentrated markets across the different market concentration
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measures. Cumulatively, this pool of validation test results suggest that differences across
market structures in terms of how subsidies are associated with pre-trends in outcomes
are largely not affected by how market concentration is measured, with the exception of
there being more severe pre-trend violations when the 30-mile market definition is used.
III.VI Concluding Discussion
This chapter’s primary results are suggestive of nursing homes in concentrated mar-
kets responding to marginal payroll subsidies with smaller increases in direct care worker
payroll per resident-day and smaller increases in nurse staffing per resident-day than oc-
cur at subsidized nursing homes in more competitive markets. These results are consistent
with a lack of product market competition dampening incentives to provide high quality
care and thereby tamping down nursing home incentives to take up subsidies and spend
them on hiring more workers per resident-day. The results are also consistent with nurs-
ing home monopsony power dampening incentives to spend subsidies on hiring workers
over which nursing homes have greater monopsony power. Finally, the results are gen-
erally robust to varying the precise method used for measuring market concentration and
for defining a nursing home’s product market.
The potential conclusions to be drawn from this chapter’s findings must be inter-
preted with caution. While the signs of estimated effects are consistent with the market
power explanations given above and while some findings are statistically significant, I
did not find a broad and robust pattern of statistical significance across specifications and
different outcome measures. As such, the primary findings should be viewed as statis-
tically inconclusive on this subject. Moreover, the validation tests indicate that subsidy
receipt potentially may be associated with pre-trends in employment and payroll expen-
130
diture within concentrated markets in a fashion different from the association observed
in unconcentrated markets. While these validation tests also do not yield a broad and ro-
bust pattern of statistically significant pre-trend assumption violations, some of the tests
do fail in a statistically significant fashion and, even when not statistically significant, the
coefficients on the pre-trend tests are large in magnitude. While this in and of itself does
not imply that my research design is insufficient for addressing whether subsidy efficacy
varies by market concentration, in the context of the estimated differential effects of sub-
sidies in concentrated markets themselves being imprecisely estimated and not entirely
reliable, this research design uncertainty is a cause for further caution. As a final note of
caution, to the extent that my estimates indicate some difference in subsidy efficacy by
market concentration, it should be noted that I cannot causally attribute that difference
to market concentration itself, as I cannot rule out that some third market characteristic
causes both variation in market concentration and in subsidy efficacy.
The results from this chapter point to a need for further research in settings better
tailored to identifying heterogeneity in nursing home responses to subsidies by market
concentration. The results suggest, but do not prove, that there may be non-trivial reduc-
tions in subsidy efficacy for nursing homes in concentrated markets. If confirmed, this
heterogeneity would be of substantial policy significance given that nearly a third of nurs-
ing homes are in concentrated markets. Moreover, nursing home policy is in large part set
by state Medicaid programs, and the distribution of nursing homes across states is such
that in most states, the average nursing home is in a concentrated market. More precisely
estimated differences in subsidy efficacy by market concentration would also be indepen-
dently interesting and potentially very informative about which types of competition, if
any, are very influential upon nursing home behavior.
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III.VII Tables




Concentrated 15-Mile Market 0.29 0.30
Concentrated 30-Mile Market 0.11 0.06
Concentrated County Market 0.30 0.33
Concentrated 15-Mile Market (County Averages) 0.74 0.67
Concentrated 15-Mile Market (State Averages) 0.70 0.58
Concentrated County Market (County Averages) 0.79 0.76
Concentrated County Market (State Averages) 0.64 0.56
Observations 12259 281795
This table lists the share of nursing homes in the payroll subsidy treatment sample and overall 1996-2015 universe of
nursing homes which reside in a concentrated market for various market definitions. In each case, a market is taken to be
concentrated if the multi-establishment firm adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the market, calculating market
shares in terms of nursing homes’ shares of market-wide resident counts, exceeds 2500. The different market definitions
explored include defining markets as the set of all nursing homes within a 15 or 30 mile radius around a given nursing
home as well as the set of all nursing homes within a given nursing home’s county. This table also presents the share of
counties and states for whom the county or state’s mean nursing home is in a concentrated market based on the 15-mile or
county market definition.
Table III.2: Distribution of Nursing Home, County Average, and State Average Market
Concentrations by Market Definition
Treatment Sample Universe
Mean 25th Pct Median 75th Pct Mean 25th Pct Median 75th Pct
15-Mile Market HHI 2292.62 402.28 980.89 3034.39 2157.31 389.34 1218.92 2805.18
15-Mile Market HHI (County Averages) 5460.77 2372.03 5005.43 10000.00 4541.92 2050.83 3561.50 6070.87
15-Mile Market HHI (State Averages) 3680.26 2189.27 3375.20 6130.17 2864.17 1523.92 2710.88 3550.17
County Market HHI 2261.87 425.34 993.35 3314.82 2302.81 488.01 1387.91 3267.22
County Market HHI (County Averages) 5931.44 3016.93 5168.68 10000.00 5348.96 2572.19 5004.59 10000.00
County Market HHI (State Averages) 3413.79 1869.87 3211.39 5662.62 2913.62 1594.29 2671.92 4099.11
Observations 12259 281795
This table gives the mean, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile market concentration for nursing homes in the
treatment sample and in the overall 1996-2015 universe of nursing homes based on 15-mile radius and county-based
market definitions. All market concentrations are presented in terms of multi-establishment firm adjusted
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices calculated using nursing homes’ shares of market wide resident counts as the market share
concept. This table also presents the same concentration moments but for the distribution of county-level and state-level
market concentration averages.
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Table III.3: Nursing Home Summary Statistics by 15-mile Market Concentration Status
Unconcentrated (15-Mile) Concentrated (15-Mile)
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
DCW Staffing Minutes 199.78 188.72 61.20 189.84 176.82 64.54
Nurse Staffing Minutes 72.21 64.03 39.03 62.77 54.40 38.90
CNA Staffing Minutes 127.57 123.36 36.10 127.07 120.66 41.96
DCW Average Hourly Wage 23.22 23.64 4.78 18.70 18.62 4.04
Share of Residents on Medicaid 62.12 66.67 24.04 63.26 64.76 20.60
Resident Count 96.60 97.00 47.65 68.62 58.00 41.81
Percent Occupancy 87.25 91.43 12.52 84.59 88.59 14.08
Largest Subsidy Offer Received 2.90 2.79 1.85 3.50 3.01 2.31
Observations 8651 3608
This table lists means, medians, and standard deviations for key variables within two samples. The sample on the left is
the set of all nursing home observations from the treatment sample in an unconcentrated market, per the 15-mile radius
market definition with multi-establishment firm adjustments and using resident count based market shares. The sample
on the right is the set of all treatment sample nursing homes from concentrated markets, per the same market definition.
The key variables examined included staffing variables denominated in minutes per resident-day of either direct care
worker (DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), or licensed nurse employment. They also include direct care worker
average hourly wages denominated in 2017 dollars per hour, the percentage share of nursing home residents on Medicaid,
the total number of residents in a nursing home, nursing home occupancy rates, and the largest subsidy offer in dollars per
resident-day ever received by a given nursing home.
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Table III.4: Effect of Subsidies on Staffing, Wages, and Payroll by Market Concentration
per the 15-mile and County Market Definitions
15 Mile HHI County HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Subsidy Baseline 4.800+ 5.105* 5.008* 5.237*
(2.349) (2.319) (2.187) (2.162)
Subsidy*Concentrated 0.270 −1.665 −0.317 −1.687
(1.123) (1.411) (0.658) (1.235)
Nurse Min
Subsidy Baseline 1.899+ 2.148* 1.862+ 1.945+
(1.035) (0.990) (1.006) (0.992)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.291 −1.394* −0.283 −0.865+
(0.361) (0.481) (0.316) (0.456)
CNA Min
Subsidy Baseline 2.899+ 2.955* 3.144* 3.292*
(1.350) (1.356) (1.234) (1.242)
Subsidy*Concentrated 0.561 −0.270 −0.035 −0.822
(0.933) (1.065) (0.581) (1.039)
Pct Nurse
Subsidy Baseline 0.032 0.094 0.026 0.038
(0.114) (0.076) (0.108) (0.096)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.044 −0.247+ −0.040 −0.129
(0.132) (0.131) (0.151) (0.162)
Avg Wage
Subsidy Baseline 0.168* 0.184* 0.146* 0.152*
(0.049) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.080+ −0.139* −0.045 −0.066
(0.039) (0.050) (0.032) (0.049)
DCW PPR
Subsidy Baseline 1.450 1.600 1.156 1.164
(1.110) (1.067) (1.172) (1.169)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.664+ −1.114+ −0.130 −0.210
(0.349) (0.625) (0.193) (0.373)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of subsidies by market concentration on a number of outcomes. The
“Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to the effect of receiving a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of subsidy receipt on
nursing homes in concentrated markets. Note that in each specification, one first stage regression is estimated for each of
the subsidy and the subsidy interaction term, with each first stage regression including both the main subsidy instrument
and the main subsidy instrument interacted with the concentrated market indicator variable. The two super columns vary
the market concentration definition being used. Each takes a market as concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
exceeds 2500, calculating the HHI using shares of market-wide resident counts as market shares and assigning residents
for nursing homes with the same owner to a single entity. The super columns vary, however, in terms of market definition,
using a 15-mile radius around each nursing home as the market definition in one and each nursing home’s county as the
market definition in the other. Within each super column, the left column reports results from the instrumental variables
regression including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects, while the column on the right adds
a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect. Finally, note that outcome variables used include direct care worker
(DCW), certified nursing assistant (CNA), and licensed nurse staffing, each denominated in minutes of labor per
resident-day, as well the percentage share of staffing minutes provided by registered nurses, the average hourly wage paid
to direct care workers, and average direct care worker payroll expenditure per resident-day.
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Table III.5: Effect of Subsidies on Staffing, Wages, and Payroll by Market Concentration
per the 15-mile and 30-mile Market Definitions
15 Mile HHI 30 Mile HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Subsidy Baseline 4.800+ 5.105* 4.806+ 4.753+
(2.349) (2.319) (2.292) (2.369)
Subsidy*Concentrated 0.270 −1.665 0.727 1.060
(1.123) (1.411) (0.757) (1.664)
Nurse Min
Subsidy Baseline 1.899+ 2.148* 1.813 1.807
(1.035) (0.990) (1.062) (1.088)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.291 −1.394* −0.237 −0.174
(0.361) (0.481) (0.429) (0.737)
CNA Min
Subsidy Baseline 2.899+ 2.955* 2.992* 2.945*
(1.350) (1.356) (1.267) (1.314)
Subsidy*Concentrated 0.561 −0.270 0.964 1.234
(0.933) (1.065) (0.547) (1.094)
Pct Nurse
Subsidy Baseline 0.032 0.094 0.034 0.044
(0.114) (0.076) (0.104) (0.098)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.044 −0.247+ −0.137 −0.268
(0.132) (0.131) (0.173) (0.215)
Avg Wage
Subsidy Baseline 0.168* 0.184* 0.151* 0.146*
(0.049) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.080+ −0.139* −0.176* −0.095
(0.039) (0.050) (0.051) (0.065)
DCW PPR
Subsidy Baseline 1.450 1.600 1.377 1.289
(1.110) (1.067) (1.178) (1.167)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.664+ −1.114+ −1.803* −0.381
(0.349) (0.625) (0.654) (0.763)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of subsidies by market concentration on a number of outcomes. The
“Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to the effect of receiving a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of subsidy receipt on
nursing homes in concentrated markets. The two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used.
Each takes a market as concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index exceeds 2500, calculating the HHI using shares of
market-wide resident counts as market shares and assigning residents for nursing homes with the same owner to a single
entity. The super columns vary, however, in terms of market definition, using a 15-mile radius around each nursing home
as the market definition in one and using a 30-mile radius in the other. Within each super column, the left column reports
results from the instrumental variables regression including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed
effects, while the column on the right adds a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect. For further details on how
the instrumental variable regressions are estimated and on the outcome variables, please see the notes to Table III.4.
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Table III.6: Effect of Subsidies on Staffing, Wages, and Payroll by Market Concentration
per the 15-mile Multi-Establishment Firm Adjusted and Unadjusted Market Definitions
15 Mile Firm HHI 15 Mile Estab HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Subsidy Baseline 4.800+ 5.105* 4.522+ 4.597+
(2.349) (2.319) (2.313) (2.290)
Subsidy*Concentrated 0.270 −1.665 1.027+ 0.048
(1.123) (1.411) (0.483) (0.884)
Nurse Min
Subsidy Baseline 1.899+ 2.148* 1.754 1.946+
(1.035) (0.990) (1.045) (0.992)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.291 −1.394* 0.063 −0.716
(0.361) (0.481) (0.258) (0.488)
CNA Min
Subsidy Baseline 2.899+ 2.955* 2.767+ 2.650+
(1.350) (1.356) (1.308) (1.323)
Subsidy*Concentrated 0.561 −0.270 0.964 0.765
(0.933) (1.065) (0.572) (0.620)
Pct Nurse
Subsidy Baseline 0.032 0.094 0.022 0.087
(0.114) (0.076) (0.110) (0.077)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.044 −0.247+ −0.021 −0.239
(0.132) (0.131) (0.127) (0.143)
Avg Wage
Subsidy Baseline 0.168* 0.184* 0.158* 0.171*
(0.049) (0.051) (0.048) (0.050)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.080+ −0.139* −0.059+ −0.113+
(0.039) (0.050) (0.032) (0.056)
DCW PPR
Subsidy Baseline 1.450 1.600 1.493 1.755
(1.110) (1.067) (1.153) (1.086)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.664+ −1.114+ −0.751 −1.042
(0.349) (0.625) (0.477) (0.636)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of subsidies by market concentration on a number of outcomes. The
“Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to the effect of receiving a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of subsidy receipt on
nursing homes in concentrated markets. The two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used.
Each takes a market, defined as the set of all nursing homes within a 15-mile radius around a given nursing home, as
concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index exceeds 2500, calculating the HHI using shares of market-wide resident
counts as market shares. The super columns vary, however, in that in the Firm-based HHI case, market shares for nursing
homes owned by the same firm are summed prior to squaring, while in the Establishment-based HHI case all nursing
home establishments are assumed to operate independently. Within each super column, the left column reports results
from the instrumental variables regression including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects,
while the column on the right adds a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect. For further details on how the
instrumental variable regressions are estimated and on the outcome variables, please see the notes to Table III.4.
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Table III.7: Effect of Subsidies on Staffing, Wages, and Payroll by Market Concentration
per the County Multi-Establishment Firm Adjusted and Unadjusted Market Definitions
County Firm HHI County Estab HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Subsidy Baseline 5.008* 5.237* 5.057* 5.278*
(2.187) (2.162) (2.199) (2.178)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.317 −1.687 −0.488 −1.763
(0.658) (1.235) (0.617) (1.261)
Nurse Min
Subsidy Baseline 1.862+ 1.945+ 1.863+ 1.966+
(1.006) (0.992) (1.007) (0.999)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.283 −0.865+ −0.289 −1.013*
(0.316) (0.456) (0.309) (0.429)
CNA Min
Subsidy Baseline 3.144* 3.292* 3.193* 3.310*
(1.234) (1.242) (1.244) (1.250)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.035 −0.822 −0.199 −0.750
(0.581) (1.039) (0.529) (1.055)
Pct Nurse
Subsidy Baseline 0.026 0.038 0.015 0.037
(0.108) (0.096) (0.107) (0.096)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.040 −0.129 −0.004 −0.176
(0.151) (0.162) (0.146) (0.140)
Avg Wage
Subsidy Baseline 0.146* 0.152* 0.151* 0.155*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.045 −0.066 −0.063+ −0.059
(0.032) (0.049) (0.032) (0.052)
DCW PPR
Subsidy Baseline 1.156 1.164 1.218 1.207
(1.172) (1.169) (1.208) (1.202)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.130 −0.210 −0.328 −0.127
(0.193) (0.373) (0.206) (0.417)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of subsidies by market concentration on a number of outcomes. The
“Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to the effect of receiving a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of subsidy receipt on
nursing homes in concentrated markets. The two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used.
Each takes a market, defined as the set of all nursing homes within a county, as concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index exceeds 2500, calculating the HHI using shares of market-wide resident counts as market shares. The super columns
vary, however, in that in the Firm-based HHI case, market shares for nursing homes owned by the same firm are summed
prior to squaring, while in the Establishment-based HHI case all nursing home establishments are assumed to operate
independently. Within each super column, the left column reports results from the instrumental variables regression
including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects, while the column on the right adds a market
concentration status-by-year fixed effect. For further details on how the instrumental variable regressions are estimated
and on the outcome variables, please see the notes to Table III.4.
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Table III.8: Effect of Subsidies on Staffing, Wages, and Payroll by Market Concentration
per the 15-mile Market Definition with Resident Count HHIs vs Non-Medicaid Resident
Count HHIs
15 Mile Resident HHI 15 Mile Non-Medicaid Resident HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Subsidy Baseline 4.800+ 5.105* 4.884+ 4.989+
(2.349) (2.319) (2.362) (2.360)
Subsidy*Concentrated 0.270 −1.665 0.068 −1.164
(1.123) (1.411) (1.128) (1.552)
Nurse Min
Subsidy Baseline 1.899+ 2.148* 1.923+ 2.084+
(1.035) (0.990) (1.045) (1.005)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.291 −1.394* −0.340 −1.173*
(0.361) (0.481) (0.382) (0.519)
CNA Min
Subsidy Baseline 2.899+ 2.955* 2.959* 2.904+
(1.350) (1.356) (1.354) (1.383)
Subsidy*Concentrated 0.561 −0.270 0.408 0.008
(0.933) (1.065) (0.904) (1.141)
Pct Nurse
Subsidy Baseline 0.032 0.094 0.023 0.081
(0.114) (0.076) (0.120) (0.080)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.044 −0.247+ −0.021 −0.221
(0.132) (0.131) (0.134) (0.126)
Avg Wage
Subsidy Baseline 0.168* 0.184* 0.171* 0.183*
(0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.080+ −0.139* −0.085+ −0.128*
(0.039) (0.050) (0.043) (0.050)
DCW PPR
Subsidy Baseline 1.450 1.600 1.466 1.670
(1.110) (1.067) (1.098) (1.026)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.664+ −1.114+ −0.683+ −1.291*
(0.349) (0.625) (0.331) (0.561)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of subsidies by market concentration on a number of outcomes. The
“Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to the effect of receiving a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of subsidy receipt on
nursing homes in concentrated markets. The two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used.
Each takes a market, defined as the set of all nursing homes within a 15-mile radius around a given nursing home, as
concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index exceeds 2500, adjusting the HHI for multi-establishment firms by
summing the market shares of nursing homes owned by the same firm prior to squaring the market shares. The super
columns vary, however, in that in one case, market shares are calculated in terms of shares of market-wide nursing home
resident counts, while in the other, they are calculated in terms of shares of market-wide nursing home non-Medicaid
resident counts. Within each super column, the left column reports results from the instrumental variables regression
including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects, while the column on the right adds a market
concentration status-by-year fixed effect. For further details on how the instrumental variable regressions are estimated
and on the outcome variables, please see the notes to Table III.4.
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Table III.9: Effect of Subsidies on Staffing, Wages, and Payroll by Market Concentration
per the County Market Definition with Resident Count HHIs vs Non-Medicaid Resident
Count HHIs
County Resident HHI County Non-Medicaid Resident HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Subsidy Baseline 5.008* 5.237* 4.895* 5.162*
(2.187) (2.162) (2.238) (2.240)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.317 −1.687 0.052 −1.372
(0.658) (1.235) (0.618) (1.147)
Nurse Min
Subsidy Baseline 1.862+ 1.945+ 1.880+ 2.010+
(1.006) (0.992) (1.022) (1.001)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.283 −0.865+ −0.295 −1.021+
(0.316) (0.456) (0.311) (0.496)
CNA Min
Subsidy Baseline 3.144* 3.292* 3.014* 3.150*
(1.234) (1.242) (1.256) (1.288)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.035 −0.822 0.346 −0.351
(0.581) (1.039) (0.536) (0.803)
Pct Nurse
Subsidy Baseline 0.026 0.038 0.029 0.057
(0.108) (0.096) (0.113) (0.094)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.040 −0.129 −0.044 −0.178
(0.151) (0.162) (0.143) (0.139)
Avg Wage
Subsidy Baseline 0.146* 0.152* 0.160* 0.166*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.045 −0.066 −0.069* −0.089+
(0.032) (0.049) (0.028) (0.047)
DCW PPR
Subsidy Baseline 1.156 1.164 1.528 1.606
(1.172) (1.169) (1.014) (0.994)
Subsidy*Concentrated −0.130 −0.210 −1.002* −1.266*
(0.193) (0.373) (0.415) (0.411)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of subsidies by market concentration on a number of outcomes. The
“Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to the effect of receiving a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of subsidy receipt on
nursing homes in concentrated markets. The two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used. Each
takes a market, defined as the set of all nursing homes within a county, as concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
exceeds 2500, adjusting the HHI for multi-establishment firms by summing the market shares of nursing homes owned by
the same firm prior to squaring the market shares. The super columns vary, however, in that in one case, market shares are
calculated in terms of shares of market-wide nursing home resident counts, while in the other, they are calculated in terms
of shares of market-wide nursing home non-Medicaid resident counts. Within each super column, the left column reports
results from the instrumental variables regression including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed
effects, while the column on the right adds a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect. For further details on how
the instrumental variable regressions are estimated and on the outcome variables, please see the notes to Table III.4.
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Table III.10: Association Between Subsidy Receipt and Pre-Trends in Staffing, Wages, and
Payroll by Market Concentration per the 15-mile and County Market Definitions
15 Mile HHI County HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −3.131 −3.598 −2.436 −3.049
(2.914) (3.331) (2.962) (3.113)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 1.726 4.314 0.067 3.862
(1.127) (3.275) (1.414) (2.461)
Nurse Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −0.841 −0.906 −0.582 −0.665
(1.071) (1.239) (1.134) (1.184)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.970* 1.687 0.482 1.330
(0.419) (1.700) (0.650) (1.602)
CNA Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −2.289 −2.692 −1.853 −2.384
(1.983) (2.221) (1.940) (2.040)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.755 2.628 −0.415 2.532+
(0.903) (1.838) (0.900) (1.277)
Pct Nurse
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.259 0.360+ 0.282 0.388+
(0.201) (0.202) (0.180) (0.183)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.132 −0.199 0.109 −0.359*
(0.157) (0.165) (0.157) (0.154)
Avg Wage
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.019 0.023 0.029 0.023
(0.061) (0.057) (0.053) (0.052)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.013 0.053 −0.019 0.026
(0.071) (0.135) (0.077) (0.129)
DCW PPR
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.502 0.068 0.625 0.557
(0.927) (0.895) (0.850) (0.812)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −0.315 1.916* −1.041 −0.065
(0.590) (0.834) (0.648) (1.100)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of eventual subsidy receipt by market concentration on pre-trends in
all major outcomes considered in the primary analysis section of this chapter. Pre-trends are calculated using the change in
outcomes from two years prior to each policy event to one year prior to each policy event. The subsidy measure used is the
immediate one-year change in instrumented subsidy offers experienced by each nursing home. The “Subsidy Baseline”
coefficients refer to the association between pre-trends and experiencing a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer
increase on nursing homes in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential
effect of increased subsidy receipt on nursing homes in concentrated markets. Note that in each specification, one first
stage regression is estimated for each of the subsidy and the subsidy interaction term, with each first stage regression
including both the main subsidy instrument and the main subsidy instrument interacted with the concentrated market
indicator variable. The two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used. Each takes a market as
concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index exceeds 2500, calculating the HHI using shares of market-wide resident
counts as market shares and assigning residents for nursing homes with the same owner to a single entity. The super
columns vary, however, in terms of market definition, using a 15-mile radius around each nursing home as the market
definition in one and each nursing home’s county as the market definition in the other. Within each super column, the left
column reports results from the instrumental variables regression including only state-by-year and nursing
home-by-policy event fixed effects, while the column on the right adds a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect.
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Table III.11: Association Between Subsidy Receipt and Pre-Trends in Staffing, Wages, and
Payroll by Market Concentration per the 15-mile and 30-mile Market Definitions
15 Mile HHI 30 Mile HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −3.131 −3.598 −2.590 −3.106
(2.914) (3.331) (2.887) (2.900)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 1.726 4.314 1.329 7.878*
(1.127) (3.275) (1.240) (2.353)
Nurse Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −0.841 −0.906 −0.548 −0.794
(1.071) (1.239) (1.140) (1.061)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.970* 1.687 0.827 3.577*
(0.419) (1.700) (0.505) (1.158)
CNA Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −2.289 −2.692 −2.042 −2.312
(1.983) (2.221) (1.897) (1.950)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.755 2.628 0.502 4.303*
(0.903) (1.838) (0.871) (1.895)
Pct Nurse
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.259 0.360+ 0.307+ 0.325+
(0.201) (0.202) (0.169) (0.176)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.132 −0.199 0.050 −0.215
(0.157) (0.165) (0.183) (0.222)
Avg Wage
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.019 0.023 0.032 0.019
(0.061) (0.057) (0.052) (0.055)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.013 0.053 −0.133* 0.087
(0.071) (0.135) (0.053) (0.225)
DCW PPR
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.502 0.068 0.512 0.339
(0.927) (0.895) (0.798) (0.836)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −0.315 1.916* −1.346 1.509*
(0.590) (0.834) (1.156) (0.588)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of eventual subsidy receipt by market concentration on pre-trends in
all major outcomes considered in the primary analysis section of this chapter. The “Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to
the association between pre-trends and experiencing a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer increase on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of increased subsidy
receipt on nursing homes in concentrated markets. For further details on how the instrumental variable regressions are
estimated and on construction of the pre-trends and subsidy measure used here, please see the notes to Table III.10. The
two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used. Each takes a market as concentrated if its
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index exceeds 2500, calculating the HHI using shares of market-wide resident counts as market
shares and assigning residents for nursing homes with the same owner to a single entity. The super columns vary,
however, in terms of market definition, using a 15-mile radius around each nursing home as the market definition in one
and a 30-mile radius in the other. Within each super column, the left column reports results from the instrumental
variables regression including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects, while the column on the
right adds a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect.
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Table III.12: Association Between Subsidy Receipt and Pre-Trends in Staffing, Wages, and
Payroll by Market Concentration per the 15-mile Multi-Establishment Firm Adjusted and
Unadjusted Market Definitions
15 Mile Firm HHI 15 Mile Estab HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −3.131 −3.598 −2.873 −2.905
(2.914) (3.331) (2.933) (3.156)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 1.726 4.314 1.236 2.388
(1.127) (3.275) (0.992) (2.595)
Nurse Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −0.841 −0.906 −0.699 −0.545
(1.071) (1.239) (1.170) (1.262)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.970* 1.687 0.702+ 0.364
(0.419) (1.700) (0.378) (1.099)
CNA Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −2.289 −2.692 −2.173 −2.359
(1.983) (2.221) (1.924) (2.065)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.755 2.628 0.533 2.024
(0.903) (1.838) (0.786) (1.672)
Pct Nurse
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.259 0.360+ 0.266 0.364+
(0.201) (0.202) (0.186) (0.195)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.132 −0.199 0.128 −0.350*
(0.157) (0.165) (0.150) (0.155)
Avg Wage
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.019 0.023 0.010 0.007
(0.061) (0.057) (0.061) (0.064)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.013 0.053 0.036 0.077
(0.071) (0.135) (0.060) (0.125)
DCW PPR
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.502 0.068 0.394 0.050
(0.927) (0.895) (0.872) (0.883)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −0.315 1.916* −0.103 1.806*
(0.590) (0.834) (0.452) (0.545)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of eventual subsidy receipt by market concentration on pre-trends in
all major outcomes considered in the primary analysis section of this chapter. The “Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to
the association between pre-trends and experiencing a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer increase on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of increased subsidy
receipt on nursing homes in concentrated markets. For further details on how the instrumental variable regressions are
estimated and on construction of the pre-trends and subsidy measure used here, please see the notes to Table III.10. The
two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used. Each takes a market, defined as the set of all
nursing homes within a 15-mile radius around a given nursing home, as concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
exceeds 2500, calculating the HHI using shares of market-wide resident counts as market shares. The super columns vary,
however, in that in the Firm-based HHI case, market shares for nursing homes owned by the same firm are summed prior
to squaring, while in the Establishment-based HHI case all nursing home establishments are assumed to operate
independently. Within each super column, the left column reports results from the instrumental variables regression
including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects, while the column on the right adds a market
concentration status-by-year fixed effect.
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Table III.13: Association Between Subsidy Receipt and Pre-Trends in Staffing, Wages, and
Payroll by Market Concentration per the County Multi-Establishment Firm Adjusted and
Unadjusted Market Definitions
County Firm HHI County Estab HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −2.436 −3.049 −2.455 −2.979
(2.962) (3.113) (2.963) (3.086)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.067 3.862 0.134 3.572
(1.414) (2.461) (1.411) (2.489)
Nurse Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −0.582 −0.665 −0.605 −0.642
(1.134) (1.184) (1.159) (1.190)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.482 1.330 0.565 1.042
(0.650) (1.602) (0.678) (1.551)
CNA Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −1.853 −2.384 −1.850 −2.337
(1.940) (2.040) (1.909) (2.007)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −0.415 2.532+ −0.431 2.530+
(0.900) (1.277) (0.840) (1.367)
Pct Nurse
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.282 0.388+ 0.274 0.382*
(0.180) (0.183) (0.161) (0.175)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.109 −0.359* 0.135 −0.438*
(0.157) (0.154) (0.110) (0.163)
Avg Wage
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.020
(0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −0.019 0.026 −0.014 0.001
(0.077) (0.129) (0.081) (0.103)
DCW PPR
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.625 0.557 0.591 0.564
(0.850) (0.812) (0.842) (0.816)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −1.041 −0.065 −0.912 −0.312
(0.648) (1.100) (0.649) (1.078)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of eventual subsidy receipt by market concentration on pre-trends in
all major outcomes considered in the primary analysis section of this chapter. The “Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to
the association between pre-trends and experiencing a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer increase on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of increased subsidy
receipt on nursing homes in concentrated markets. For further details on how the instrumental variable regressions are
estimated and on construction of the pre-trends and subsidy measure used here, please see the notes to Table III.10. The
two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used. Each takes a market, defined as the set of all
nursing homes within a county, as concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index exceeds 2500, calculating the HHI using
shares of market-wide resident counts as market shares. The super columns vary, however, in that in the Firm-based HHI
case, market shares for nursing homes owned by the same firm are summed prior to squaring, while in the
Establishment-based HHI case all nursing home establishments are assumed to operate independently. Within each super
column, the left column reports results from the instrumental variables regression including only state-by-year and nursing
home-by-policy event fixed effects, while the column on the right adds a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect.
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Table III.14: Association Between Subsidy Receipt and Pre-Trends in Staffing, Wages, and
Payroll by Market Concentration per the 15-mile Market Definition with Resident Count
HHIs vs Non-Medicaid Resident Count HHIs
15 Mile Resident HHI 15 Mile Non-Medicaid Resident HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −3.131 −3.598 −2.985 −3.554
(2.914) (3.331) (2.920) (3.245)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 1.726 4.314 1.354 4.313
(1.127) (3.275) (1.031) (2.875)
Nurse Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −0.841 −0.906 −0.809 −0.941
(1.071) (1.239) (1.080) (1.199)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.970* 1.687 0.879* 1.815
(0.419) (1.700) (0.398) (1.567)
CNA Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −2.289 −2.692 −2.175 −2.613
(1.983) (2.221) (1.976) (2.164)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.755 2.628 0.474 2.498
(0.903) (1.838) (0.799) (1.579)
Pct Nurse
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.259 0.360+ 0.248 0.344
(0.201) (0.202) (0.201) (0.197)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.132 −0.199 0.157 −0.173
(0.157) (0.165) (0.153) (0.150)
Avg Wage
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.019 0.023 0.026 0.021
(0.061) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.013 0.053 −0.003 0.067
(0.071) (0.135) (0.063) (0.134)
DCW PPR
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.502 0.068 0.494 0.070
(0.927) (0.895) (0.927) (0.901)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −0.315 1.916* −0.298 1.928*
(0.590) (0.834) (0.594) (0.840)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of eventual subsidy receipt by market concentration on pre-trends in
all major outcomes considered in the primary analysis section of this chapter. The “Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to
the association between pre-trends and experiencing a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer increase on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of increased subsidy
receipt on nursing homes in concentrated markets. For further details on how the instrumental variable regressions are
estimated and on construction of the pre-trends and subsidy measure used here, please see the notes to Table III.10. The
two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used. Each takes a market, defined as the set of all
nursing homes within a 15-mile radius around a given nursing home, as concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
exceeds 2500, adjusting the HHI for multi-establishment firms by summing the market shares of nursing homes owned by
the same firm prior to squaring the market shares. The super columns vary, however, in that in one case, market shares are
calculated in terms of shares of market-wide nursing home resident counts, while in the other, they are calculated in terms
of shares of market-wide nursing home non-Medicaid resident counts. Within each super column, the left column reports
results from the instrumental variables regression including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed
effects, while the column on the right adds a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect.
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Table III.15: Association Between Subsidy Receipt and Pre-Trends in Staffing, Wages, and
Payroll by Market Concentration per the County Market Definition with Resident Count
HHIs vs Non-Medicaid Resident Count HHIs
County Resident HHI County Non-Medicaid Resident HHI
State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE State X Year FE SY FE + Year X Concentrated FE
DCW Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −2.436 −3.049 −2.274 −2.824
(2.962) (3.113) (3.028) (3.281)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.067 3.862 −0.419 2.815
(1.414) (2.461) (1.270) (2.844)
Nurse Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −0.582 −0.665 −0.563 −0.639
(1.134) (1.184) (1.153) (1.250)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.482 1.330 0.364 1.092
(0.650) (1.602) (0.633) (1.777)
CNA Min
Pre-Trend Baseline −1.853 −2.384 −1.711 −2.185
(1.940) (2.040) (1.984) (2.135)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −0.415 2.532+ −0.784 1.724
(0.900) (1.277) (0.741) (1.404)
Pct Nurse
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.282 0.388+ 0.294 0.391+
(0.180) (0.183) (0.190) (0.204)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated 0.109 −0.359* 0.057 −0.344
(0.157) (0.154) (0.168) (0.235)
Avg Wage
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.029 0.023 0.037 0.032
(0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.060)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −0.019 0.026 −0.036 −0.003
(0.077) (0.129) (0.081) (0.142)
DCW PPR
Pre-Trend Baseline 0.625 0.557 0.641 0.623
(0.850) (0.812) (0.864) (0.813)
Pre-Trend*Concentrated −1.041 −0.065 −0.873 0.017
(0.648) (1.100) (0.523) (0.783)
This table gives estimates of the instrumented effect of eventual subsidy receipt by market concentration on pre-trends in
all major outcomes considered in the primary analysis section of this chapter. The “Subsidy Baseline” coefficients refer to
the association between pre-trends and experiencing a one dollar per resident-day subsidy offer increase on nursing homes
in unconcentrated markets, while the “Subsidy Interaction” coefficient gives the differential effect of increased subsidy
receipt on nursing homes in concentrated markets. For further details on how the instrumental variable regressions are
estimated and on construction of the pre-trends and subsidy measure used here, please see the notes to Table III.10. The
two super columns vary the market concentration definition being used. Each takes a market, defined as the set of all
nursing homes within a county, as concentrated if its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index exceeds 2500, adjusting the HHI for
multi-establishment firms by summing the market shares of nursing homes owned by the same firm prior to squaring the
market shares. The super columns vary, however, in that in one case, market shares are calculated in terms of shares of
market-wide nursing home resident counts, while in the other, they are calculated in terms of shares of market-wide
nursing home non-Medicaid resident counts. Within each super column, the left column reports results from the
instrumental variables regression including only state-by-year and nursing home-by-policy event fixed effects, while the
column on the right adds a market concentration status-by-year fixed effect.
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III.VIII Multi-Establishment Firm Identification Appendix
The primary measure of market concentration used in this chapter assigns market
shares for nursing homes owned by the same firm to a single entity, thereby adjusting
market shares to account for ownership by multi-establishment firms. The process of
identifying which nursing homes were owned by the same entity was non-trivial. The
OSCAR/CASPR data reports, for each year, whether a given nursing home is part of a
nursing home chain or if instead it is independently owned. The OSCAR/CASPR data
also elicits for nursing homes that are not independently owned the name of the firm that
owns it, though this information is only available for me in the years 1996-1999. Although
the data includes these firm owner names, it does not include numerical identifiers for
owner firms. This is a non-trivial complication since nursing homes often report their
owners’ names inconsistently. Beyond just typographic errors and the like, nursing homes
also vary in terms of whether they report their parent company’s full name, in their use
of various abbreviations, and in whether they report their parent company’s name or the
name of the division in their parent company that they most directly interact with.
In order to address these difficulties and identify which nursing homes are owned
by the same parent companies, I adopted the following procedure. First, I took the set of
all nursing home parent company names reported in the 1996-1999 data, converted them
to lower case, stripped them of punctuation, and stemmed them (e.g., converted words
like “walks”, “walking”, and “walked” to “walk”). I took any nursing homes reporting
the same parent company name after this simple cleaning procedure to be owned by the
same parent company. Next, I calculated the string distance between each unique, cleaned
nursing home parent company name and every other unique, cleaned parent company
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name using the Jaro-Winkler string distance metric, using a penalty parameter of 0.1. Us-
ing this set of string distances between each pair of parent company names, I adopted the
following algorithm to assign nursing homes to parent companies and applied it to my list
of nursing home parent company names:
For a given seed parent company name under consideration, begin by forming a list
of candidate parent company names which may refer to the same parent company as the
seed parent company name. This candidate list must contain every parent company name
with a Jaro-Winkler string distance of less than or equal to 0.3 from the seed name under
starting consideration. For each parent company name on the candidate list, construct
for it its own sub-list of other parent company names that also may refer to it, using the
same string distance of 0.3 or less criterion. Next, for each parent company name that
appears on either the initial candidate list or on one of the sub-lists, calculate how many
lists (including both the sub-lists and the seed name’s list) it appears on. Then, conclude
that any parent company name appearing on 80% or more of the lists (again, including
both the sub-lists and the initial seed name’s list) refers to the same parent company as the
seed name being examined. Assign all nursing homes that report being owned by either
the seed parent company name or by one of the matched parent company names a single,
unique owner identifier number and remove their reported parent company names from
the pool of unassigned names. Finally, iterate this procedure on the now shrunken list of
unassigned names until all nursing homes are assigned to unique parent company owner
identifiers.
The above procedure is intended to address a number of practical difficulties. Since
I have no information about the total number of nursing home parent companies in exis-
tence in a given year, I must deduce how many unique parent companies exist based on
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patterns in the parent company name data. The sub-list appearance procedure is intended
to help do that by linking nursing home parent company names only when a given pool of
names frequently match with one another. This helps ensure that parent company names
that, for idiosyncratic reasons, happen to match just one parent company name in a pool
but not the others will not be assigned to the pool, while still allowing parent company
names that match most of the pool to fail to match some of the names in the pool. This
procedure also helps reduce the degree to which the results of the algorithm depend on
the order in which different parent company names are examined. For an example of why
these properties are valuable, consider the case of a nursing home owned by the hypothet-
ical “Jekyll Corporation” that reports as its parent company name “Jekyll North West”,
the division of its parent company with which the nursing home most directly interacts.68
Taking “Jekyll North West” as the seed parent company name, I might form an immediate
match candidate list consisting of “Jekyll Inc”, “Jekyll North East”, “Jekyll South West”,
“Jekl South West”, “Jekyll Northwet”, and “Hyde North West”. The sub-list correspon-
dence procedure will help ensure that “Jekyll South East” enters the final match pool as it
will match with most of the other “Jekyll” names, despite not matching very well with the
seed name “Jekyll North West”. The sub-list procedure will also help screen out “Hyde
North West” as it will be a poor match for most Jekyll names despite being a reasonably
good match for “Jekyll North West”.
There are a few other issues associated with this procedure worth considering. First,
I apply the above algorithm to the set of all parent company names from 1996-1999, rather
than going separately year by year. This is done so as to allow a larger pool of parent com-
pany names to be used, which in turn should help improve the reliability of the sub-list
68Within the actual pool of nursing home parent company names, nursing homes do appear to report
parent company division names rather frequently.
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procedure described above. Spot checks indicate that nursing homes are usually success-
fully matched to the same parent company firm ID over time, with exceptions appearing
to represent either actual changes in nursing home ownership or a name changes by the
nursing home’s owner. Second, in order to address the years 2000 to 2015, I carry forward
the 1999 nursing home parent companies linkages, changing them only to relabel nursing
homes as independent if they report no longer being owned by a nursing home chain.
Nursing homes who enter after 1999 or enter into parent company ownership after 1999
are labeled as independent. While this procedure is reasonable for the bulk of my sample
– most of my payroll subsidy variation occurs in the late 1990s and early 2000s – there may
be substantial measurement error in my assignment of nursing homes to owners the in late
2000s and 2010s. As a final comment, it is worth noting that my procedure does assign a
number of nursing homes to parent companies that do not appear to own any other nurs-
ing homes. While it is potentially true that this is due to a failure by my algorithm to match
nursing homes to the correct owners, it is also worth noting that many nursing homes are
part of multi-establishment firms that genuinely only own one nursing home, but which
do own other healthcare businesses such as hospitals or assisted living facilities.
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IV Chapter 4: Excess Capacity and Heterogeneity in the Fiscal Multiplier: Evi-
dence from the Obama Stimulus Package
This chapter is coauthored with Arindrajit Dube, Ethan Kaplan, and Ben Zipperer.
IV.I Introduction
We do not have a good measure of the effects of fiscal policy in a recession
because the methods that we use to estimate the effects of fiscal policy—both
those using the observed outcomes following different policies in aggregate
data and those studying counterfactuals in fitted model economies—almost
entirely ignore the state of the economy and estimate “the” government multi-
plier, which is presumably a weighted average of the one we care about—the
multiplier in a recession—and one we care less about—the multiplier in an
expansion. Notable exceptions to this general claim suggest this difference is
potentially large. Our lack of knowledge stems significantly from the focus on
linear dynamics: vector autoregressions and linearized (or close-to-linear) dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Our lack of knowledge
also reflects a lack of data: deep recessions are few and nonlinearities hard to
measure” – Parker (2011).
This chapter shifts focus away from the payroll subsidies examined in the prior two chap-
ters in order to study the effect of fiscal stimulus on employment, aiming in particular
estimate the fiscal multiplier as a function of employment conditions. We do so using
spatial variation in stimulus expenditure generated by the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009 during the Great Recession along with variation in the county-level
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impact of the recession itself. While there is already a large body of research aiming to
estimate fiscal multipliers, the approach laid out in this chapter will help address the gaps
in our knowledge laid out by Parker (2011) as our use of spatial variation will enable us to
much more credibly identify the multiplier and the degree to which it varies with the state
of the economy.
There is considerable variation in existing empirical estimates of fiscal multipliers.
Some are in the 0-0.5 range (Barro and Redlick, 2011; Conley and Dupor, 2013), others are
near to 1 (Ramey, 2011), and yet others are well above 1 (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). The-
oretical estimates exhibit similar variation, from near zero (Baxter and King, 1993) to well
over 1 and sometimes even over 2 (Chodorow-Reich, 2017; Christiano et al., 2011; Wood-
ford, 2011). Part of the reason for the disagreement, as Parker (2011) points out, may be due
to heterogeneity in the multiplier as a function of the degree of slack in the economy. For
macroeconomic stabilization purposes, the figure of greatest interest is the multiplier dur-
ing a recession when there is a great deal of excess capacity in the economy. Unfortunately,
estimation of the multiplier as a function of excess capacity has been elusive. The reasons
for this are three-fold. First, at a country level, identification must exclusively rely on time
series variation. However, the timing of expenditures is correlated with the business cycle
itself and thus expenditures are confounded by the state of the economy. Second, there
is a limited sample size from which to perform statistical inference. Some recent efforts
have attempted to use a narrative approach in order to estimate fiscal multipliers (Romer
and Romer, 2010). However, this approach is plagued by small sample sizes, which is par-
ticularly problematic when investigating heterogeneous effects of fiscal stimulus by the
amount of slack in the economy. Third, when excess capacity is high, interest rates tend to
be low and fiscal expenditure more effective. Thus, the interest rate confounds the estimate
151
of the heterogeneity in the multiplier. This is particularly important when excess capacity
is quite large since during such times the interest rate on government debt is likely to be
close to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, and a large recent literature argues
that multipliers are much higher at the zero lower bound and when policy interest rates
are sticky downwards (Christiano et al., 2011; Eggertsson et al., 2003; Eggertsson, 2011;
Woodford, 2011).
Beginning with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), a burgeoning literature has
attempted to estimate heterogeneity in the multiplier using time series variation (Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Baum et al., 2012; Clemens and Miran, 2012; Fazzari et al.,
2015; Ramey, 2011; Ramey and Zubairy, 2018; Mittnik and Semmler, 2012; Semmler and
Semmler, 2013). However, it has focused on the difference in the multiplier at the zero
lower bound in nominal interest rates. One recent paper (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018) also
uses time series variation and employs vector autoregression methods to estimate the dif-
ferential multiplier in recessions versus expansions. They find no differential due to high
unemployment and only limited evidence for a difference in multipliers caused by the zero
lower bound. Their multiplier estimates lie between 0.4 and 0.8 throughout recessions and
booms and during periods of high interest rates as well as low interest rates. However,
their time series based estimation is not well identified. Moreover, such estimates are not
robust to timing misspecification or to alternative choices of method for constructing im-
pulse response functions (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018).
An alternative approach to multiplier estimation using national time series is estima-
tion using intra-national variation in fiscal expenditures over time (Chodorow-Reich et al.,
2012; Chodorow-Reich, 2017; Conley and Dupor, 2013; Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2011; Moretti,
2010; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014; Serrato and Wingender, 2016). There is even a small
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set of papers estimating local multipliers using variation in American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act spending across local areas (Chodorow-Reich et al., 2012; Conley and Dupor,
2013; Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2011).
This chapter uses cross-county variation in expenditure during the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act to estimate fiscal multipliers. Further, we semi-parametrically
estimate the multiplier as a non-parametric function of the degree of counties’ excess ca-
pacity, measured by the magnitude of the negative employment shock each county re-
ceived as a consequence of the Great Recession. We show that our estimates of the fiscal
multiplier satisfy time placebos and are robust to inclusion of Bartik controls for evolution
of employment based upon the sectoral composition of local employment and national
trends in employment by sector. Moreover, Boone et al. (2014) show that allocation of
funds in ARRA was not correlated with the unemployment rate.69 Our paper is closest
in topic to Ramey and Zubairy (2018) in that we estimate the heterogeneity in the mul-
tiplier as a function of excess capacity, partialing out interest rate effects. It is closest
to Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011) in terms of methods, though they do not estimate differ-
ential multipliers by excess capacity. In contrast to Ramey and Zubairy (2018), we find
a seven-fold increase in the fiscal multiplier for above-median excess capacity counties
compared to below-median excess capacity counties. One recent paper, Michaillat (2014),
shows that when unemployment is higher, public sector employment crowds out fewer
private matches and thus the multiplier is countercyclical. Our methods are unable to dis-
tinguish whether the multiplier is higher in high excess capacity areas because in those
areas there is more idle capital (Keynes, 2018), whether there is less crowdout of match-
ing efficiency from employment programs (Michaillat, 2014), or whether in areas of high
69These results are at the Congressional District level but they hold at the county level as well.
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excess capacity, unemployment is also greater and consumption multipliers are therefore
higher (Gross et al., 2016). It is also with noting that, as with the rest of the local multiplier
literature, our use of spatial variation comes at a cost. We do not directly estimate a na-
tional fiscal multiplier and, because expenditures are financed through federal rather than
through local taxes, what we are estimating is more akin to a transfer multiplier in an open
economy as opposed to a national fiscal multiplier.
In addition to providing an estimate of the multiplier as a function of excess capacity,
our paper also adds to the literature in a number of other ways. First, we provide more
evidence on the dynamics of expenditure, computing non-parametric impulse responses
similar to what is estimated in the Vector Autoregression literature (Blanchard and Perotti,
2002; Ramey, 2011; Ramey and Zubairy, 2018). Allowing more non-parametric estimation
of impulse responses to fiscal expenditure is beneficial because it allows for arbitrary non-
linearities in the time path of the effect of expenditure. This is a particularly important
contribution given Ramey and Zubairy (2018)’s demonstration of the sensitivity of the
multiplier to the method of constructing impulse response functions in non-linear models
such as the VAR models pioneered by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) to estimate
heterogeneity in the multiplier over the business cycle.
Second, we point out that, given the heterogeneity which we find in the fiscal multi-
plier, our estimates reflect an average multiplier which is averaged over each dollar spent.
We separate out the economic and political aspects of the multiplier by computing the mul-
tiplier for a politically unconstrained government which optimally targets federal dollars
to the highest multiplier areas. In other words, in addition to estimating the actual mul-
tiplier, we compute what the multiplier would have been had the stimulus dollars been
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optimally spent based upon the information that the government would have had access
to at the time.
IV.II Research Design
To estimate the effects of fiscal stimulus we regress county-level quarterly employ-
ment and earnings on a quarterly measure of county-level stimulus and additional con-
trols. We primarily use fixed effect methods. To explore heterogeneity of the effects of
stimulus across counties of varying excess capacity, we estimate over split samples as well
as estimate using the semiparametric smooth coefficient estimator proposed by Li et al.
(2002). To explore heterogeneity of the multiplier in the extent of stimulus, we add a
quadratic term in the amount of stimulus. We also re-estimate our results, focusing on
not just total employment and earnings but also on employment and earnings by industry.
Our primary regressions are estimated at the county-by-quarter level on a sample
stretching from 2006Q1 to 2016Q3. Letting i, s, and t denote, respectively, county, state,
and quarterly indices, the following specification:




βkSit−k + γBit + Fst + tD
′
it∆ + εit (IV.1)
regresses quarterly employment or earnings per capita outcomes Yit on eight lags and leads
in stimulus per capita Sit. We then report the the contemporaneous effects of stimulus β0
summed with two, four, six, and eight quarters of lagged stimulus effects. We also report
the eight quarter summed leads on stimulus. Controls in this specification include a Bartik
shift-share control for predicted employment based upon industrial shares of employment
in county i in 2008 Quarter 1, state-time-specific fixed effects Fst and demographic controls
which vary over time and across counties denoted by Dit. Demographic controls all con-
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sist of cross-sectional controls interacted with linear time trends. These controls include
time trends interacted with 2000 Census estimates of the share of county population that
is black, Hispanic, urban, and in poverty. They also include county median income, av-
erage amount of home purchase loans in 2006, and total HMDA loans per capita in 2006.
In some specifications, the fixed effects are at the state-by-time level or at just the pure
time level: Ft. Note that in the specifications including county and state-time fixed effects,
identification of stimulus effects hinges on the allocation of stimulus within states being
exogenous to trends in employment and wage bill conditional on the demographic-linked
trends and on industrial composition-predicted employment and wage bill. Additionally,
identification in these specifications requires that stimulus spending has no cross-county
spillover effects. Given that these spillover effects should be expected to some degree, our
local fiscal multiplier estimates should be viewed more as lower bounds since cross-county
spillovers should bias our estimates of stimulus effects toward zero.
In order to assess how the effect of stimulus varies by excess capacity, we simply
re-estimate the specification in equation IV.1 above, but separately among counties with
above median and below median excess capacity. Note that our measure of excess ca-
pacity (Ei), the construction of which is discussed further in the next section, is based on
pre-period industry shares and is constant for each county. Additionally, we also investi-
gate heterogeneity in the multiplier using a more flexible non-linear interaction between
stimulus and excess capacity, or semi-parametric smooth coefficient model:
Yit = g(Ei) + (Sit, Zit)′h(Ei) + εit (IV.2)
where the scalar g and vector h are unspecified functions of excess capacity. We es-
timate equation IV.2 at each excess capacity percentile ep by linear regressions of Yit on Sit
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and Zit for observations whose population-weighted kernel-based distance is near ep, as
suggested by Li et al. (2002). We county-cluster bootstrap these estimates to conduct in-
ference. Note that with this approach, including lags and leads on the effect of stimulus is
infeasible due to sample size constraints, so we are limited only to estimating contempo-
raneous stimulus effects here.
IV.III Data and Measurement
Our primary data sources are the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 70 and the recipient-reported American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act stimulus award data from recovery.gov.71 Additionally,
we use a variety of other demographic data as control variables from multiple sources that
we detail below.
IV.III.I Outcomes
The key dependent variables are employment and earnings (wage bill) per capita.
We construct our main employment measure, employment per capita, by dividing county-
level employment reported at the quarterly level from the QCEW and dividing it be inter-
censal population estimates from the Bureau of the Census for the population aged 15-
64.72. Quarterly earnings data are taken directly from the county-level BLS QCEW. We
70https://www.bls.gov/cew/
71This data was formerly available at http://www.recovery.gov/FAQ/Pages/DownloadCenter.aspx; a
portion of it is currently available at https://www.nber.org/data/ARRA/.
72The definition of employment per capita used by BLS divides aggregate employment in the CPS by the
16+ population. Our definition differs from this definition in a few respects. First, we use the QCEW rather
than the CPS. The QCEW is based on unemployment insurance records reported to state governments by
firms and then transmitted to the U.S. Census. It differs from the CPS in that it is a census, not a sample. Thus,
we have accurate measures of employment by county in each quarter. However, though it contains 98% of
jobs, it does not contain the self-employed. Additionally, at the county level, we use July intercensal estimates
of population for people aged 15-64 (http://www.census.gov/popest/) rather than 16+. Our measures of em-
ployment are thus smaller than those used by BLS to construct national employment per capita. However, our
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divide the aggregate wage bill in a county-quarter by the size of the population aged 15-
64. We also then divide by 100,000 so that wage bill impacts can be interpreted as impacts
upon per capita wages per $100,000. These data are not seasonally adjusted. To calculate
quarterly population levels we use the annual July 1st intercensal estimates published by
the US Census Bureau73 as our third quarter population estimates and interpolate esti-
mates among quarters assuming a quarterly geometric growth rate.
IV.III.II Treatment
For our treatment variable, we use the amount of stimulus funds per capita spent in
a county in a quarter. We construct this variable using recipient-reported stimulus award
data that we downloaded from www.recovery.gov. These data are a panel of individ-
ual contracts, grants, and loans reported quarterly beginning in 2009q4 through 2013q3,
though we only use data on contracts and grants.74 Award data are also reported for
a single 2009q1-2009q2 period, which we we assign to 2009q2.Recipient-reported data is
available for prime awardee recipients and sub-recipients who receive more than $25,000.
Prime awardees report the overall award amount and sub-recipients report subawards.
We construct our dataset using prime awards and their award amount. We then add in
subrecipients and their subawards.
Prime awards report their expenditure-to-date on a quarterly basis. We use this data
to construct prime awards’ expenditure per quarter. Subawards do not report expenditure-
to-date, instead reporting only when the subaward is active. We assume that subawards
measures of population are larger. Overall, our employment per capita measure is smaller than the national
measure constructed by BLS.
73http://www.census.gov/popest/
74We exclude data on loans out of concern that their inclusion would overstate the quantity of stimulus
flowing to different regions, depending on the relative interest rates between public and private loans and on
whether recipients were credit constrained.
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are spent at the same rate as their prime awards over the period in which the subaward is
active. Specifically, in any quarter when a subaward is active, we assume the share of the
subaward’s total value spent in that quarter is equal to the its prime award’s expenditure
that quarter divided by the total prime award expenditure that occurs while the subaward
is active.75
A reasonably small number of prime awards report nonmonotonicities in their cu-
mulative amount spent over time, such as when they report cumulative expenditure levels
of 0 in their final reporting periods. In cases like these where awards report cumulative
expenditure levels lower than the prior cumulative expenditure level for up to two con-
secutive quarters, we correct these nonmonotonicities by replacing those observations with
data linearly interpolated based on the two quarters surrounding the block of nonmono-
tonic cumulative expenditure levels. When expenditure levels fall in an award’s final re-
porting period, we use the value from the prior period. Only a small share of the data
exhibits nonmonotonicities of any kind. In the rare cases that these corrective procedures
fail to produce monotonically increasing cumulative expenditure data, we drop the data
from our sample.
For a given award in the recipient-reported data, funds awarded and place of perfor-
mance zip code are available for prime recipients and subrecipients. We assign zip codes
to counties using the MABLE/Geocorr2K Census 2000 zip code-to-county crosswalk.76 In
the rare cases where place-of-performance zip code data is not reported or is reported with
75Not all prime award expenditure is reported as spent prior to the end of our stimulus award sample. In
cases where a subaward is active up through the last reporting period for a prime award that does not report
expenditure of the entire award, we divide by total prime award expenditure during the subaward active
period summed with the outstanding unspent funds.
76When a zip code in multiple counties, we allocate awards based on population shares using
MABLE/Geocorr2K Census 2000 population allocation factors.
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error, we use an award’s reported city and state to assign it to a county. When this data is
also not available, we use the award recipient’s zip code.
We divide our stimulus measure by the size of the population aged 15-64 per the
Census. We then also divide by $100,000. Thus, our estimates of the impact of stimulus
can be interpreted as the impact of receiving an additional $100,000 of expenditure per
capita in a county.77
IV.III.III Excess Capacity
For our measure of county excess capacity, we compute a county’s excess capacity as
the largest observed 1-year or 2-year reduction in industry shift-share predicted employ-
ment in the county from 2006 to 2008. We then multiply our measure by -1 for reporting
convenience. We restrict ourselves to 1-year and 2-year reductions in order to account for
possible variation in the degree to which employment is seasonal across counties. In prac-
tice, however, this seasonality adjustment is not very impactful on the construction of the
excess capacity measure. Intuitively, this measure ranks counties by the size of the reduc-
tion in the employment to population ratio that their industry-composition suggests they
should have received, prior to passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
IV.III.IV Controls
Because our identification using panel data relies on county fixed effects, we do not
use lagged outcomes as controls for fear of biasing our OLS estimates. Instead, we use
as controls predicted employment and earnings, using pre-period county-level industry
shares and contemporaneous national level employment and earnings to predict actual
77Since we divided the dependent and independent variables by the same measure of population, any
measurement error in the county-level intercensal population estimates produced by the Census introduces
negative bias into our estimated multiplier.
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employment and earnings in the manner of Bartik (1991). Specifically, we first calcu-
late county-level averages over the years 2006 and 2007 employment (earnings) shares
of national employment (earnings) at the three-digit NAICS level. Then we multiply these
county-NAICS shares by contemporaneous national three-digit NAICS employment. We
sum the resulting county-NAICS series over NAICS categories to form a single, time-
varying predicted employment (earnings) series for each county.
In addition to Bartik-predicted outcomes and geographic and time dummies, we
also employ a variety of pre-period demographic controls in the hope of increasing the
precision of our estimates and also to account for potential selection bias remaining in
stimulus assignment. In particular, we focus on 2000 Census county-level estimates of the
share of county populations that are black, Hispanic, urban, and in poverty, as well as
county-level median income.78 Because of the central role of housing wealth in the most
recent recession, we also use two county-level housing variables derived from the loan
origination reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA): the 2006 average
value of home purchase loans and the 2006 total of all HMDA loans divided by county
population.79 We then interact these demographic controls with a time trend and include
them in our county fixed effects regressions.
IV.IV Results
We begin by showing the amount of stimulus spent over time. Figure IV.1 shows
the amount spent nationally over time. The majority of the funds were spent by 2012.
However, even at the end of our data set, 13% of them had not been allocated. We see in




States. Looking at the shaded map of amount spent by county, we see no obvious spatial
patterns of expenditure.
IV.IV.I Own-county Multipliers
We present our baseline estimates of the contemporaneous own-county impact of
stimulus in Table IV.1. These estimates are broken down into two super-columns. The
left super-column contains estimates of the impact of stimulus on own-county employ-
ment and the right super-column contains estimates of stimulus on the own-county wage
bill. Across the various rows, we show the sum of the contemporaneous effect of stimulus
and either 2, 4, 6, or 8 lags of stimulus. Finally, in the bottom row, we show the sum of
all 8 leads on stimulus. Within each super column, we show four separate specifications
with progressively more stringent sets of controls and fixed effects. All columns contain
county fixed effects. The first column additionally contains quarter-by-year (henceforth
time) fixed effects. The second column puts in a set of controls which vary across coun-
ties and over time: a Bartik predicted outcome variable 80 percent black, hispanic, urban,
and under poverty, median income and 2006 average home purchase price for loans and
2006 total HMDA loans per capita. The third column drops demographic and economic
covariates but replaces time fixed effects with state-by-time fixed effects. The final col-
umn re-adds the demographic and economic controls to the model with state-by-time and
county fixed effects.
We use our estimates with the most stringent set of controls as our main estimates.
We believe that they are the best identified. They generally also have the greatest precision.
80When the outcome variable is the employment to population ratio, then the Bartik prediction is for the
employment to population ratio; when the outcome variable is the wage, then we compute a Bartik predicted
wage. The Bartik controls are computed using county-level employment and wage bill from the QCEW, av-
eraged over the 2006-2007 time period. Predictions are made using industrial composition at the three-digit
NAICS level.
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Our results do vary some across specification. However, they are all of the same sign and,
with a single exception among the six-quarter aggregated and eight-quarter aggregated
effects, are all significant at the 5% level. Our benchmark estimate of the effect of an ad-
ditional $100,000 of stimulus expenditure per capita on employment is that the additional
expenditure increases employment per capita by 0.424 percentage points. Since ARRA was
$787 billion and the U.S. population in 2011 (when the median ARRA dollar was spent)
was 311 million, this amounts to $2500 per person or 2.5% of $100,000 per person. Thus,
assuming that the multiplier for all ARRA expenditure is the same as for ARRA’s contract
and grant expenditure, our estimates imply that ARRA expenditures raised employment
per capita by 1.07 percentage points.
We also estimate the impact of stimulus on wage bill. The 8-lag time-aggregated
wage bill effect is 0.172, though just barely fails to achieve statistical significance at the
5% level. This point estimate implies that an extra $100,000 of expenditure per capita
raises the per capita wage bill by $17,200. If we divide this by the employment multiplier,
we find that if wages for employed people did not rise, the average person employed by
the stimulus would have made $40,566. The marginal jobs created by ARRA thus were
likely lower than median paying jobs, but not exceptionally low paying. Overall, our
time-aggregated results are consistent with a positive and significant multiplier. It is also
worth noting that across all specifications, the eight-quarter time-aggregated leads fail to
achieve statistical significance, suggestive of stimulus expenditure not being preceded by
substantial differences in employment or wage bill shocks.
The sign of our estimates is informative and useful in better understanding the chan-
nels through which stimulus worked. It is important to note that we are estimating the
impact of expenditures holding fixed tax payments, as long as tax payments are not corre-
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lated with stimulus expenditures. We empirically estimate, though do not report, estimates
controlling for deciles of tax payments per capita, and find that including these controls
does not qualitatively affect our results. Thus, we find that our estimates do not reflect dif-
ferences in future potential tax burden across counties, but rather reflect differences in ex-
penditures. Unlike traditional national estimates, our local estimates therefore effectively
hold expected future tax payments constant and net wealth increases are at least weakly
larger in the areas which receive stimulus. Since, in the baseline macro model, an increase
in wealth should reduce rather than increase labor supply, the fact that we estimate posi-
tive coefficients indicates that the multiplier is not likely through the wealth-labor supply
channel. The leading alternative channel is the Keynesian demand-side channel.
IV.IV.II Heterogeneity by Excess Capacity
In Table IV.2 and Figures IV.3, IV.4, and IV.5we present estimates of heterogeneity by
the degree of excess capacity. Recent macroeconomic theory (Christiano et al., 2011; Wood-
ford, 2011; Eggertsson, 2011) suggests strong heterogeneity in the multiplier when the in-
terest rate reaches the zero lower bound. However, others have suggested that govern-
ment expenditures may vary also by the degree of slack or excess capacity in the economy
(Keynes, 2018; Parker, 2011). There are many reasons as to why the multiplier may vary
with the degree of excess capacity. In counties with greater slack, employment does not
necessarily rely upon large capital investments. In addition, in areas with high unemploy-
ment, consumers have may be more liquidity constrained and have a higher propensity to
consume out of money spent.
Our parametric estimates of the impact of stimulus funds in counties with higher
and lower excess capacity are in Table IV.2. Once again, we separate out the presentation
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of our estimates into two super columns. In the left super column, we present employment
multipliers and, on the right, wage bill multipliers. Each super column contains three
columns. These columns show pooled estimates (identical to the estimates in Table IV.1),
estimates from below-median excess capacity counties, and estimates from above-median
excess capacity counties. All results presented here are estimated using the all controls
benchmark specification (column 4 in Table IV.1). Note that a visualization of these results
that plots the impulse-response of employment and wage bill to stimulus is available in
Figure IV.3.
We find very strong differences between low and high excess capacity counties in
their estimated multipliers. Our cumulative lag estimates for both wage bill and employ-
ment in low excess areas are substantially smaller and statistically insignificant. The stim-
ulative effect of an extra $100,000 per capita of government expenditure in below-median
excess capacity counties is to raise employment per capita by a statistically insignificant
0.148 over two years. Turning to above median-excess capacity counties, we find a sub-
stantially larger employment multiplier. The high-excess capacity multiplier is almost 7
times the size of the low-excess capacity multiplier. An additional $100,000 of expenditure
per capita in high excess capacity counties yields 0.981 extra jobs per person. ARRA over-
all is thus estimated to have increased employment in high excess capacity areas by 3.17
percentage points over two and a quarter years (or 1.41 per year). It is important to point
out that these cross-sectional multipliers are identified off of differential changes across
counties with high versus low excess capacity. Since interest rates were the same in high
and low excess capacity areas (and in fact, policy rates were at the zero lower bound for
most of the period), our estimates are not confounded by differential multipliers at the
zero lower bound, as is common with time series estimates (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018). In
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addition to the ability to estimate using variation unconfounded by the state of the econ-
omy, the ability to unconfound state-contingent multipliers from interest-rate contingent
multipliers is one of the greatest benefits of our cross-county panel estimation strategy.
The wage bill multipliers exhibit similar patterns to what is observed for the em-
ployment multipliers. The low excess capacity wage bill coefficient implies an additional
expenditure of $100,000 per person yields a statistically insignificant additional $4,800 per
person in wage income. Strikingly, the wage bill effect in high excess capacity counties is
nearly 10 times larger than the effect in low excess capacity counties. Specifically, in high
excess capacity counties, an additional expenditure of $100,000 per person yields an addi-
tion $40,600 wage bill per person, though this effect is only statistically significant at the
10% level. This point estimates implies that ARRA generated an additional $1,400 per per-
son in high excess capacity counties. Note that, as in the pooled case, the aggregated lead
effects of stimulus on employment and wage bill are once again statistically insignificant
in both the low and high excess capacity samples.
Once concern with our main parametric approach is that our main effects are esti-
mated using lag operators. However, in a balanced panel, longer lags are estimated off
of a truncated sample of time periods. Thus, dynamic estimates can reflect causal effects
of treatment or compositional differences in lag estimation. To address this concern, we
also estimate the dynamic impact of stimulus by regressing employment per capita and
the wage bill respectively on a set of time dummies interacted with the (time-invariant)
average stimulus amount spent in a county. We plot these estimates in Figure IV.5. The
results here are consistent with our main estimates. In low excess capacity counties, we
see essentially no effect on employment per capita, and only a small effect on wage bill.
In high excess capacity counties, by contrast, we see an immediate, large, and persistent
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increase in employment for counties that received greater stimulus. The effect on wage bill
is smaller and less persistent, but also present during the height of stimulus expenditure.
Finally, in Figure IV.4, we present the plots of our semi-parametric estimates of the
effect of stimulus by excess capacity on both employment per capita and the wage bill. In
these plots, the x-axis gives county excess capacity, while the y-axis the effect of stimulus
estimated at a given point in the excess capacity distribution. As we can see from the first
panel, the employment multiplier increases weakly monotonically until excess capacity
reaches high levels, where estimates become more imprecise. The wage bill multipliers
exhibit a similar pattern, though remain more flat at lower excess capacity levels. These
results comport with our parametric findings, identifying once again substantial hetero-
geneity in the multiplier as a function of excess capacity.
IV.IV.III Placebo Tests
There is a risk that our multipliers may not reflect causal effects of stimulus but
rather the differential evolution of employment per capita and wages across counties that
would have occurred in the absence of stimulus spending. For example, if counties suf-
fering more from the recession received more money but, owing to their steeper reduction
in employment, also had larger recoveries, it is possible that ARRA expenditures could
merely reflect the depth of the crisis and the subsequent natural recovery. In order to
test if this is the case, in Table IV.3, we conduct a set of placebo tests where we regress
a number of measures of pre-ARRA changes in employment and wage bill on the total
amount of stimulus expenditure taking place in each county. In particular, we use as out-
comes the change in employment and wage bill between 2006Q1 and 2007Q1 as well as
between 2006Q1 and 2009Q1. We also use the severity in the pre-Great Recession drop in
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employment, measured as the maximum quarter-to-quarter pre-Great Recession dip (over
the period 2006Q1–2007Q4 to 2008Q1-2009Q1). All these regressions control for state fixed
effects and we present results both with and without the same cross-sectional controls used
in our primary regressions. Note that we estimate on the full set of counties, but regress
on our placebo treatment measure and that same measure interacted with a dummy for
above median excess capacity.
Out of 20 regressions, we find none with statistically significant coefficients and only
one with a coefficient significant at even the 10% level. We thus find that stimulus expen-
ditures in a county was not well predicted by evolution of employment and wages before
the passage of ARRA. As such, this evidence indicates that ARRA funding is likely not
endogenous to the evolution of employment and wages in a county.
IV.IV.IV Non-Linear Impacts of Stimulus Funds
One possible explanation for the heterogeneity in the multiplier between high ex-
cess capacity regions and low excess capacity regions is that more money was spent in
high excess capacity regions and that the multiplier increases with the amount spent. In
Table IV.4, we show that this does not explain our heterogeneity results. In particular,
we regress the employment to population ratio as well as the wage bill on the same fixed
effects and controls as used in the benchmark heterogeneous effects tables, but now in-
cluding a quadratic term in contemporaneous stimulus expenditure and for each lag of
stimulus expenditure. We drop the leads on stimulus in this specification, since they do
not impact the model much, are not very informative in this context, and prove taxing in
terms of degrees of freedom when estimated with quadratic terms. Once again, we break
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our results into pooled effects, effects in low excess capacity counties, and effects in high
excess capacity counties.
The results in Table IV.4 do not support the hypothesis that higher multipliers in high
excess capacity areas are driven in some way by increasing returns to stimulus. Within the
pooled set of counties and in each subset of counties, the point estimate of the quadratic
term in the effect of stimulus on each of employment per capita and wage bill at every level
of lag aggregation is negative. However, note that the negative quadratic terms are only
statistically significant in the pooled models. These results suggest that, if anything, there
may be diminishing returns to stimulus expenditure. However, it is worth noting that the
practical impact of this diminishing returns seems small, with substantial differences in
the effect occurring only in a relatively small number of outlier counties. Table IV.4 reports
the effect of stimulus at each of the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of actual
stimulus expenditure within each sample of counties. The nonlinearity in the effect of
stimulus implies virtually no difference in stimulus efficacy across this range.
IV.IV.V Sector Specific Multipliers
For further evidence on the mechanism behind variation in our local multipliers by
excess capacity, we show how the impact of fiscal expenditure on employment and wages
varies by sector of the local economy. Funds allocated to public sector schools, to Medi-
caid, and to other public programs are likely to increase public employment. In addition,
contracts given to manufacturing firms are likely to increase local employment in manu-
facturing. However, stimulus expenditures may also increase employment in non-tradable
sectors which did not receive federal funds through a consumption multiplier. The impact
of aggregate stimulus expenditure in the county on industry-specific employment cap-
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tures both direct contractual effects of stimulus expenditure as well as demand spillovers.
In order to shed more light on differential effects by sector, we simply re-estimate our main
regressions by industry, using the QCEW broken down by industry. Our sample size drops
slightly because in a small number of county-quarters, data on employment by industry
data is missing for disclosure reasons. Results from these regressions are available in Table
IV.5.
We first break down employment into public sector employment and private sector
employment. We estimate effects on all counties, on low excess capacity counties and on
high excess capacity counties separately. We find that the public sector employment effect
does not substantially vary across low and high excess capacity counties, consistent with
the absence of demand spillovers to public sector employment and wages. Meanwhile, the
effect for private sector employment is small and negative in low excess capacity counties
but positive and much larger in high excess capacity counties. Similar is true of the results
for wage bill. Breaking down the private sector employment effects into sub-industries,
we find that the negative employment effects in low excess capacity counties are spread
across all private industries but goods and construction, while they are spread across all
industries in the wage bill case. Point estimates of employment and wage bill multipliers
in the high excess capacity counties, meanwhile, are positive for all industries. Note that
all of these results require some interpretive caution, as the industry effect estimates are all
estimated rather imprecisely and do not achieve statistical significance.
Overall, our industry-specific results are useful for validating our approach and for
explicating the channels through which expenditure impacts employment and the wage
bill. First, they point toward stimulus crowding out private sector employment in low
excess capacity places but not in high excess capacity places. This is consistent with labor
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market slack being required for public sector employment expansion to not come at the
expense of private sector employment and is consistent with the predictions of Michaillat
(2014). Second, the fact that the larger high excess capacity multipliers are being driven
by the private sector, and especially non-tradable industries in the case of the employment
multiplier, is suggestive of the difference in multipliers being driven by demand effects.
IV.IV.VI Output Multipliers and the Effectiveness of an Optimally Allocated Stim-
ulus
In this section, we compute the number of job-years created from the contracts and
grants portion of the Obama stimulus bill and then compute the number of job-years that
would have been created had the money been spent solely in above median excess capacity
counties. We also calculate the output multipliers implied by our employment multipliers.
Our baseline estimates suggest a time-aggregated employment multiplier of 0.424
jobs per $100,000 spent. Since $261 billion were spent on the contracts and grants portion
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the portion of ARRA funding studied
in this analysis, that leaves us with 1.107 million job years created. As shown in Section
4.2 and in Boone et al. (2014), the amount of stimulus provided to an area is very weakly
correlated with the unemployment rate in the area. Under the assumption that the multi-
plier is the same in all regions, this allocation would maximize the efficacy of the stimulus.
However, in this paper, we have shown that the multiplier in high excess capacity regions
is many times greater than the multiplier in low excess capacity areas. This poor targeting
of high unemployment areas lowers the average multiplier that we estimate.
We now compute the number of jobs created if the stimulus had been optimally
spatially targeted towards high excess capacity counties. We do this using a simple back of
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the envelope calculation. We assume that there are two multipliers: one for above median
excess capacity counties and a separate one for below median excess capacity counties. We
also assume that the multipliers do not substantially change with increased expenditures.81
We do note that even if stimulus had been allocated to only above median excess capacities,
excess capacity in the above median counties would still have remained above the median.
We compute the output multiplier, following Chodorow-Reich (2017), by dividing
income per worker by cost per job. We use the year 2011 as a benchmark year since the
median ARRA dollar was spent in 2011. In 2011, income per worker was $111,400. Our es-
timated effect on employment per capita per $100,000 of stimulus expenditures per capita
was to create 0.424 jobs per capita. This translates into a cost per job of $235,850. Our em-
ployment multiplier thus translates to an output multiplier of 0.472. However, if money
had solely been allocated to above-median excess capacity counties, the multiplier would
have been 0.981 and the cost per job would have been $101,900. This implies that the as-
sociated output multiplier would have been 1.09.82 Thus the multiplier would have been
130% higher – it would have more than doubled.
This computation is revealing for two reasons. First, from a policy perspective, it
shows the importance of optimally allocating funds. Of course, optimal allocation of funds
might make bill passage more difficult. However, the welfare consequences of allocating
funds in a spatially optimal manner are large. Second, this computation makes a method-
ological point about multiplier estimation. Most macroeconomic theories are divorced
81Although the nonlinearity results do point toward eventual diminishing returns to stimulus, the negative
nonlinearities are quite weak: moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the actual stimulus distribution
has virtually no effect on the multiplier. For this reason, we view the assumption that multipliers would not
substantially change due to nonlinearities in stimulus expenditure as quite reasonable. Furthermore, optimal
reallocation to high excess capacity counties would involve reducing expenditure in at least some very high
stimulus areas where returns to marginal stimulus expenditure is negative, counterbalancing some of the
diminishing returns in other counties.
82By contrast, the implied output multiplier in low excess capacity counties is just 0.164. This figure is on
the low end of other measures of multipliers in “good times” (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018).
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from the political economy of bill passage. To the degree that the economy has a single
multiplier, this is a useful abstraction. In the presence of spatial heterogeneity in the mul-
tiplier, estimating national multipliers using national data estimates an average multiplier
rather than an employment maximizing multiplier.
IV.V Conclusion
This chapter estimates local employment multipliers and converts them into out-
put multipliers. On average, we find a jobs multiplier of 0.42, meaning that an additional
$100,000 of expenditure translates into just 0.42 additional jobs over 2 years. This jobs
multiplier yields an equivalent output multiplier of 0.47. However, this average multiplier
masks substantial heterogeneity in the multiplier by excess capacity. We both parametri-
cally and semi-parametrically estimate the multipliers as a function of excess capacity. We
find large differentials between low and high excess capacity regions. Even during the
Great Recession, we find no statistically significant, cumulative impact of public expen-
ditures on overall employment in counties below median excess capacity. The evidence
from these counties is consistent with the additional public employment largely crowding
out private employment, leading to an employment multiplier of an additional 0.15 jobs
for every $100,000 of expenditures. However, for the counties with above median excess
capacity, we find a substantially larger contemporaneous employment multiplier of 0.98
jobs per person for every $100,000. This translates into a fiscal multiplier in above median
excess capacity areas of about 1.09. We also find that multipliers do decline in the amount
spent, but only to a small degree.
The employment effects we find are surprisingly persistent, even through the end of
our sample period at the end of 2016. This persistence suggest that the gains we document
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here may understate the ultimate, long run impact of the policy. These findings of per-
sistent stimulus employment effects are also consistent with the finding of cross-sectional
hysteresis documented in Yagan (2019), who finds that the employment losses during the
Great Recession were highly persistent. By reducing the severity of employment loss from
the Great Recession, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act likely reduced the ex-
tent of labor market scarring in hard-hit counties.
Our estimates are useful for understanding when and where public funds are ef-
fective at increasing employment and output and for designing employment maximizing
stimulus programs. They also point to the importance of policies that act as automatic sta-
bilizers. The spatial heterogeneity in the multiplier further highlights an important point
in testing theories of the multiplier. The aggregate national multiplier is influenced by
the political economy of the spatial allocation of funds. Thus, estimates using national
data implicitly test a joint economic and political hypothesis. In contrast, by using spa-
tial variation in the multiplier, it is possible to compute a spatially-optimal employment-
maximizing multiplier and test an economic hypothesis unconfounded by the political
process that targets stimulus to different regions.
We hope that future work will improve upon what we have done by better rec-
onciling local multiplier estimates with national estimates. This reconciliation could be
improved in three ways. First, we have focused solely upon labor market impacts of stim-
ulus. However, stimulus could impact capital income as well. Second, our research design
cannot capture cross-county spillover effects of stimulus, and so presumably largely iden-
tifies effects on various types on non-tradable employment. However, the magnitude of
the multiplier would presumably be greater if we could incorporate effects on the tradable
sector. There could also be qualitative differences between tradable and non-tradable sec-
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tor multipliers. Finally, we have estimated our effects during the Great Recession when the
nominal interest rate on government debt was at zero. This presumably makes monetary
policy relatively ineffective but fiscal policy quite effective. Our estimates would be im-
proved if they could be generalized outside of the ZLB interest rate zone and also if they
could incorporate endogenous responses of monetary policy. We hope future empirical
work will make progress in these three ways.
Finally, we also would like to see better theoretical explanations for why the fiscal
multiplier is increasing in excess capacity. We can imagine three classes of theories focus-
ing on either the labor market, consumption, or production. In the first theory, variation in
the degree of public sector crowdout of private sector employment leads the multiplier to
be decreasing in the degree of labor market tightness (Michaillat, 2014). In the second, in
high unemployment areas, a higher fraction of individuals are liquidity constrained and
thus have higher average marginal propensities to consume, generating a larger consump-
tion multiplier and thereby a larger fiscal multiplier. Finally, in the third theory, in higher
excess capacity areas, it is easier to hire labor without accompanying capital investments
due to slack in the usage of capital. Our empirical results cannot entirely differentiate a la-
bor market tightness effect from a liquidity effect or from an excess capacity effect, though
our finding of public sector crowd out of private sector employment in low excess capacity
counties provides some suggestive evidence for the presence of a labor market tightness
effect. Given this, our paper calls on future theoretical work on the potential impact of
excess capacity on the multiplier as well as further empirical work differentiating between
the different theories of the countercyclical multiplier.
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IV.VI Figures





























2009q1 2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1 2014q1
Date
Figures shows per capita cumulative flow of stimulus awards from 2009q1 to 2014q1 in
Dollars. County population is the number of residents aged 15-64 in 2008. Timing of
stimulus expenditures is adjusted from stimulus recipient reports from www.recovery.gov.
Dollars are adjusted for inflation using the quarterly GDP deflator index from FRED, to
2009q3 Dollars.
176








Figure shows total stimulus awards per capita in Dollars, for each county. County pop-
ulation is the number of residents aged 15-64; total county stimulus is divided by this
population in 2008. Stimulus expenditures are adjusted from stimulus recipient reports
from www.recovery.gov. Dollars are adjusted for inflation using the quarterly GDP defla-
tor index from FRED, to 2009q3 Dollars.
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High excess capacity counties
Figures show cumulative effects from regressions of own-county employment per capita and own-county
wage bill per capita on own-county stimulus, with quarterly lags and leads of treatment. Stimulus expendi-
tures and the wage bill are measured in $100,000 per person. County population is the number of residents
aged 15-64. The sample is from 2006Q1 to 2016Q3. Employment and wage bill data come from the QCEW. Tim-
ing of stimulus expenditures is adjusted from stimulus recipient reports from www.recovery.gov. Coefficients
on lags and leads are (separately) summed cumulatively from event-date -1, where the effect is normalized
to 0. The sums of lags include the contemporaneous effect at event-date 0. The vertical reference line indi-
cates 2009q1. The colored line indicates the summed coefficients, while the shaded area is the associated 95%
confidence interval. Employment estimates are annualized such that coefficients should be understood as ef-
fects on job-years. Regressions control for Bartik predicted employment to population ratio, Bartik predicted
wage bill, demographic controls, state-by-time fixed effects and county fixed effects. Bartik predictions are
based upon county-level employment and wage bill averages over 2006-2007 at the three-digit NAICS level.
Demographic controls are Census 2000 estimates of percents black, hispanic, urban, and under poverty, as
well as median income and 2006 average home purchase loans and 2006 total HMDA loans per capita. All
demographic controls are interacted with a time trend. Low excess capacity is below and high excess capacity
is above the 50th percentile of county excess capacity. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Wage bill per capita
Figures show effects from semi-parametric smoothing regressions of own-county employment per capita and own-county
wage bill per capita on own-county stimulus, by excess capacity. Stimulus expenditures and the wage bill are measured
in $100,000 per person. County population is the number of residents aged 15-64. The sample is from 2006Q1 to 2016Q3.
Employment and wage bill data come from the QCEW. Timing of stimulus expenditures is adjusted from stimulus recipient
reports from www.recovery.gov. The estimates are from a non-linear interaction model where the linear regression of the
outcome on stimulus (plus controls) is estimated at each excess capacity percentile p for observations whose population-
weighted kernel-based distance is near p. The colored line indicates the estimated coefficients at each value of excess
capacity, while the shaded area is the associated 95% confidence interval. The model is estimated using county excess
capacity before the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was introduced, and these values of excess capacity are
indicated on the main x-axis. An additional x-axis is provided which indicates the associated level of excess capacity
drawn from the entire Great Recession (GR) period. It shows predicted values from a linear regression of post-GR excess
capacity on pre-ARRA excess capacity. The dashed line indicates the density of pre-ARRA excess capacity, estimated using
the Epanechnikov kernel function. The figure shows effects only up to the 95th percentile of pre-ARRA excess capacity.
Employment estimates are annualized such that coefficients should be understood as effects on job-years. Regressions
control for Bartik predicted employment to population ratio, Bartik predicted wage bill, demographic controls, state-by-
time fixed effects and county fixed effects. Bartik predictions are based upon county-level employment and wage bill
averages over 2006-2007 at the three-digit NAICS level. Demographic controls are Census 2000 estimates of percents black,
hispanic, urban, and under poverty, as well as median income and 2006 average home purchase loans and 2006 total HMDA
loans per capita. All demographic controls are interacted with a time trend. The estimates are state-cluster bootstrapped to
conduct inference.
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Figure IV.5: Time-based Effects of Stimulus, Using Time Fixed Effects Interacted with Total
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High excess capacity counties
Figures show coefficients from regressions of own-county employment per capita and own-county wage bill
per capita on own-county aggregate ARRA-stimulus fully interacted with quarterly time dummies. Stimulus
expenditures and the wage bill are measured in $100,000 per person. County population is the number of
residents aged 15-64. The sample is from 2006Q1 to 2016Q3. Employment and wage bill data come from the
QCEW. Timing of stimulus expenditures is adjusted from stimulus recipient reports from www.recovery.gov.
Coefficients are interpreted with reference to 2009q1, the omitted time-dummy. The vertical reference line
indicates 2009q1. The colored line indicates the coefficients on the stimulus--time-dummy interaction, while
the shaded area is the associated 95% confidence interval. The dashed line indicates the total flow of stimulus
awards over time, across all counties. Employment estimates are annualized such that coefficients should be
understood as effects on job-years. Regressions control for Bartik predicted employment to population ratio,
Bartik predicted wage bill, demographic controls, state-by-time fixed effects and county fixed effects. Bartik
predictions are based upon county-level employment and wage bill averages over 2006-2007 at the three-digit
NAICS level. Demographic controls are Census 2000 estimates of percents black, hispanic, urban, and under
poverty, as well as median income and 2006 average home purchase loans and 2006 total HMDA loans per
capita. All demographic controls are interacted with a time trend. Low excess capacity is below and high




Table IV.1: Main Effects of Stimulus on Employment and Wage Bill
Employment per capita Wage bill per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Time-aggregated lags
Two quarters 0.314** 0.267** 0.261** 0.206** 0.085 0.078 0.100* 0.082*
(0.083) (0.084) (0.062) (0.064) (0.058) (0.051) (0.039) (0.039)
Four quarters 0.404** 0.329** 0.342** 0.259* 0.139+ 0.108 0.148** 0.114*
(0.116) (0.121) (0.093) (0.101) (0.073) (0.066) (0.053) (0.055)
Six quarters 0.662** 0.557** 0.530** 0.421** 0.260** 0.229* 0.213** 0.184*
(0.164) (0.170) (0.123) (0.134) (0.083) (0.086) (0.070) (0.070)
Eight quarters 0.808** 0.655* 0.565** 0.424* 0.357** 0.281* 0.216* 0.172+
(0.252) (0.258) (0.167) (0.181) (0.106) (0.120) (0.093) (0.088)
Time-aggregated leads
Eight quarters 0.333 0.337 0.371+ 0.299 −0.115 −0.047 0.045 0.061
(0.278) (0.256) (0.210) (0.196) (0.277) (0.224) (0.134) (0.131)
Common time FE Y Y Y Y
State X time FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Estimates are of own-county employment and wage bill on own-county stimulus expenditures. Stimulus
expenditures and the wage bill are measured in $100,000 per person. County population is the number of
residents aged 15-64. The sample is from 2006Q1 to 2016Q3. Employment and wage bill data come from the
QCEW. Timing of stimulus expenditures is adjusted from stimulus recipient reports from www.recovery.gov.
The outcome variable is employment per capita in the four columns on the left and wage bill per capita in the
four columns on the right. Regressions are at the quarterly level, but employment estimates are annualized
such that coefficients should be understood as effects on job-years. Each column shows sums of coefficients
from a single regression. The rows under time-aggregated lags show the sum of contemporaneous results
plus subsequent lags. The row under time-aggregated leads shows the sum of coefficients from eight quarter
leads. The controls are Bartik predicted employment to population ratio, Bartik predicted wage bill, and
demographic controls. Bartik predictions are based upon county-level employment and wage bill averages
over 2006-2007 at the three-digit NAICS level. Demographic controls are Census 2000 estimates of percents
black, hispanic, urban, and under poverty, as well as median income and 2006 average home purchase loans
and 2006 total HMDA loans per capita. All demographic controls are interacted with a time trend. All
specifications include county-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table IV.2: Effects of Stimulus on Employment and Wage Bill, Sample Split by Excess Ca-
pacity
Employment per capita Wage bill per capita
All counties Low excess High excess All counties Low excess High excess
Time-aggregated lags
Two quarters 0.206** 0.087 0.423** 0.082* 0.028 0.217*
(0.064) (0.083) (0.136) (0.039) (0.045) (0.087)
Four quarters 0.259* 0.097 0.553* 0.114* 0.019 0.269+
(0.101) (0.109) (0.228) (0.055) (0.064) (0.139)
Six quarters 0.421** 0.202 0.785* 0.184* 0.077 0.412*
(0.134) (0.146) (0.302) (0.070) (0.084) (0.180)
Eight quarters 0.424* 0.148 0.981* 0.172+ 0.048 0.406+
(0.181) (0.188) (0.412) (0.088) (0.102) (0.235)
Time-aggregated leads
Eight quarters 0.299 0.113 0.266 0.061 −0.082 0.232
(0.196) (0.210) (0.407) (0.131) (0.141) (0.310)
Estimates are of own-county employment and wage bill on own-county stimulus expenditures. Stimulus
expenditures and the wage bill are measured in $100,000 per person. County population is the number of
residents aged 15-64. The sample is from 2006Q1 to 2016Q3. Employment and wage bill data come from the
QCEW. Timing of stimulus expenditures is adjusted from stimulus recipient reports from www.recovery.gov.
The outcome variable is employment per capita in the three columns on the left and wage bill per capita in the
three columns on the right. Regressions are at the quarterly level, but employment estimates are annualized
such that coefficients should be understood as effects on job-years. Each column shows sums of coefficients
from a single regression. The rows under time-aggregated lags show the sum of contemporaneous results
plus subsequent lags. The row under time-aggregated leads shows the sum of coefficients from eight quarter
leads. Regressions control for Bartik predicted employment to population ratio, Bartik predicted wage bill,
demographic controls, state-by-time fixed effects and county fixed effects. Bartik predictions are based upon
county-level employment and wage bill averages over 2006-2007 at the three-digit NAICS level. Demographic
controls are Census 2000 estimates of percents black, hispanic, urban, and under poverty, as well as median
income and 2006 average home purchase loans and 2006 total HMDA loans per capita. All demographic
controls are interacted with a time trend. Low excess capacity is below and high excess capacity is above the
50th percentile of county excess capacity. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table IV.3: Pre-Trend Validation Tests, Sample Split by Excess Capacity
No controls Controls
Low excess High excess Low excess High excess
Change in employment
2006q1–2007q1 0.033 0.018 0.003 0.056
(0.141) (0.129) (0.191) (0.143)
2006q1–2009q1 0.085 0.212 0.033 0.211
(0.142) (0.175) (0.184) (0.180)
Change in wage bill
2006q1–2007q1 −0.002 0.068 −0.006 0.065+
(0.020) (0.048) (0.028) (0.037)
2006q1–2009q1 0.003 0.007 −0.002 0.006
(0.022) (0.030) (0.031) (0.026)
GR severity (employment) −0.052 −0.015 −0.039 0.004
(0.068) (0.146) (0.067) (0.139)
Estimates are of a variety of trends in pre-ARRA outcome variables on own-county total stimulus
expenditure. Stimulus expenditures and the wage bill are measured in $100,000 per person. County
population is the number of residents aged 15-64. Employment and wage bill data come from the QCEW.
Timing of stimulus expenditures is adjusted from stimulus recipient reports from www.recovery.gov.
Outcome variables are listed along the rows. The first four rows’ variables are changes in employment per
capita or wage bill per capita between 2006q1 and 2007q1, or 2006q1 and 2009q1. The fifth row’s variable is a
measure of the severity of the Great Recession in a given county before the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act was enacted – it is the largest dip in employment per capita from any quarter in
2006q1-2007q4 to any quarter in 2008q1-2009q1, comparing only between same quarters of the year. Each
row per super-column (“No controls” vs “Controls”) is a single regression, with “Low excess” and “High
excess” specifications estimated simultaneously; each entry is interpretable as coming from a separate
(split-sample) regression. Where controls are indicated, regressions include Census 2000 estimates of
percents black, hispanic, urban, and under poverty, as well as median income and 2006 average home
purchase loans and 2006 total HMDA loans per capita. Low excess capacity is below and high excess
capacity is above the 50th percentile of county excess capacity. All regressions control for state fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table IV.4: Nonlinear Effects of Stimulus Expenditure, Sample Split by Excess Capacity
Employment per capita Wage bill per capita
All counties Low excess High excess All counties Low excess High excess
Two quarters’ cumulative lags
Linear term 0.366** 0.169 0.668* 0.161* 0.052 0.317*
(0.081) (0.120) (0.255) (0.065) (0.062) (0.148)
Quadratic term −9.865** −4.093 −24.247 −5.734* −1.391 −11.069
(3.619) (3.987) (40.514) (2.593) (2.293) (23.428)
Effect at 25th pct of stimulus 0.365** 0.169 0.665* 0.161* 0.051 0.316*
(0.081) (0.120) (0.251) (0.065) (0.062) (0.146)
Effect at 75th pct of stimulus 0.354** 0.164 0.638** 0.154* 0.050 0.304*
(0.079) (0.117) (0.213) (0.063) (0.061) (0.124)
Four quarters’ cumulative lags
Linear term 0.402** 0.146 0.692* 0.197* 0.027 0.292
(0.138) (0.152) (0.306) (0.079) (0.084) (0.199)
Quadratic term −11.094+ −3.381 −16.850 −7.408* −1.195 −5.959
(5.794) (6.227) (56.646) (3.610) (3.135) (34.146)
Effect at 25th pct of stimulus 0.401** 0.145 0.691* 0.196* 0.027 0.291
(0.138) (0.152) (0.302) (0.078) (0.084) (0.196)
Effect at 75th pct of stimulus 0.388** 0.142 0.672* 0.188* 0.026 0.285+
(0.134) (0.147) (0.251) (0.075) (0.082) (0.165)
Six quarters’ cumulative lags
Linear term 0.701** 0.351+ 1.212* 0.363** 0.155 0.579*
(0.169) (0.195) (0.464) (0.106) (0.097) (0.237)
Quadratic term −18.746* −7.698 −49.228 −12.803* −4.378 −20.406
(7.051) (7.401) (76.284) (5.068) (4.208) (44.388)
Effect at 25th pct of stimulus 0.700** 0.350+ 1.208* 0.362** 0.155 0.577*
(0.168) (0.195) (0.458) (0.105) (0.097) (0.234)
Effect at 75th pct of stimulus 0.679** 0.342+ 1.153** 0.347** 0.150 0.554**
(0.164) (0.190) (0.392) (0.101) (0.094) (0.194)
Eight quarters’ cumulative lags
Linear term 0.712** 0.249 1.584** 0.343** 0.114 0.502+
(0.243) (0.266) (0.551) (0.126) (0.127) (0.271)
Quadratic term −20.450* −5.945 −71.469 −13.457* −4.264 −14.036
(9.808) (10.596) (88.433) (5.926) (5.369) (51.624)
Effect at 25th pct of stimulus 0.710** 0.249 1.578** 0.341** 0.113 0.500+
(0.243) (0.265) (0.545) (0.126) (0.126) (0.267)
Effect at 75th pct of stimulus 0.688** 0.242 1.498** 0.326** 0.109 0.485*
(0.236) (0.258) (0.477) (0.121) (0.123) (0.226)
Please see the notes on Table IV.2 for details on sample construction and measurement. This table varies from
Table IV.2 in that for each level of time aggregation, the table reports the summed coefficients on both linear
and quadratic terms in stimulus expenditure. It also differs in that it does not include leads on stimulus. In
addition to coefficients, this table also reports the effect of stimulus at the actual 25th and 75th percentiles of
the county stimulus distribution. Regressions control for Bartik predicted employment to population ratio,
Bartik predicted wage bill, demographic controls, state-by-time fixed effects and county fixed effects.
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Table IV.5: Effects of Stimulus on Employment and Wage Bill by Industrial Sector, Sample
Split by Excess Capacity
Employment per capita Wage bill per capita
All counties Low excess High excess All counties Low excess High excess
Overall 0.424* 0.148 0.981* 0.172+ 0.048 0.406+
(0.181) (0.188) (0.412) (0.088) (0.102) (0.235)
Public sector 0.182 0.224 0.136+ 0.053+ 0.072+ 0.018
(0.118) (0.159) (0.074) (0.031) (0.039) (0.027)
Private sector 0.222 −0.098 0.792+ 0.059 −0.109 0.341
(0.176) (0.207) (0.409) (0.092) (0.122) (0.238)
Tradables 0.073 −0.003 0.284+ 0.011 −0.047 0.142
(0.094) (0.104) (0.160) (0.049) (0.052) (0.119)
Non-tradables 0.199 −0.050 0.419 0.081 −0.047 0.122
(0.140) (0.171) (0.341) (0.056) (0.085) (0.167)
Services 0.118 −0.095 0.250 0.043 −0.073 0.056
(0.105) (0.126) (0.313) (0.050) (0.070) (0.175)
Goods 0.097 0.049 0.248+ 0.031 −0.004 0.131
(0.087) (0.094) (0.140) (0.045) (0.044) (0.102)
Construction 0.115+ 0.010 0.255+ 0.016 −0.048 0.126+
(0.065) (0.067) (0.127) (0.042) (0.056) (0.069)
Estimates are of own-county employment and wage bill on own-county stimulus expenditures. Stimulus
expenditures and the wage bill are measured in $100,000 per person. County population is the number of
residents aged 15-64. The sample is from 2006Q1 to 2016Q3. Employment and wage bill data come from the
QCEW. Timing of stimulus expenditures is adjusted from stimulus recipient reports from www.recovery.gov.
The outcome variable is employment per capita in the three columns on the left and wage bill per capita in
the three columns on the right. Each estimate is the sum of a contemporaneous effect and eight quarterly lags
of stimulus. The full specification includes 8 quarterly leads of stimulus which are not reported. Regressions
control for Bartik predicted employment to population ratio, Bartik predicted wage bill, demographic
controls, state-by-time fixed effects and county fixed effects. Bartik predictions are based upon county-level
employment and wage bill averages over 2006-2007 at the three-digit NAICS level. Demographic controls are
Census 2000 estimates of percents black, hispanic, urban, and under poverty, as well as median income and
2006 average home purchase loans and 2006 total HMDA loans per capita. All demographic controls are
interacted with a time trend. Low excess capacity is below and high excess capacity is above the 50th
percentile of county excess capacity. Industries come from NAICS classifications in the QCEW. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
185
Bibliography
Alberto Abadie, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. Synthetic Control Methods for
Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Pro-
gram. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490):493–505, 2010.
Alberto Abadie, Susan Athey, Guido Imbens, and Jeffrey Wooldridge. When Should You
Adjust Standard Errors for Clustering? Working Paper 24003, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, November 2017.
Alan J Auerbach and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal
Policy. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2):1–27, 2012.
Robert J Barro and Charles J Redlick. Macroeconomic Effects from Government Purchases
and Taxes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1):51–102, 2011.
Reagan A. Baughman and Kristin Smith. The Effect of Medicaid Wage Pass-Through Pro-
grams on the Wages of Direct Care Workers. Medical Care, 48(5):426–432, 2010.
Ms Anja Baum, Mr Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Anke Weber. Fiscal Multipliers and the
State of the Economy. Number 12-286. International Monetary Fund, 2012.
Marianne Baxter and Robert G King. Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium. The American
Economic Review, pages 315–334, 1993.
Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti. An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic
Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output. the Quarterly Journal
of economics, 117(4):1329–1368, 2002.
Christopher Boone, Arindrajit Dube, and Ethan Kaplan. The Political Economy of Discre-
tionary Spending: Evidence from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, pages 375–428, 2014.
Timothy F Bresnahan and Peter C Reiss. Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets.
Journal of Political Economy, 99(5):977–1009, 1991.
Gary Burtless. Are Targeted Wage Subsidies Harmful? Evidence from a Wage Voucher
Experiment. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 39(1):105–114, 1985.
Matias Busso, Jesse Gregory, and Patrick Kline. Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency of
a Prominent Place Based Policy. American Economic Review, 103(2):897–947, April 2013.
Pierre Cahuc, Stephane Carcillo, and Thomas Le Barbanchon. The Effectiveness of Hiring
Credits. The Review of Economic Studies, page rdy011, 2018.
186
A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. Bootstrap-based Improve-
ments for Inference with Clustered Errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3):
414–427, 2008.
David Card, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber. What Works? A Meta-Analysis of Recent
Active Labor Market Program Evaluations. Journal of the European Economic Association,
16(3):894–931, 2018.
Nicholas G. Castle and Jamie C. Ferguson. What Is Nursing Home Quality and How Is It
Measured? The Gerontologist, 50(4):426–442, 2010.
Andrew T Ching, Fumiko Hayashi, and Hui Wang. Quantifying the Impacts of Limited
Supply: The Case of Nursing Homes. International Economic Review, 56(4):1291–1322,
2015.
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich. Geographic Cross-Sectional Fiscal Spending Multipliers: What
Have We Learned? Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Laura Feiveson, Zachary Liscow, and William Gui Woolston.
Does State Fiscal Relief During Recessions Increase Employment? Evidence from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
4(3):118–45, 2012.
Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. When is the Government
Spending Multiplier Large? Journal of Political Economy, 119(1):78–121, 2011.
Jeffrey Clemens and Stephen Miran. Fiscal Policy Multipliers on Subnational Government
Spending. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2):46–68, 2012.
Timothy G Conley and Bill Dupor. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: Solely
a Government Jobs Program? Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(5):535–549, 2013.
Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho, and Robin S. Lee. The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital
Mergers. Working Paper 22106, National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2016.
Mark Duggan. Hospital Market Structure and the Behavior of Not-For-Profit Hospitals.
RAND Journal of Economics, pages 433–446, 2002.
Gauti B Eggertsson. What Fiscal Policy is Effective at Zero Interest Rates? NBER Macroe-
conomics Annual, 25(1):59–112, 2011.
Gauti B Eggertsson et al. Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy.
Brookings papers on economic activity, 2003(1):139–233, 2003.
Blake Ellis and Melanie Hicken. Sick, Dying and Raped in America’s Nursing Homes.
CNN, Feb 2017.
Steven M Fazzari, James Morley, and Irina Panovska. State-dependent Effects of Fiscal
Policy. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, 19(3):285–315, 2015.
Zhanlian Feng, Yong Suk Lee, Sylvia Kuo, Orna Intrator, Andrew Foster, and Vincent Mor.
Do Medicaid Wage Pass-through Payments Increase Nursing Home Staffing? Health
Services Research, 45(3):728–747, 2010.
187
James Feyrer and Bruce Sacerdote. Did the Stimulus Stimulate? Real Time Estimates of
the Effects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.
Ronald A. Fisher. The Design of Experiments. Oliver And Boyd; London, 1925.
Andrew D. Foster and Yong Suk Lee. Staffing Subsidies and the Quality of Care in Nursing
Homes. Journal of Health Economics, 41:133 – 147, 2015.
Paul J Gertler. Subsidies, Quality, and the Regulation of Nursing Homes. Journal of Public
Economics, 38(1):33–52, 1989.
David C. Grabowski, Zhanlian Feng, Orna Intrator, and Vincent Mor. Recent Trends in
State Nursing Home Payment Policies. Health Affairs, 23(4):292–292, 2004.
David C. Grabowski, Jonathan Gruber, and Joseph J. Angelelli. Nursing Home Quality as
a Common Good. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4):754–764, 2008.
Tal Gross, Matthew J Notowidigdo, and Jialan Wang. The Marginal Propensity to Consume
Over the Business Cycle. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
Robert M. Groves, Floyd J. Fowler Jr, Mick P. Couper, James M. Lepkowski, Eleanor Singer,
and Roger Tourangeau. Survey Methodology, volume 561. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
Martin B. Hackmann. Incentivizing Better Quality of Care: The Role of Medicaid and
Competition in the Nursing Home Industry. Working Paper 24133, National Bureau of
Economic Research, August 2018.
Martin B. Hackmann and R. Vincent Pohl. Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long Term
Care. Working Paper 25178, National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2018.
Susan Harmuth and Susan Dyson. Results of the 2002 National Survey of State Initiatives
on the Long-Term Care Direct-Care Workforce. , Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute,
2004a.
Susan Harmuth and Susan Dyson. Results of the 2003 National Survey of State Initiatives
on the Long-Term Care Direct-Care Workforce. , Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute,
2004b.
Susan Harmuth and Susan Dyson. National Survey of State Initiatives on the Long-Term
Care Direct-Care Workforce: Survey Results 2005. , Paraprofessional Healthcare Insti-
tute, 2005.
Susan Harmuth and Susan Dyson. Results of the 2006 National Survey of State Initiatives
on the Long-Term Care Direct-Care Workforce. , Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute,
2006.
Charlene Harrington. Nurse Staffing in Nursing Homes in the United States: Part I. Journal
of Gerontological Nursing, 31(2):18–23, 2005a.
Charlene Harrington. Nurse Staffing in Nursing Homes in the United States: Part II. Jour-
nal of Gerontological Nursing, 31(3):9–9, 2005b.
188
Charlene Harrington. Nursing Home Staffing Standards in State Statutes and Regulations.
Continuously updated survey of state policies, available online and from the author.,
December 2010.
Charlene Harrington, John F Schnelle, Margaret McGregor, and Sandra F Simmons. The
Need for Higher Minimum Staffing Standards in US Nursing Homes. Health Services
Insights, 9:HSI–S38994, 2016.
Paul Heaton. The Effects of Hiring Tax Credits on Employment of Disabled Veterans.
Working paper, RAND National Defense Research Institute Santa Monica CA, 2012.
Human Rights Watch. ’They Want Docile’: How Nursing Homes in the United States
Overmedicate People with Dementia. , Feb 2018.
Rustam Ibragimov and Ulrich K. Müller. Inference with Few Heterogeneous Clusters.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 98(1):83–96, 2016.
Lawrence Katz. Wage Subsidies for the Disadvantaged. Russell Sage Foundation, 1998.
John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Springer,
2018.
KFF. Medicaid’s Role in Nursing Home Care, 2017.
Qi Li, Cliff J Huang, Dong Li, and Tsu-Tan Fu. Semiparametric Smooth Coefficient Models.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 20(3):412–422, 2002.
Haizhen Lin. Revisiting the Relationship between Nurse Staffing and Quality of Care in
Nursing Homes: An Instrumental Variables Approach. Journal of Health Economics, 37:
13 – 24, 2014.
Haizhen Lin. Quality Choice and Market Structure: A Dynamic Analysis of Nursing Home
Oligopolies. International Economic Review, 56(4):1261–1290, 2015.
LTCFocus. Shaping Long Term Care in America Project at Brown University funded in
part by the National Institute on Aging (1P01AG027296).
Pascal Michaillat. A Theory of Countercyclical Government Multiplier. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(1):190–217, 2014.
Edward A. Miller, Lili Wang, Zhanlian Feng, and Vincent Mor. Improving Direct-care
Compensation in Nursing Homes: Medicaid Wage Pass-Through Adoption, 1999–2004.
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 37(3):469–512, 2012a.
Edward Alan Miller, Denisa A. Tyler, Julia Rozanova, and Vincent Mor. National Newspa-
per Portrayal of U.S. Nursing Homes: Periodic Treatment of Topic and Tone. The Milbank
Quarterly, 90(4):725–761, 2012b.
Stefan Mittnik and Willi Semmler. Regime Dependence of the Fiscal Multiplier. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(3):502–522, 2012.
Enrico Moretti. Local Multipliers. American Economic Review, 100(2):373–77, 2010.
189
Emi Nakamura and Jon Steinsson. Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence from
US regions. American Economic Review, 104(3):753–92, 2014.
David Neumark. Alternative Labor Market Policies to Increase Economic Self-Sufficiency: Man-
dating Higher Wages, Subsidizing Employment, and Raising Productivity. Russell Sage Foun-
dation, 2009.
David Neumark and Diego Grijalva. The Employment Effects of State Hiring Credits.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 70(5):1111–1145, 2017.
David Neumark and Helen Simpson. Place-Based Policies. Working Paper 20049, National
Bureau of Economic Research, April 2014.
North Carolina Division of Facility Services. Comparing State Efforts to Address Recruit-
ment and Retention of Nurse Aide and Other Paraprofessional Aide Workers. , Septem-
ber 1999.
North Carolina Division of Facility Services. Results of a Follow-Up Survey to States on
Wage Supplements for Medicaid and Other Public Funding to Address Aide Recruit-
ment and Retention in Long-Term Care Settings. , November 2000.
Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute. 2007 National Survey of State Initiatives on the
Long-Term Care Direct-Care Workforce: Key findings. , 2009.
Jeongyoung Park and Sally C. Stearns. Effects of State Minimum Staffing Standards on
Nursing Home Staffing and Quality of Care. Health Services Research, 44(1):56–78, 2009.
Jonathan A Parker. On Measuring the Effects of Fiscal Policy in Recessions. Journal of
Economic Literature, 49(3):703–18, 2011.
Elena Prager and Matt Schmitt. Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from Hos-
pitals. Working Paper, 2019.
Valerie A Ramey. Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy? Journal of Economic
Literature, 49(3):673–85, 2011.
Valerie A Ramey and Sarah Zubairy. Government Spending Multipliers in Good Times
and in Bad: Evidence from US Historical Data. Journal of Political Economy, 126(2):850–
901, 2018.
Michael W. Robbins, Jessica Saunders, and Beau Kilmer. A Framework for Synthetic Con-
trol Methods With High-Dimensional, Micro-Level Data: Evaluating a Neighborhood-
Specific Crime Intervention. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 112(517):109–
126, 2017.
Christina D Romer and David H Romer. The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes:
Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks. American Economic Review, 100(3):
763–801, 2010.
Emmanuel Saez, Benjamin Schoefer, and David Seim. Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior, and
Rent Sharing: Evidence from a Young Workers’ Tax Cut in Sweden. Working Paper
23976, National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2017.
190
Willi Semmler and Andre Semmler. The Macroeconomics of Fiscal Consolidation in the
European Union. 2013.
Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato and Philippe Wingender. Estimating Local Fiscal Multipliers.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
Douglas O. Staiger, Joanne Spetz, and Ciaran S. Phibbs. Is there Monopsony in the Labor
Market? Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Journal of Labor Economics, 28(2):211–236,
2010.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Nursing Homes: Sustained Efforts Are Essential
to Realize Potential of the Quality Initiatives. GAO/HEHS-00-197, September 2000.
Michael Woodford. Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier. American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(1):1–35, 2011.
Danny Yagan. Employment Hysteresis from the Great Recession. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 2019.
191
